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Abstract
INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF INFORMATION SECURITY: CASE OF THE
INDONESIAN BANKING SECTOR

By: Muhamad Faisal Fariduddin Attar Nasution, Ph.D.

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree
of Doctor of Philosophy at Virginia Commonwealth University.

Virginia Commonwealth University, 2012

Director: Dr. Gurpreet Dhillon
Department of Information Systems

This study focuses on the institutionalization of information security in the banking
sector. This study is important to pursue since it explicates the internalization of
information security governance and practices and how such internalization develops an
organizational resistance towards security breach. The study argues that information
security governance and practices become institutionalized through social integration of
routines and system integration of relevant technologies. The objective is to develop an
understanding of how information security governance and practices in the Indonesian
banking sector become institutionalized. Such objective is built on an argument that
information security governance and practices become institutionalized through social
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integration of routines and system integration of relevant technologies. Pursuing this
study is necessary to conceptualize the incorporation of security governance and practices
as routines, the impact of security breaches on such routines, and the effects of a central
governing body on such routines altogether.
Accordingly, the concept of institutionalization is developed using Barley and
Tolbert’s (1997) combination of institutional theory and structuration theory to explain
the internalization of security governance and practices at an organizational level. Scott’s
(2008) multilevel institutional processes based on institutional theory is needed to
elaborate security governance and practices in an organization-to-organization context.
The research design incorporates the interpretive case-study method to capture
communicative interactions among respondents. Doing so provides answers to the
following research questions: (1) how institutions internalize information security
governance and practices, (2) how an external governing body affects the
institutionalization of information security governance and practices in institutions, and
(3) how security breaches re-institutionalize information security governance and
practices in institutions.
Several important findings include the habitualized security routines, information
stewardship, and institutional relationship in information-security context. This study
provides contributions to the body of literature, such as depicting how information
security becomes internalized in an organization and the interaction among organizations
engaged in implementing information security.

1

1.1.

INTRODUCTION

Prologue
This study focuses on information security institutionalization in the banking sector.

Institutionalization is a process of building a social structure that embodies concepts in
regulation and change resistance (Burrell and Morgan 1979). Unlike any other concepts,
institutionalization depicts the dynamic process of creating structure (Barley and Tolbert 1997).
The use of institutionalization is aimed at depicting how information security is governed and
practiced as routine and how radical changes or disruptions such as security breach incidents
have the possibility of disturbing the routine. The radical changes in general are usually
indicative of a problem with managing of information security in organizations. While studies
have identified good security policies (Dhillon 1997; Dhillon and Torkzadeh 2006) and
frameworks for security governance (Brotby 2009; Da Veiga and Eloff 2007; Von Solms and
Von Solms 2009), there is a lack of understanding about how security breach incidents have the
potential to impair the implementation of security policies and security governance in the long
run.
Individuals, organizations, and businesses use banks to safeguard and secure, lend, or
invest money. As the economy of a nation progresses, the banking sector and its activities
become one of the country’s fundamental economic indicators. Any nationwide economic
turbulence often results in negative impacts (e.g., reputational damage) on commercial banks.
However, such adverse impacts can be prevented or lessened by governmental intervention and
1
	
  

involvement. This can be demonstrated by clearly determining the banks’ permissible activities,
corporate structure, ownership, and maximum leverage ratios (Flannery 1998). While advances
in information and communication technologies have created opportunities for growth,
expansion and myriad other benefits for banks and their customers, such technologies pose
potential dangers and pitfalls of tremendous significance and staggering proportions.

In fact,

currently the most prevalent examples of the potentially negative impact of technology
advancement on the banking sector are electronic-banking transaction sniffing and debit card
identity theft.
A simple definition of a bank is “an institution for receiving, lending, exchanging, and
safeguarding money and, in some cases, issuing notes and transacting other financial business.”1
Keeping this definition in mind, the perception of a bank as an institution refers to an
organization with an existing synergy of norms and regulations. Furthermore, these norms and
regulations are enforced through various methods such as rewards, punishment, or supervision.
The supervisory function of a central bank ensures systematic stability, as it conducts prudential
supervision (solvency of banks), monitors transparency, and ensures correct practices (Quaglia
2008). The prudential banking supervision is a powerful tool that the central bank uses to govern
and control the functioning of commercial banks and other financial institutions. Any situation
arising out of the Central bank’s failure to supervise commercial banks or any commercial
bank’s failure to comply with regulations mandated by the central bank, results in not only
harming customers but can also trigger off a countrywide economic crisis. An example of such a
scenario is the plight of Japanese banks in the 1990s. This national crisis in the banking sector
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and colossal failure was attributed to the inadequate alignment of the Japanese banks’
governance structure to the dynamic nature of business environments in the 1980s (Kawaura
2004).
Information security in banking sector is a vibrant and interesting topic that has long been
under careful investigation by scholars, researchers, and economists alike and continues to be
pursued rigorously. The topic is such that it is a major concern for every practitioner, especially
bank personnel, governmental agencies, law enforcement and prevention agencies and the
general public alike, which comprise the wide catchment of the banking sector’s stakeholders.
Information security in the banking sector demands and necessitates one of the most
highly enforced security governances and control mechanisms due to the nature of bank
operations. The key factor of information security in banking sector is how central banks govern
and enforce sets of regulations and policies to minimize information security breaches, and how
central banks enforce the enhancement of information confidentiality, integrity, and availability.
In this respect, as the initiators, protectors and supervisors of good information security practices,
central banks should define good practices in information security, which allow commercial
banks to provide convenient and secured financial transactions and thus maintain the stability of
a nation’s macroeconomic operations and general welfare. Furthermore, commercial banks need
to abide by a set of regulations and policies enforced by the central bank which concern their
information security. A commercial bank may have its own set of standards and policies
pertaining to information security, reflecting the information security guidelines issued by the
central bank. Therefore, issues in information security governance in banking sector coincide
with issues of regulations and governance.

3
	
  

1.2.

Research Motivation
The motivation for this study is based on three facets of information security: 1) security

governance and practices that form routine actions, 2) disturbance of such routines by security
breaches, and 3) effects of central governing bodies on such routines. As such, there is a gap in
information security studies. Most studies in information security focus on the first or the second
facet. Not many studies, however, have attempted to connect security governance routines with
the impact of security breaches. The three motivational facets can be linked to the multilevel
governance in a complex institutional setting through the concept of institutionalization (Hall
2008). The banking sector provides a perfect empirical scenario, portraying a complex
institutional setting. Any activity by a commercial bank is overseen and controlled by the central
bank. For example, a commercial bank manages its information risk not only to safeguard its
information assets, but also because this action is compulsorily regulated by the central bank.
Failure to manage information risks has often caused greater damage than mere privacy
violation, mostly involving loss of financial assets (Dhillon and Moores 2001).
Studies in information security have revealed various practices, techniques, and
frameworks aimed at preserving security from a technical aspect, a behavioral aspect, or a
combination of both. Studies have also investigated various computer crimes. Most studies,
however, have not investigated how all these aspects can be intertwined into what would emerge
as a routine that is unique to one organization.
This study focuses on conceptualizing the formation of information security in an
organization as routine security behavior. Institutionalization concept introduced by Barley and
Tolbert (1997) is borrowed to capture how information security can be delineated as a daily,
4
	
  

habitual practice (routine) by members of an organization. This study therefore explores three
important aspects of information security as proposed by Dhillon and Moores (2001) and by
Dhillon (2007): technologies and technical procedures, organization and formal regulations, and
informal communication and security awareness. Extant studies rarely emphasize on combining
the three aspects.
Studies in information security have not reflected nor incorporated the idea of a central
governing body. Governance, control, and supervision by a central governing body draws upon
the simplification of prudential supervision. This study adopts the prudential banking supervision
by emphasizing the act to enforce policies, standards, and permissible activities in banks. The
application of prudential banking supervision can be perceived as a macro-institutional
phenomenon by which the central bank governs the practice of information security in
commercial banks. The application of prudential banking supervision can also be perceived as a
micro-institutional phenomenon wherein such institutionalization can be conceptualized to depict
information security governance and practices within each individual bank. Prudential banking
supervision is hence a key factor towards defining and formalizing the institution or
institutionalizing the phenomena, i.e., enforcing regulations and norms of permissible activities
in banks. This supervision effort is one such method to safeguard the unsavory impact of bank
failures, which inflict an open wound leading to severe economic losses and reputational damage
to a bank (Pennathur 2001).
Finally, studies in information security focusing on computer crimes often depict only
types of computer crimes, impacts of such crimes on organizations, and preventive and
mitigation measures undertaken by organizations. Studies implicitly acknowledge, if not openly
regard, computer crimes and security breaches as an unsubstantial implementation of information
5
	
  

security. Studies often regard computer crimes and security breaches as a separate entity that is
not integral to security practices. Even when performed by members of an organization (e.g.,
employees), computer crimes are considered subversive acts rather than a regular instantiation of
information security practices (Dhillon and Moores 2001).
This study is therefore built upon the incorporation of security governance and practices
as routines, the impact of security breaches on such routines, and the effects of a central
governing body on such routines. The fundamental concept of this study lingers between the
technology/technical aspect, organizational aspect, and informal-communication aspect. Using
institutionalization allows the viewing of security breaches as an instantiation of information
security and integration of such a view into routine security governance and practices. Security
breaches should be viewed as a radical event that provokes change within the institutionalization
(i.e., re-institutionalization) of information security (Powell and DiMaggio 1991).
Therefore, this study is developed to achieve the following objective: to develop an
understanding of how information security governance and practices in the Indonesian banking
sector become institutionalized. The argument of this study is that information security
governance and practices become institutionalized through social integration of routines and
system integration of relevant technologies. To accommodate such an objective, this study seeks
to answer the following questions:
•

How do institutions internalize information security governance and practices?

•

How does an external governing body impact the institutionalization of information
security governance and practices in institutions?

•

How do security breaches re-institutionalize information security governance and
practices in institutions?
6

	
  

1.3.

Definition

1.3.1. Information Security
Cornell University’s Legal Information Institute defines Information Security as a means
of “protecting information and information systems from unauthorized access, use, disclosure,
disruption, modification, or destruction in order to provide confidentiality, integrity, and
availability”2. Information security breaches in banking sector can be cumbersome and hence are
viewed as a crucial issue. Since it deals with financial information, a bank becomes a lucrative
target for data and information thefts. Banks manage information risk through liability transfer,
indemnification, mitigation, and retention to minimize vulnerabilities, accidents, losses, and
countermeasure effectiveness (Blakley et al. 2001). Information security practices in general
comprise of activities that deter, prevent, detect information security breaches (Straub and Welke
1998), and recover the damages attributed to lack of emphasis on information confidentiality,
integrity, and availability (Dhillon and Backhouse 2000; Page et al. 2007).
Most often, researchers focus on the technical aspects of information security such as
network security (Alfaro et al. 2008), firewall (Finne 1996), and cryptography (Rindfleisch
1997). Researchers mostly look at the management aspect of information security, focusing on
the information security policy and the management of information risks. The management
aspect of information security also deals with issues in upper management’s support, addressing
the need to support the campaign for certain standards and codes of conduct which are used to
apply controls based on the organizational and formal regulations aspect. Moreover, researchers
also agree that establishing and socializing organizational culture and norms is essential for
employees’ adaptation to attempts that reinforce controls using informal communication and
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security awareness among social agents. Specifically, Straub and Welke (1998) allude to the
importance of raising security awareness through education and training programs, in order to
progress toward the development of information systems security through risk analysis,
countermeasures, and security implementation.
This study adopts the concept of information security that embodies such concepts as the
technical aspect, management aspect, and informal communication. Reviewing these concepts in
totality provides insights into the interaction between controls based on technology and technical
procedures, formal organization, and informal communication among social agents. These
interactions provide a fundamental ground for conceptualizing information security governance.
The minute details and nitty-gritty’s of security governance practices can be explained using
institutionalization.

1.3.2. Institutionalization
Institution is defined as “a well-established and structured pattern of behavior or of
relationships that is accepted as a fundamental part of a culture”3. Examples of an institution
include marriage, higher education, and banks. Commercial banks along with the central bank
form an entity of financial institutions that engage in financial activities (Lewis et al. 2008;
McLaughlin 1999; Shull 2002) and determine the stability of a nation’s macroeconomic welfare
(Cecchetti and O’Sullivan 2003; Hellier 1999/2000; Quaglia 2008). Bank as an institution
consists of individuals who are bound under similar regulations and share similar beliefs (Stern
and Barley 1996). Tsoukas and Chia (2002) define an organization as an abstraction of
generalizing and institutionalizing human action through cognitive representations and as a
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pattern that can be shaped and constituted, and which is evolutionary in nature. Barley and
Tolbert (1997) assert that organizations can be viewed as an institution, which leads to the
conception of it being an organization consisting of a framework of rules and representations of
symbols derived from cumulative history and interaction.
The essential concept that distinguishes institution from organization is regulation, which
refers to governance or supervision. In a practical sense, bank regulations, imposed by the central
bank, regulate capital requirements, mandatory restrictions on asset choice (e.g., the use of ICT),
and deposit insurance (John et al. 2000; Laeven and Levine 2009). From a micro-institutional
perspective, the banking corporate governance body has already defined the concept of banks as
financial institutions. The board of directors and senior management are responsible for
corporate governance in a bank (Singh 2006). Hence, policies and regulations are enforced by
the board of directors and senior management of each bank. Hence, from a macro-institutional
perspective, the existence of and the supervisory activities of the central bank help refine the
concept of banks as a notion of financial institution. The policies and regulations of each bank
are based upon the policies and regulations imposed by the central bank according to the
demands of a nation’s financial situation. The enforcement of policies and regulations reflects
the strength of the central bank (Quaglia 2008).
In order for banks to avoid such malfunctions, banks need to formulate strategic use of
their information systems and pay attention to their information security. The strategic use of
information systems can be exercised by the management of information security, through the
enforcement and supervision of information security policies in banks; hence formulating and
enforcing the practice of information security governance. There are two views of information
security governance practice in banking sector: the micro-level practice or the (inter) micro9
	
  

institutional perspective, and the macro-level practice or the (intra) macro-institutional
perspective. The micro-institutional perspective views the enforcement and supervision of
information security policies in each individual bank, while the macro-institutional perspective
looks at such enforcement and supervision in a top-down approach (i.e., the enforcement and
supervision of such policies by the central bank).

1.4.

Structure of Dissertation
This study is organized as follows: chapter 2 looks at the extant literature in the fields of

information security, banking regulations, banking business and activities, and prudential
banking supervision. Points of interest include managing information risks in banking sector,
managing information security in banking sector, permissible bank activities and bank structures,
bank regulations, and prudential banking supervision, i.e., the relationship between the central
bank and commercial banks.
Chapter 3 covers the philosophical elucidation of institutional theory and structuration
theory. The institution theory is elaborated using seminal works by S. Barley (1986), W. R. Scott
(1987, 2008), and P. Selznick (1969) while the structuration theory borrows conceptual
frameworks offered by A. Giddens (1994), W. J. Orlikowski (1992, 2000), and G. Walsham
(1993). These theories together have created the concept of institutionalization using the
approach introduced by S. Barley and P. Tolbert (1997), providing a powerful theoretical
framework that can be used to explain the practice of information security governance in banking
sector. This chapter also serves to establish the theoretical framework for this study using the
institutional theory as well as the proposed research methodology.
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Chapters 4, 5, and 6 offer the theoretical case studies based on empirical data. Chapter 4
presents a case study of the institutionalization of information security in the central bank (Earl
Capita Bank), chapter 5 presents a case study of the same process in a government-owned
commercial bank (Centro Metropolitan Bank), and chapter 6 provides such case study in a
private commercial bank (Blue Sequoia Bank). Chapter 7 provides a synthesis and presents a
thorough discussion of the three case studies.
This study ends at chapter 8, which provides concluding remarks and implications for
further research and practice.
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2

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1. Introduction
This study essentially looks at how information security governance and practices are
internalized in an organization. In doing so, this chapter presents concepts that reflect the socioorganizational orientation of information security (Dhillon and Backhouse 2001), emphasizing
on a behavioral perspective of information security. The socio-organizational orientation of
information security looks at the synergy between technical controls that direct technology use
and technical procedures, formal controls that focus on formal organizational aspect such as
policies and regulations, and informal controls that emphasize the importance of informal
communication aimed at raising security awareness. These three controls comprise the securitycontrol dimensions (Dhillon and Moores 2001; Dhillon 2007). Information security governance,
which is the most important concept in this study, introduces frameworks that direct the
implementation of information security and incorporates the three security-control dimensions.
The frameworks in general suggest managing information risk (Blakley et al. 2001;
Brenner 2007) and information security policy (Herath and Rao 2009; Hong et al. 2006).
Literatures are selected to cater to information-security studies that focus on behavior and social
interaction, including those that explore ethics in information security (e.g., Dhillon and
Backhouse 2000; Workman and Gathegi 2007) and security policy compliance (e.g., Bulgurcu et
al. 2010; Moulton and Coles 2003).
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Most literature, however, regard security breach as a menace and an aberration. Scholars
do not consider security breach an integral component of information security and often do not
include breach in theoretical frameworks they develop. In addition, many literatures in
information security governance confine governance in an internal system and do not recognize
external formal body that may have significant influence on internal governance. This study
seeks to bridge such gaps by reviewing and finding connections between security literature and
other relevant literature. Some literature from banking theories and concepts are revisited to
provide better understanding of banking governance.
This chapter aims to revisit literature in information security governance and literatures in
behavioral information security. Section 2.2 presents various views of information security
governance. These views focus on the fundamental issues and concepts in information security
and information risk, information security policy, and information security governance in
banking sector. These concepts will be formulated as components of the theoretical framework
that builds the thesis for this study, as depicted in section 2.3 and 2.4 that conclude this chapter.

2.2. Information Security Governance
Governance is generally “an inherently social, relational phenomenon” (Hall 2008, p. 4).
Scholars have attempted to define (corporate) governance (Brotby 2009; Hall 2008; Von Solms
and Von Solms 2009). Brotby (2009, p. 5) defines governance as:
“The set of responsibilities and practices exercised by the board and executive management with the
goal of providing strategic direction, ensuring objectives are achieved, ascertaining that risks are
managed appropriately, and verifying that the enterprise’s resources are used responsibly.”
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A definition by Von Solms and Von Solms (2009, p. 2) depicts governance as a set of
activities that “(1) direct, or plan, or establish responsibilities, and (2) control outcomes, or
ensure implementation, or enforce compliance.” They also argue that risk management is one of
the essential factors to be considered in corporate governance. Schooner and Taylor (2009)
denote that the corporate governance standard emphasizes that bank management assumes the
sole responsibility to conduct business, and not the supervisory agencies. Flannery (1998) asserts
the importance of assessing the institution’s condition and implementing any disciplinary action
when necessary.
The concept of governance by an external-central body occurs as a result of a system of
multilevel governance (Hall 2008). This implies a set of corporate governances within each
institution governed by a superior institution that assumes higher power. Hall (2008) has
introduced the deontic power and constitutive power of central bank as a denominator of the
higher hierarchy in the banking social system. These powers bestow the central bank the capacity
for macro-prudential supervision, which is “the monitoring and assessment of risks to the
stability of the financial system as a whole” (Krauskopf and Steven 2009, p. 1174).
The conceptualization of prudential supervision is dependent upon the existence of the
central bank. The central bank is a higher, regulatory authority as denoted by Hall (2008):
“Possession of either or both of these forms of independence leaves the central bank in command of
enormous authority over, for example, the domestic money supply and the supply and price of shortterm credit to the banking sector, as well as the price of money in the short-term money markets. It
also permits central banks to delegate authority to other actors, including private sectors in the
financial markets.”
R. B. Hall (2008, pp. 1-2)
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The consensus view of the central bank is that this institution is responsible for maintaining
price stability by keeping inflation low and stable (Ising 2009). Hall (2008) denotes that the
central bank possesses “deontic powers.” Such possession means that “the powers of central
banks, in the same fashion, are uniformly deontic powers in the form of rights, duties,
obligations, authorizations, permissions, empowerments, requirements, and certifications that
endow the central bank with social and economic power as a result of the collective assignment
of its status functions” (Hall 2008, p. 57). Hall borrows the concept of deontic power from
deontology, which is “the science of duty; that branch of knowledge which deals with moral
obligations; ethics” (Hall 2008, p. 49). Hall further implies that the deontic power of central bank
is a manifestation of power arising from social relations of a specific form of constitution, which
is one that results from collective assignment of status functions. Hence the central bank also
possesses constitutive power resulting from status functions of the bank as a government agency,
lending it the authority to “(1) socialize risk, (2) determine the level of national wealth held in
reserves in the form of foreign exchange, and (3) determine how many of these reserves to
expend to uphold the exchange rate when it comes under pressure” (Hall 2008, p. 96). Quaglia
(2008) examines the strength of the central bank and measures such strength in terms of tangible
and intangible resources (e.g., credibility, expertise, and international ties), and existing policy
competences. In addition to Hall’s (2008) deontic power and constitutive power, Silva and
Backhouse (2003) introduce two types of power that emerge from social conditioning. The first
type, dispositional power, resembles Hall’s (2008) deontic power, accumulating from social
integration. The second type, facilitative power, is a power that endows an entity with the
capacity to persuade or force other entities to behave accordingly.
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The first type of literature in information-security governance

is one that deal with

governance frameworks. Wibowo and Batra (2010) introduce an information-security
governance framework that incorporates internal and external threats and note the damages
caused by any security breach involving such a framework. Dos Santos Moreira et al. (2008)
develop an information security governance framework based on the decision-making structure
which prevails in information systems, containing operational level (daily activities), tactical
level (review/follow-up), and strategic level (annual reviews, establishing policies, and
organization view). The framework reflects policy controls, process of implementing controls,
people who are responsible for the policy controls, and the technology used for implementing
policy controls. Da Veiga and Eloff (2007) provide a more detailed framework for information
security governance. This framework highlights the technology, processes, and people aspects,
specifically comprising the strategic framework (e.g., sponsorship, strategy, and risk
management), managerial and operational framework (e.g., security management and
organization, security policies, user security management) and technical framework (e.g., system
development, incident management, technical operations, physical and environmental, and
business continuity).
Another type of security-governance literature looks at other details of the security
governance framework, particularly through the assessment of model and outcomes. Brotby
(2009) details six outcomes that information security governance needs to achieve for it to be
accepted as desirable. These outcomes are (1) strategic alignment between security activities and
business strategy, (2), risk management, (3) business process assurance/convergence, (4) value
delivery with a view of optimizing investments in support of business objectives, (5) resource
management, and (6) performance measurement. Von Solms and Von Solms (2009) introduce a
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model for information security governance, consisting of (1) three levels of management
(strategic level or board and executive management, tactical level or senior and middle
management, and operational level or lower management and administration), (2) direct part of
the cycle from the strategic level to the operational level (the top-down cycle), (3) execution part
by the operational level, and (4) control part of the cycle going from the operational level to the
strategic level (the bottom-up cycle).
Studies have found the executive and top management’s involvement to have significant
impact on information security governance (Dutta and McCrohan 2002; Khalfan and Alshawaf
2004; Knapp et al. 2006). Ward and Smith (2002) state that access control policies for
information systems should follow corporate governance guidelines and risk management
strategies. They propose that information security policies should be implemented through
information security responsibilities, management accountability policy, and other baseline
access control security policies within individual and distributed systems. Von Solms (2001)
creates a direct link between corporate governance and information security, emphasizing issues
in corporate information security and the necessity to include information security in corporate
governance documents. Von Solms (2005) also states that in order to create effective information
security governance, implementation should be supported by good practices in IT governance
and corporate governance. The implementation should be conducted by not only the IT
department, but also the Information Security Compliance Management Department. Von Solms
and Von Solms (2006a) develop a framework for information security governance depicting the
direction, execution, and control of management levels of information security, including
strategic, tactical, and operational. They emphasize the need for the board to control (manage)
the organization effectively in order to ensure sound information security governance. Von
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Solms and Von Solms (2006 b) also emphasize that boards and executives should pay particular
attention to issues in information security even if they pose no immediate danger or imminent
risk, as a general practice in information security governance.
Other studies investigate the direct role and impact of executive and top management.
Posthumus and Von Solms (2004) underline the importance for executive management,
including the board and CEO, to carefully consider issues in information security and encourage
the need to integrate information security in corporate governance through a sound information
security governance framework. Moreover, Moulton and Coles (2003) define corporate
governance as a managerial attempt to efficiently manage a corporation and exploit its resources
and an attempt to balance power between managers and investors. In the context of information
security governance, they add that corporate governance should consider (1) security
responsibilities and practices, (2) strategies/objectives for security, (3) risk assessment and
management, (4) resource management for security, (5) compliance with legislation, regulations,
security policies and rules, and (6) investor relations and communications’ activity (as related to
security). McFadzean et al. (2007), unfortunately, contend that management only pays attention
to information security if the strategic information systems are considered important for the well
being of the organization and there is an imminent risk or threat to information.
Information security governance requires active participation of not only the CISO and his
team, but also the board and the CEO of the organization. For instance, information security
governance requires participation, and even intervention, by higher authorities. Information
security governance depicts the synergy between people, organization, technology, and strategy.
Scholars agree with the concept that information security governance is the control of
information security policies and regulations, reflecting the good corporate practices of an
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organization (Mishra 2009). The governance, however, involves controls of managers
(management) by boards, boards by stakeholders, and stakeholders by management (Von Solms
and Von Solms 2006). Information security governance is therefore an effective and efficient
mechanism to ensure the interaction between social actors and their wider social systems. Most
studies, however, do not consider how security governance is driven by external factors other
than security breaches. These studies often focus on internal factors such as the role of executive
and top management, risk management, security rules and policies, and framework. Identifying
such gap, this study seeks to explore a level that involves an interaction between social actors in
an internal institution and an external governance body in the wider social system.

2.2.1. Information Security: Fundamental Issues and Applications in Banking Studies
Studies often focus only on the technical perspective of information security. These studies
look at the design and application tools for information security and hence define security as a
tangible and concrete concept (Baskerville 1993; Dhillon and Backhouse 2001). Nowadays,
scholars have begun to consider the non-technical perspectives of information security, i.e., the
socio-organizational perspective (Dhillon and Backhouse 2001). The scholars studying these
aspects advocate that while technology is important, organizational and human factors also
significantly contribute to the success of information security (Dutta and Roy 2008). Some of
these scholars often refer to risks when discussing information security (Blakley et al. 2001;
Jones 2007). Some scholars have linked information security to the values of confidentiality,
integrity and availability of information (Anderson 2003; Dhillon and Backhouse 2000). Dhillon
and Backhouse (2000) extend the notions of confidentiality, integrity, and availability of
information security to responsibility and knowledge of roles, integrity (as a requirement of
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membership), trust (which is distinct from control), and ethicality (as opposed to rules).
Anderson (2003) presents information security as an assurance of a balanced information risks
and controls. Kulczycki (1997) defines information security as all activities undertaken to
safeguard assets, which includes financial and accounting responsibility as well as intangible
valuables (e.g., proprietary product information, intellectual property, and basic computer system
integrity). Kulczycki further contends that advances in information and communication
technologies have caused data and information to become more powerful and easier to
manipulate and hence there is a need for more potent, advanced technology to protect the data
and information.
Dutta and Roy (2008) express that information security involves an intertwining of
technical, organizational, and behavioral factors. Hazari et al. (2008) believe that in informationsecurity, organizational and behavioral factors are contrived upon the employees’ integrity and
commitment to safeguarding their organizational assets and interest. Moreover, Hazari et al.
(2008) notice that the integrity of these individuals is influenced by attitude, subjective norm,
and perceived behavioral control. In his paper, Dhillon (2001) denotes the use of formalized
rules in the form of security policies, normative controls such as culture, value or belief system,
and monitoring of employee behavior. Dhillon argues that the act of breaching information is
performed as a result of the combination of an individual’s behavioral and normative beliefs.
Rhee et al. (2005) take a different direction while investigating information-security related
behavioral factors by demonstrating that the users’ optimistic bias in their risk perceptions about
information security has a relation to the perception of controllability. Rhee et al. argue that
individuals tend to believe that negative events are less likely to happen to them than to others.
With respect to information security breach in banking sector, several scholars have attributed
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such breaches to insider threat (Dhillon 2001; Dhillon and Moores 2001). Albrechtsen (2007)
denote that employees’ security awareness and cautious behavior play an important role in
information security performance of organizations, particularly banks. The security awareness
and causes behavior can be improved by using the user-involving approach, whereby employees
are engaged in various awareness activities such as participation in information security
workshops. In a similar argument, Stinchcombe (2006) states that 70% of security breach cases
occur from within organizations. Stinchcombe also brings to the managers’ attention several
factors that contribute to information security breaches. These issues are password leakages and
misuse , identity theft, phishing, spamming, etc.
In terms of the attack method, Botha and Solms (2001, 2002) note various ways in which
hackers attempt to breach security of information in corporations, government and banks. They
contend that insiders often perform non-malicious attack attempts while outsiders may conduct
both non-malicious and malicious attack attempts (2001). They also introduce the proactive
identification model (PAIM), a fuzzy methodology to combat hacking proactively (2002).
Kaleem and Ahmad (2008) conduct a survey of bankers’ perception of electronic banking
and find that bankers in Pakistan perceive electronic banking as a tool that minimizes
inconvenience, reduces transaction costs, and saves time. However, Kaleem and Ahmad also
opine that bankers have a perception that electronic banking opens a security hole, allowing
government access to public data, increasing the chances for fraud and reducing the level of
security. Castiglione (2002) argues that despite the fact that banks successfully protect their
information assets in the Internet realm using passwords, firewalls, encryption, etc., they,
overlook the non-technical information security aspects such as trashcans, photocopiers or
employee desks. Miller and Engemann (1996) introduce the Information Security Management
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Planning (ISMP) program to proactively identify and analyze resources that are vulnerable to
risks. They emphasize on the importance of proactive involvement of the management. Tsaih et
al. (2008) support this notion by extending the importance to even non-information technology
managers. They use a study of a bank’s loan process, which involves non-information
technology managers dealing with safeguarding gaps of physical information assets and their
digital formats, as well as the information-processing infrastructure to arrive at this conclusion.
Accordingly, this study takes the view that information security is a socio-organizational
instance that requires intensive and complex interaction between technology, organizational, and
individual behavior. IT security has been mistakenly styled as information security, with the
former being a mere technological artifact that secures the information asset of an organization.
The view of technological aspect, however, is not sufficient to describe information-security
concept since the technological aspect restricts the dynamic of social interaction, which is
constructed by human interactions, whether in a non-formal, non-hierarchical setting or in an
organizational setting (Dhillon and Backhouse 2001). Moreover, the organizational setting
demands more attention since human interactions in organizational setting are defined and
formalized within well recognized norms and goals. In addition, the organizational setting
distinguishes the roles of its individual members.

2.2.2. Information Risk
Information risk is an essential component of information security governance. In relation
to the banking concept, information risk is a subset of operational risk. Studies in banking
concept and theory do not directly point out information risk. Governance and control studies in
information security and in banking sector have stated that risk management is an essential
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component of corporate governance. This subsection aims to create a connection between
information risk that has been extensively investigated in information security studies and
operational risk that is one of risk factors in banking concept and theory. By first looking at how
operational risk is defined in banking concept and theory, one can see how information risk can
be positioned in banking concept and theory.
Banks are exposed to various types of risks, which are mainly categorized into four areas:
financial, credit, market, liquidity, operational, business, and event risks (Van Greuning and
Brajovic Bratanovic 2000; Gupta 2009; Jarrow 2008). The impediment of technology is usually
related to the obstruction of operational risk management (Schooner and Taylor 2009). Schooner
and Taylor (2009, p. 174) details operational risk as following:
“It thus includes situations involving fraud, e.g., when traders deliberately falsify information, management
failure, and inadequate procedures and controls. Technical errors may be due to breakdowns in information,
transaction processing, settlement systems, or more generally, problems in operations that deal with the recordkeeping of transactions and the reconciliation of individual trades with the firm’s aggregate position (typically
refered to as the back office functions).”

Issues in information systems are a major concern in operational risk. Studies that
investigate information security in banking sector often refer to the problematic concept of
information risk and various applications of such an issue. Flores et al. (2006) explain the
socialization and enforcement of Basel II norms on the measurement and control of operational
risk and the bank’s effort to comply with these new requirements within their existing
information systems. They propose to use a socio-technical approach that involves the personnel,
IT systems (including information risk), organizational structures, and internal controls in order
to diminish such a gap. Scholars have linked information risk to information security breaches
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and procedures to prevent these breaches. Brenner (2007) states that ISO 27001 is an
international standard that aids information risk management by implementing and monitoring
strong security controls. Von Solms and Von Solms (2009) introduce a variety of frameworks
that can be used as a basis for information security policies (e.g., COBIT, ISO 27001, ISO
27002). Ryan and Bordoloi (1997) identify main causes of information security breaches, often
including viruses/bombs/worms, inadequate or non-existent logon security, access to data/system
by outsiders, loss due to inadequate backups or log files, uncontrolled read and/or update access,
uncontrolled user privilege levels, accidental data destruction by employees, and inadequate
audit trails. Maguire (2002) states that there are many areas of potential risk during the system
development process, and hence this process needs to be carefully analyzed and managed. He
identifies potential behaviors and circumstances that result in vulnerability of information to
security breaches, including:
1. Use of previously unused platform (failure to deal with known or unknown bugs).
2. Multitasking capabilities (inability to handle user numbers and response times).
3. Changes in the development team (several project managers).
4. Lack of rigorous testing (inability to test in a “live” environment).
5. System development methodology (inappropriate application leading to divergent
approaches).
6. Number of stakeholders (failure to satisfy the system requirements of the
disparate groups).
7. Immovable end date.
8. Limited access to users (lack of analysis in business areas).
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9. Consultancy support (several suppliers of consultancy with separate aims and
objectives).
10. Local business requirements (failure to reconcile separate design needs).
11. System changeover (lack of contingency planning).
12. Lack of availability of qualified staff.
Straub and Welke (1998) suggest the importance of raising security awareness through
education and training, and progress towards the development of information systems security
through risk analysis, countermeasures, and security implementation.
The effectiveness of information security risk is strongly dependent upon the efficient
management of information security. McFadzean et al. (2007) contend to this notion by stating
that the effective management of information security is accomplished by acknowledging the
strategic importance of information systems within the organization and is enhanced by how risk
is perceived. Adding to this concept, Bodin et al. (2008) argue that the Chief of Information
Security Officer (CISO) needs to recognize and understand the nature of risk. They present three
measures to determine and capture various aspects of information security risk. They further
denote that risk involves multiple dimensions and meanings within the context of information
security. Moreover, according to Blakley et al. (2001), risks of information security breaches can
be technically managed through liability transfer, indemnification, mitigation, and retention, and
information security risk control can be measured through vulnerabilities, incidents, losses, and
the effectiveness of countermeasures. They also suggest that management of information risk
emphasizes on reporting, the analysis of information risk, and the evaluation of information
security technology. In addition, Jones (2007) recommends the development of a framework for
information security risk assessments within an organization. Risk framework should therefore
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consist of phases that include risks identification (e.g., compliance with standards and
regulations, and risk ownership), risks assessment (e.g., risk modeling and testing), risks
treatment (e.g., prioritization of risk mitigation), and risks monitoring and reporting.	
  
Information security breaches can also be caused by employees. Scholars have
acknowledged security breaches resulting from insider threat. For instance, Dhillon and Moores
(2001) assert that computer crimes are often conducted by employees or insiders, and should
therefore be prevented and controlled at the very least. They discuss two case studies of
computer-crime scandals involving employees of respectively the Kidder Peabody & Co and the
Daiwa Bank. Aldhizer III (2008) seconds this finding by presenting facts presented by
PriceWaterhouseCoopers (PWC) Global State of Information Security Study in 2007 which finds
that 69% of database breaches are caused by people inside the organizations. He propogates
another measure to safeguard the insider risk by implementing centralized and automated
identity and access management (IAM) controls. Several studies have provided solutions and
frameworks to predict and deter insider threat as well as to safeguard information assets. Schultz
(2002) presents framework and models dealing with insider attack-related behaviors. Workman
and Gathegi (2007) find that punishment and ethics training can be effective in mitigating threats
to information and communication technologies by employees. However, the effectiveness of
these efforts relies heavily on the underlying motivations of the employees.
Information risk as part of operational risk needs to undergo ongoing evaluation by key
players in order to avoid losses, particularly catastrophic losses. This effort requires internal
controls, as well as risk monitoring and mitigation, inscribed in the bank policies and procedures;
all of which are an essential component of information security governance. Overall, the role of
regulatory or supervisory authorities is important in order to govern and monitor the practice of
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risk management (Adeleye et al. 2004). Therefore, risks of security breach (i.e., information risk)
are inherent in the use of technology, and hence can be considered issues in operational risk. As
with the management of operational risk, the management of information risk requires
participation and involvement of key players in a bank (Van Greuning and Brajovic Bratanovic
2000; Fragniere et al. 2010; McFadzean et al. 2007; Dutta and McCrohan 2002; Khalfan and
Alshawaf 2004; Knapp et al. 2006). Information risk can be viewed mostly as a risk that may
harm or lead to the misuse of information by relying on inappropriate access to information and
communication technologies belonging to a certain organization (Blakley et al. 2001). The most
threatening risks, are those posed by insiders, who are employees of the organization or are
closely connected to these employees. Various standards and frameworks (e.g., ISO 27001 and
COBIT) have been prescribed to safeguard information from these threats. Therefore, the
management of information risk resembles the management of operational risk whereas the role
of the executive management and regulatory or supervisory authorities is necessary for success.
Scholars agree that information risk can be effectively decreased only through management
support. Top management or executive support therefore sustains the development of sound
information systems security, enhances the adherence of organizational culture to good security
practices, and increases the level of enforcement of existing security policies (Dutta and
McCrohan 2002; Khalfan and Alshawaf 2004; Knapp et al. 2006).
Studies in information security in banking sector have asserted the importance of managing
and mitigating information risk and highlighted how failure to do so can cause a calamity in the
victim organization. Studies in banking concept and theory however do not recognize
information risk and do not associate information risk with operational risk. Furthermore, studies
in information security in banking sector do not directly state that information risk is a
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component of operational risk. This subsection aims to position information risk in studies in
banking concept and theory. By doing so, this subsection has discovered regulatory frameworks
(e.g., Basel II and ISO 27001) to manage and mitigate information risks in banking sector.

2.2.3. Information Security Policy
One of the essential concepts in corporate governance is the formulation and
implementation of policies and regulations. Bank regulators govern and control the formal
responsibility of banks to protect the interests of legal stakeholders (Singh 2006). Quaglia (2008)
contends that policy competences affect the central bank’s ability to influence the change of
supervisory arrangements. Central banks have mostly governed the monetary policy as an
attempt to stabilize the nation’s economic welfare but tend to overlook the supervision and
governance of particular policies related to operational risk (Aguiar and Martins 2008; Batini
2007; Christiano et al. 2008; Ising 2009; Lees 2007). Nevertheless, the actions taken concerning
the monetary policy are similar to those taken for other regulatory measures (Ising 2009). Lamy
and Moyer (1995) state that the assessment and development of banking regulation needs to take
into consideration the perspective of various parties involved: the banking industry, the banking
regulators, and the banking consumer. Yang and Zhang (2007) contend that the new anti-money
laundering regulations in China impose more severe punishment than do the old regulations.
They also state that the new regulations help reduce the likelihood of breaches by imposing
stringent requirements of client identity recognition, retention of client identity documents and
trading records, and reporting of large-sum transactions and suspicious transactions.
Issues pertaining to top management support of information security necesitate the need to
include issues in information security policy (Hong et al. 2006; Fulford and Doherty 2003).
28
	
  

Information security as part of the information technology plans needs to be directed and
formulated. Smith and Jamieson (2006) define information security policies as policies that
ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information and assets through protection
from theft, tampering, manipulation, or corruption. Chandra (2008) states that the initiation of
information security policies denotes management’s commitment to advance and safeguard
information as an asset. Ross (2008) seconds this notion as he states that information security
policies and standards depict management’s objective. Knapp et al. (2009) conduct an
exploratory study to develop a practice-based organizational model for a comprehensive
information security policy for organizations. Knapp et al. also categorize information security
policy based on policy management and organizational environment.
Doherty and Fulford (2006) argue that carefully and explicitly aligning information
security policy and strategic information system plans enhance the security of the information
systems. They find that there is a strong impact of a carefully designed information security
policy on the planning of strategic information systems. Knapp et al. (2006) find that top
management support has a significant impact on the enforcement of information security policy
as well as on the organization’s security culture. Whitman (2003) quotes findings by scholars
which indicate that only half of the surveyed organizations had effectively designed and enforced
information security policy and 90% of those organizations ironically detected computer security
breaches within the past 12 months. He implies that IT executives identified information security
as a necessary component but not as a critical issue and that information security has been
constantly ignored by top management. However, Doherty and Fulford (2005) find no significant
relationship between the formulation and implementation of information security policies and the
incidence of information security breaches. They attribute this anamoly to factors such as
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difficulties of raising awareness, difficulties of policies enforcement, policy standards being too
complex, inadequate resources, and failure to tailor policies. In relation to information security
policy, Vroom and Von Solms (2004) state that auditing the employee behavior with regard to
policy compliance is difficult and suggest a less structured and more informal approach by
looking at the organizational culture. Bulgurcu et al. (2010) examine the antecedents of
employee compliance with information security policy in an organization and discover that the
effects of attitude, normative beliefs, and self-efficacy in an employee’s intention to comply are
significant.
Baskerville and Siponen (2002) enunciate the importance of security policy formulation,
particularly in an emergent organization, to the implementation and development of information
systems security. Baskerville and Siponen argue that the use of meta-policy is important for the
implementation and development of information security, particularly the use of information
security policy in an emergent organization. Cuppens and Cuppens-Boulahia (2008) connote that
requirements and context are extra conditions that demand specific treatment, whereby
information security policy can be applied. Herath and Rao (2009) develop a framework for
information security compliance in organizations. An important finding of this study is that there
is a strong connection between social influence and organizational commitment, and policy
compliance intention. Hong et al. (2006) develop a summary of procedures for building
information security policies, which include security policy development and security awareness
and policy education.
Information security policy is a necessary determinant of how information security should
be formulated and adopted to prevent and deter security breaches. Information security needs to
reflect the strategic formulation and implementation of the holistic information systems of the
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organization. Therefore, the existence of top management and executive support contributes to a
clear and precise formulation and adoption of information security policies. Information security
policies may exist as rules, permissions, prohibition, obligation, or dispensation to ensure good
practices of organizational information security and should hence be defined and formulated by
information security meta-policies to maintain consistency and stability (Cuppens and CuppensBoulahia 2008; Baskerville and Siponen 2002). In addition, information security policies need to
be precise and concise, and should be introduced and socialized in order to be effectively
adopted and implemented in organizations. This is because employees’ policy compliance
attitudes are often influenced by threat perception, organizational commitment and self-efficacy.

2.3. Summary and Discussion
“Information Security Governance (ISG) consists of the management commitment and leadership,
organizational structures, user awareness and commitment, policies, procedures, processes,
technology and compliance enforcement mechanisms, all working together to ensure that the
confidentiality, integrity, and availability (CIA) of the company’s electronic assets (data,
information, software, hardware, people, etc.) are maintained at all times.”
S. H. Von Solms and R. Von Solms (2009, p. 24)

Based on the literature review, this section aims to conceptualize and synthesize distributed
concepts of governance elicited from banking studies and security governance studies. The
ultimate aim is to discover the intersection between such concepts in a wider social system such
as banking sector. The literature unfolds the concept of two-level governance that is extensively
present in the banking sector. Of the two types of governance, studies in banking concepts and
theories introduce the macro-institutional perspective of corporate governance, termed as macro31
	
  

prudential supervision. This type of governance is controlled by the central bank, resulting from
the central bank’s possession of deontic power, constitutive power (Hall 2008; Krauskopf and
Steven 2009), and facilitative power (Silva and Backhouse 2003).
The concept of information security governance is essentially similar to the concept of
conventional corporate governance. Da Veiga and Eloff (2007), Knapp et al. (2006), and Dos
Santos Moreira et al. (2008), have emphasized the importance to exercise control and regulative
authorities to achieve strategic objectives. Schooner and Taylor (2009), and Von Solms and Von
Solms (2006a) second this notion by stressing the importance of management in exercising direct
internal control to achieve strategic objectives. Schooner and Taylor (2009, pp. 105-106) state
that:
“Corporate governance involves a set of relationships between a company’s management, its board,
its shareholders, and other stakeholders. Corporate governance also provides the structure through
which the objectives of the company are set, and the means of attaining those objectives and
monitoring performance are determined. Good corporate governance should provide proper
incentives for the board and management to pursue objectives that are in the interests of the
company and its shareholders and should facilitate effective monitoring. The presence of an effective
corporate governance system, within an individual company and across an economy as a whole,
helps to provide a degree of confidence that is necessary for the proper functioning of a market
economy.”

Schooner and Taylor (2009) have indentified key players in banking corporate governance.
These key players are the bank’s board of directors, senior management, shareholders, customers
and other relevant stakeholders. In light of the information security governance, many of the key
players for the banking corporate governance are the same personnel accompanied by additional
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stakeholders. Indeed, key players do play an important role as well in ensuring sound
information security governance. Information security scholars have emphasized the importance
of executives or top management as participants and involved members in the management of
information security. Von Solms and Von Solms (2009) specify these key members as the board
of directors, senior executives, steering committee, and the CISO. Each of these key players has
an important role in accomplishing sound information security governance. Furthermore, these
key players constitute the upper-stratum in the inter-level view of information security
governance.
Risk is an important aspect that needs to be considered and handled in corporate
governance, as well as in information security governance. Strategic actions and controls need to
be performed by key players in order to achieve desirable outcomes. Both banking corporate
governance concept and information security governance concept entail the damaging impact of
risk as a result of ineffective governance. Scholars have identified the results of such issue,
leading to other harmful effects on the nation’s economic stability (Malkawi and Malkawi 2007;
Penn 2005; Yang and Zhang 2007). Banking corporate governance concept has identified risk
caused by the use of technology as part of operational risk. Regulatory authorities have created
the Basel II as a guideline for managing operational risk in banks. Such a guideline, however, is
geared toward the management of general activities in operational risk. However, aspects of both
operational and information risk management emphasize the following: measurement and
identification of risk, strategic actions and direct control by key players, and ongoing risk
evaluation (McFadzean et al. 2007; Blakley et al. 2001; Jones 2007; Stone and Marotta 2003;
Van Greuning and Brajovic Bratanovic 2000; Fragniere et al. 2010). Ongoing evaluation
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includes raising awareness through education and training (Straub and Welke 1998; Workman
and Gathegi 2007).
The use of technology, particularly IT, is an important aspect of information security
governance. Improper use of technology and lack of risk socialization by insiders may harm the
institution (Flores et al. 2006; Hall 2008; Van Greuning and Brajovic Bratanovic 2000; Schooner
and Taylor 2009). Despite the fact that IT plays an important role in effective and efficient
banking operations, the improper and unethical use of IT by insiders may prove
counterproductive (Dhillon 2001; Castiglione 2002; Dhillon and Moores 2001; Kaleem and
Ahmad 2008). Scholars conclude that IT and security need to be regulated and should therefore
conform to the standard notion of security: confidentiality, integrity, and availability (Dhillon
and Backhouse 2000; Anderson 2003; Brotby 2009).
Another important aspect of corporate governance is the effect of regulations and policies
(Singh 2006). Regulations and policies are key components of an institution, and the creation and
the enforcement of these produce the effect of institutionalization. The central bank, acting as a
regulatory and supervisory authority, is responsible for creating and enforcing regulations and
policies for banks and other financial institutions to adhere to. Despite the implementation of
Basel II, the central bank seems to take for granted the implementation of regulations and
policies for the prevention of operational risk, particularly information risk. Scholars, however,
have underlined the importance of regulations and policies for governing information security
(Hong et al. 2006; Fulford and Doherty 2003). As such, the existence of the implementation of
such regulations and policies is contingent among banks on the micro surface.
The highlight of this study is, however, the aspect of multilevel governance, or the
existence of the central bank as the upper-stratum institution among banks as individual
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institutions. This social instance has conjured a different type of governance, the macroprudential supervision, conducted only by the central bank (Hall 2008; Krauskopf and Steven
2009). This study looks at the two levels of information security governance. The within-thebank governance, called the inter-level governance, is implemented by top management within
any individual bank. Governance that involves a central governance body is the intra level,
which is governed by the central bank in relation to other banks. The macro-prudential
supervision lies within the concept of deontic power and constitutive power (Hall 2008). The
central bank itself has its own micro-level information security governance implemented by its
own key players.
Table 2.1 is developed to highlight the key themes inferred from prior literature. Based on
concepts from the literature review, information security governance can be categorized
according to the security-control dimensions. Von Solms and Von Solms (2009) introduce a
model of information security governance that consists of two major parts: the core part and the
expanded part. The core part details the direct and control execution by management actions at
the strategic level, tactical level, and operational level. The expanded part provides concepts on
directives, control, risk management, organization, and awareness. The technical aspect is
inherent in the direct and control aspects but is latent within the core part. The technical aspect is
implemented particularly in the operational level of both direct and control aspects in the core
part. Scholars have linked operational risk to risk of using information technology (Evans et al.
2008; Flores et al. 2006; Schooner and Taylor 2009; Van Greuning and Brajovic Bratanovic
2000). As for the other control dimensions (i.e., formal and informal), Von Solms and Von
Solms (2009) state that the expanded part is to be developed using best practices in information
security. Except for the information risk strategic action and control, all managerial themes are
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categorized under both formal control and informal control. This is because the directive and
control of information risk require underlying frameworks (e.g., ISO 27001) (Brenner 2007; Von
Solms and Von Solms 2009) and strategic procedures (Blakley et al. 2001; Jones 2007), and are
supervised and directed by top management (Bodin et al. 2008; McFadzean et al. 2007).
According to Dhillon (2007), security awareness and education fall under the informal control
dimension. Security awareness and education are an essential component of sound informationsecurity governance.

Key Themes

Research Methodology

Institutional Authority:

Board of Directors
Senior Executives
Steering Committee
CISO
External Authority

Information Risk Strategic
Action and Control

Grounded Theory
(McFadzean et al. 2007),
Survey Method (Fulford
and Doherty 2003;
Khalfan and Alshawaf
2004;
Adeleye et al. 2004),
Mix Method (Knapp et al.
2006)
Explanatory Case Study
(Quaglia 2008)
Grounded Theory
(McFadzean et al. 2007),
Analytic Hierarchy
Process (Bodin et al.
2008), Multistage
Stochastic Program
(Fragniere et al. 2010),
Survey Method (Adeleye
et al. 2004; Gupta 2009),
Cox Counting Processes
(Jarrow 2008)

Relevant Literature
McFadzean et al. (2007); Hong
et al. (2006); Bodin et al.
(2008); Schooner and Taylor
(2009); Adeleye et al. (2004)
Fulford and Doherty (2003);

Security Control Dimension
Formal control and informal
control

Dutta and McCrohan (2002);
Khalfan and Alshawaf (2004);
Knapp et al. (2006);
Von Solms and Von Solms
(2006; 2009)
Hall (2008); Krauskopf and
Steven (2009); Quaglia (2008);
Schooner and Taylor (2009);
Adeleye et al. (2004)
Bodin et al. (2008);
McFadzean et al. (2007);
Brotby (2009); Von Solms and
Von Solms (2006; 2009); Da
Veiga and Eloff (2007);
Blakley et al. (2001); Jones
(2007); Workman and Gathegi
(2007); Schooner and Taylor
(2009); Fragniere et al. (2010);
Stone and Marotta (2003); Van
Greuning and Brajovic
Bratanovic (2000); Gupta
(2009); Jarrow (2008); Adeleye
et al. (2004)

Formal control
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Ongoing Use of IT

Case Study (Dhillon 2001;
Flores et al. 2006; Dhillon
and Moores 2001), Survey
Method (Kaleem and
Ahmad 2008)

Risk Policies and
Regulations

Case Study (Doherty and
Fulford 2006; Smith and
Jamieson 2006), Logistic
Regression Analysis
(Batini 2007), Survey
Method (Doherty and
Fulford 2005; Herath and
Rao 2009; Hong et al.
2006), Grounded Theory
(Knapp et al. 2009), ASAD Macroeconomic
Structure (Aguiar and
Martins 2008), TaylorRule Formulation of
Monetary Policy
(Christiano et al. 2008),
Linear-Quadratic
Framework (Lees 2007)
Design Science (Dos
Santos Moreira et al.
2008)

Lower-Stratum Institution:
Corporate Governance

Upper-Stratum Institution:
Macro-Prudential
Supervision

Dhillon (2001); Castiglione
(2002); Dhillon and Moores
(2001); Kaleem and Ahmad
(2008); Flores et al. (2006);
Van Greuning and Brajovic
Bratanovic (2000); Schooner
and Taylor (2009)
Smith and Jamieson (2006);
Hong et al. (2006); Chandra
(2008); Ross (2008); Knapp et
al. (2009); Doherty and Fulford
(2005; 2006); Herath and Rao
(2009); Aguiar and Martins
(2008); Batini (2007);
Christiano et al. (2008); Ising
(2009); Lees (2007); Singh
(2006)

Technical control

Dos Santos Moreira et al.
(2008); Da Veiga and Eloff
(2007); Brotby (2009); Ward
and Smith (2002); Von Solms
and Von Solms (2006; 2009);
Flannery (1998); Hall (2008)
Flannery (1998); Hall (2008);
Krauskopf and Steven (2009)

Technical control, formal
control, and informal control

Formal control and informal
control

Technical control, formal
control, and informal control

Table 2.1 – Conceptual Elements of Two-Level Information Security Governance in Banking Sector

2.4. Conclusion
This chapter analyses the various bodies of literature pertaining to banking management
and governance, and information security governance. Extant literature reveals widely accepted
conceptualizations of information security governance, including key players in governance, risk
management, IT in banks and information security, regulations and policies, and macro37
	
  

prudential supervision. It is believed that the intra-level governance of information security,
hence termed as information security macro-prudential supervision, delineates similar
information security governance at the micro level, barring the only difference in terms of the
key players and institutional strata. Hence the information security governance in banking sector
reveals two-level governance: one within each institution (inter-institutional perspective) and the
other by an institution to other institutions (intra-institutional perspective).
The institutionalization of information security as an impact of the two-level security
governance enhances the view of information security as a socio-organizational instance. As the
building block for a socio-organizational study of information security, the three security-control
dimensions are applied to each component of the information-security governance ontology.
With the use of IT exclusively linked to the technical control, the other dimensions are applied to
the managerial and informal aspects of information security governance.
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3

3.1.

THEORY AND RESEARCH FRAMEWORK

Introduction
The essence of institutional theory comprises of issues in society, broadly categorized

into order and conflict, stability and change, or consensus and coercion. This chapter seeks to
explore two theoretical frameworks that portray institutionalization of information security in the
inter level (i.e., within an organization) and the intra level (i.e., between organizations). Both
frameworks denote institutionalization as a process, originating from institution. Another
objective of this chapter is to present a research design for this study, using the interpretive case
study. This study borrows the view of institution from Scott (2008), who points towards the
infinity of institutions, and Powell and DiMaggio (1991), who contend that there are different
faces of institutionalization.
The first theoretical framework looks at the combination and conjunction between
institutional theory and structuration theory as introduced by Barley and Tolbert (1997).
Applying such a combination can demonstrate the dynamic interactions among social elements
in banks, as well as the formulation of policies and regulations, dictating the formation of banks
as collective institutions. Institutional theory is concerned with the maintenance of societal
cohesiveness, the elemental unity of society, which creates a harmonic entity, and the
explanation of the role of regulation in society (Burrell and Morgan 1979). On the other hand,
structuration theory presents an explanation of dynamic social structuring of agency’s interaction
with resources (Barley and Tolbert 1997). Structuration theory provides an understanding of how
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the use of resources or artifacts can become a habit (Berger and Luckmann 1966). The two
theories complement each other. Institutional theory depicts the internalization process of an
interaction between agency and modalities while structuration theory shows the dynamics of
such an interaction. Whatever approach one undertakes, institutional theory and structuration
theory as social-science theories attempt to discover knowledge that guides everyday life, i.e., to
portray the reality of everyday life (Berger and Luckmann 1966). The contention of this chapter
is that the inter-level institutionalization is an important combined concept of institutional theory
and structuration theory.
Another theoretical framework that is used in this study is derived from Scott’s (2008)
view of multilevel institutional processes. This view alludes to the interaction and relationship
between two entities and their larger social environment. While each entity affects one another,
each entity manages its affair respectively. This view also pinpoints the influence of social
environment on the activity of each entity. This framework serves as a roadmap for the intralevel institutionalization.
The organization of this chapter is as follows: section 3.2 reviews various concepts of
institutions. Section 3.3 provides a thorough view of institutionalization that is built from
institutional theory. These two sections contain various conservative perspectives of institutional
theory as covered in this section, including the background of institution, the notion of
institutionalization as a social phenomenon, and the variety of institution-related seminal works
by researchers who have developed or often used institutional theory in their work. These
include works by W. Richard Scott, Walter W. Powell and Paul J. DiMaggio, Philip Selznick,
and Stephen Barley. Section 3.4 covers the development of the two theoretical frameworks using
Barley and Tolbert’s combination of institutional theory and structuration theory, largely based
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on the structuration usage and legitimacy usage (Björck 2004), and Scott’s multilevel
institutional processes. This section explains the theoretical frameworks based on inter-level
perspective of institutionalization and intra-level perspective of institutionalization. Section 3.5
discusses and proposes the research methodology designed for this study. Section 3.6 concludes
this chapter.

3.2.

A Review of “Institution”
An abstract view of an institution is that it is a result of ongoing “typification of

habitualized” actions by social actors (Berger and Luckmann 1966, p. 54). Such typification, or
actions that become a habit, is shared among all members of a social system and typifies
individual actors as well as individual actions in return (Berger and Luckmann 1966). This
typification is an ongoing process that over time begins to be viewed as rational, and is taken for
granted, by the members (Scott 2008). The rational view of institutional theory is taken from its
economic roots (i.e., the rational actor model of organizations) whereby actors seek to achieve
objectives and perform collective tasks or functions in a certain, regulated manner in a formal
organization (Powell and DiMaggio 1991; Lawrence 2003; Scott 2008). Furthermore, Selznick
(1969, p. 77) refers to “the emergence of rationality as an attribute of a system.” Another
conceptual view of institution is that it embodies structural principles as a reproduction of
societal totalities in a time-space extension (Giddens 1984). Powell and DiMaggio (1991, p. 145)
describe institution as “a social order or pattern that has attained a certain state or property.”
Several examples of institution are marriage, academic tenure, the contract, wage labor,
insurance, the motel, the academic discipline, voting, the corporation, the handshake, the army,
and formal organization. One of the originators of institutional theory terms an institution as:
	
  
	
  

41

“Multifaceted, durable social structures made up of symbolic elements, social activities, and
material resources. Institutions exhibit distinctive properties: They are relatively resistant to
change. They tend to be transmitted across generations, to be maintained and reproduced…
Institutions exhibit these properties because of the processes set in motion by regulative,
normative, and cultural-cognitive elements. These elements are the central building blocks of
institutional structures, providing the elastic fibers that guide behavior and resist change.”
W. R. Scott (2008, pp. 48-49)

Such a view of institutions recognizes an important concept: the notion of change
resilience. Burrell and Morgan (1979) introduce the concepts of “sociology of regulation” and
“sociology of radical change.” Through conceptualization, institutional theory resents the notion
of change, and thus enquires into the epistemic and the ontology of maintaining and reproducing
social order and stability. Such an enquiry characterizes institutional theory as one belonging to
the sociology of regulation. Despite its nature of resenting change, institutional theory also
concerns itself with destructuration of an institution, i.e., deinstitutionalization, in which an
institution begins to lose credibility and experiences change (Scott 2008). Furthermore, the
foundation of institutional theory rests on the investigation of the impact of social control on
human activity (Berger and Luckmann 1966). According to Selznick (1969, p. 8), law is required
to enforce control, and order, and is therefore necessary to encourage “peace, settle disputes,
suppress deviance.”
Scott (2008) has developed exhaustive concepts for institutional theory. He contends that
an institution is created when repetitive, rational actions become internalized by individual social
actors. He also states that institutions “do not emerge in a vacuum; they always challenge,
borrow from, and, to varying degrees, replace prior institutions” (Scott 2008, p. 94). He forwards
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two approaches to studying social facts using institutional theory: one that concerns institutional
creation and another that deals with institutional change. The study of institutional creation, as
stated earlier, does not lend itself to the belief of an empty initial state. It rather examines how an
institution morphs into a new institution as a consequence of ascension from its initial state and
its contamination with reproduced interactions of beliefs, norms, and organizations within timespace extension (Giddens 1994; Scott 2008). The study of institutional change, on the other
hand, looks at “how an existing set of beliefs, norms, and practices comes under attack,
undergoes de-legitimization, or falls into disuse, to be replaced by new rules, forms, and scripts”
(Scott 2008, p. 94). There are four types of institutional change (Powell and DiMaggio 1991, p.
152):


Institutional formation: this concept is similar to the one about institutional creation as
introduced by Scott (1987, 2008). Powell and DiMaggio (1991, p. 152) moreover provide
their own definition for institutional formation as “an exit from social entropy, or from
non-reproductive behavioral patterns, or from reproductive patterns based on ‘action’.”



Institutional development (or elaboration): this institutional change represents “a change
within an institutional form” where the institutional form advances and continues to
become complex and meaningful. This form is always evolving and nowhere near its
extinction.



Deinstitutionalization: this concept represents the destruction of institutional form, or “an
exit from institutionalization.”



Re-institutionalization: this concept is almost similar to deinstitutionalization, which
represents an exit from institutionalization. Re-institutionalization, however, depicts an
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entry into a completely different institutional form, “organized around different principles
or rules.”

Formal structures are structured social forms that act like a blueprint, for examples offices,
departments, positions, and programs. These formal structures are similar to those elucidated by
proponents of structuration, in which formal, or social, structures are shaped by habitualized
interactions between agency (or actors), rules, and resources (Giddens 1984). Powell and
DiMaggio (1991) introduce the function of formal structures as myths, which serve to rationalize
and impersonalize the existence of technical functions of social object and can later be taken for
granted as functions become regular, everyday guidelines. The notion of “taken-for-granted”
refers to the fact that formalized, i.e., institutionalized, actions are superficially embedded in any
social actor’s behavior in organizational contexts, thus becoming embedded in regular behavior
(Berger and Luckmann 1966; Powell and DiMaggio 1991; Scott 2008). Furthermore, the notion
of “taken-for-granted” is viewed as rational by other social actors in a similar organizational
context and is a requirement for conformity. In other words, with acceptance emerging as a
regular feature in any institution, legitimacy becomes invisible and imperceptible since social
actors behave according to prescribed institutionalized procedures. Hence, this concept of
“taken-for-granted” legitimate procedures, programs, technologies, techniques, or professions
comes to be perceived as a myth.

3.3.

Institutionalization as Social Structuration
Institutionalization is a social process of creating an institutionalized social structure

(Berger and Luckmann 1966; Giddens 1984; Powell and DiMaggio 1991; Scott 2008). Powell
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and DiMaggio (1991) state that formal organizations become institutions through
institutionalization, hence institutionalization is best represented as a particular state or property
of a social pattern. Powell and DiMaggio specifically define institutionalization as “a
constraining process that forces units in a population to resemble other units that face the same
constraints” (Powell and DiMaggio 1991, p. 194). Scott (1987) refers to institutionalization as a
process to instill values beyond the technical requirements of a task over time, and as a process
of creating social reality, which is independent of any actor’s view and actions but is taken for
granted. Berger and Luckmann (1966) contend that institutionalization is typification of
habitualized actions, implying the impact of history and control on activities within an
institution. History is needed for any institution to be able to reflect on its past records, i.e., to
reproduce itself in a modified format. Control is required as a method to ensure that an institution
functions according to its legitimacy. These elements infer the importance of reproduction in any
institution and that institutionalization reproduces an institution. Powell and DiMaggio (1991)
introduce four avenues of institutional reproduction: (1) the exercise of power, (2) complex
interdependencies, (3) “taken-for-granted” assumptions, and (4) path-dependent development
process. Barley and Tolbert (1997) argue, however, that institutionalization does not depict a
comprehensive process of institutionalizing formal structure since institutional scholars do not
empirically denote the creation, alteration, and reproduction of institutions. Essentially,
institutionalization is not only an institutional process, but also contains property variables (Scott
2008).
A key element to institutionalization is the exercise of control. As such, this key element
bears resemblance to the essence of governance systems, as defined by Scott (2008):
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“…those arrangements which support the regularized control – whether by regimes created by
mutual agreement, by legitimized hierarchical authority or by non-legitimate coercive means – of the
actions of one set of actors by another.”
W. R. Scott (2008, p. 186)

Borrowing the conceptual view of corporate or information security governance from
chapter 2, institutionalization indeed requires regulations and authorities which control and
enforce such regulations. Selznick (1969, p. 254) denotes that “the legitimacy of authority should
be assured,” meaning that authorities should be clearly defined and are required to act in
accordance with their scope and “principles of legitimacy.” He also contends that act of
governance needs to be constrained to the extent of protecting all legal interests. Furthermore, he
introduces the concept of bureaucratization, which is a result of governance on formal
organization. Bureaucratization embodies the following characteristics: (1) performance of tasks
or functions under an explicit purpose, (2) requirement of a determinate organizational hierarchy
as a chain of command, (3) appointment of and control by officialdom as the designated
authorities, and (4) governance and administration according to policies and regulations.
An additional element highlighted in chapter 2 is multilevel governance. Scott (2008)
introduces multiple levels of institutional processes in formal organizations. Scott (2008)
enunciates that organizational field pinpoints a locus between individual actors and organizations
at inter-levels, and between systems of societal and trans-societal actors at intra-levels. The use
of inter-levels of institutional processes provides “a wider institutional environment within which
more specific institutional fields and forms exist and operate” (Scott 2008, p. 191). Furthermore,
this allows for the bidirectional influences among social actors in institutions. Top-down
processes, e.g., “constitutive activities, diffusion, translation, socialization, imposition,
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authorization, inducement, and imprinting,” describe the governance, administration, or control
of authorities (higher stratum) to their subordinates (lower stratum) (Scott 2008, p. 191). On the
other hand, the bottom-up processes, e.g., “selective attention, interpretation and sense-making,
identity construction, error, invention, conformity and reproduction of patterns, compromise,
avoidance, defiance, or manipulation,” depict the opposite effect, i.e., the influence of the lower
stratum on the higher stratum (Scott 2008, p. 191). As such, the bidirectional influence that can
be depicted in a recursive fashion shows an ongoing, cyclical institutional creation, diffusion,
and reproduction. The recursive manner represents a situation through which institutionalization
may emerge at multiple levels, with the inner processes denoting the inter-levels and vice versa.
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Figure 3.1 – Multilevel Institutional Processes: Top-Down and Bottom-Up Processes in Institutional
Creation and Diffusion (Scott 2008, p. 192)

A distinguishing feature of intra-level institutionalization is the authoritative powers
possessed by higher-stratum societal institutions. Hall (2008) introduces the relationship between
institutions and deontic powers and constitutive powers. Hall contends that:
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“Deontic powers, deriving from the collective assignment of status functions, thereby constitute
social structures of power relations by generating institutional facts that function as structures that
generate desire-independent reasons for action.”
(Hall 2008, p. 50)

Specifically, he denotes that “deontic powers, in the social realm, create social relations of
power, such as rights, duties, and obligations” (Hall 2008, p. 49). Hall further states that deontic
power provides trans-societal actors with the ability to exercise authority and certify “states of
affairs” and assigns them status functions (Smith and Searle 2003; Hall 2008). In other words,
the authority status functions of certain trans-societal actors having deontic powers provide such
trans-societal actors with higher authority over their subordinates. In relation to the notion of
deontic powers and institutions, Smith and Searle (2003, pp. 285-286) highlight the two-level
ontology of social reality. The lower level refers to the ‘brute’ facts, by which facts can exist
independently of human beings and their institutions (i.e., observer-independent phenomena),
while the upper level refers to institutional facts, whereby facts are crafted intentionally by
human institutions (i.e., observer-dependent phenomena) (Smith and Searle 2003; Hall 2008).
Institutional facts are composed of two elements: (1) “they are constituted first through collective
intentionality” (Hall 2008, p. 47), and (2) they emphasize on “assignment of function to an
object, person, or group which does not intrinsically have that function but acquires it only by
virtue of the assignment of function” (Hall 2008, p. 48).
Another aspect of intra-level institutionalization involves the exercise of constitutive
powers. Larner and Le Heron (2005) imply that constitutive power of institutions is one such
factor that affects the governance of practices within institutions. Hall (2008) states that while
deontic power emerges from the collective assignment of status functions, constitutive power is
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derived from the social relations of constitution. One such example is the institutional power of
money, arising from financial and economic constitutions, or constitutive rules (Hall 2008).
Another example by Ansolabehere and Snyder (1999) depicts money as an institution that has an
impact on how politicians behave in order to achieve their subjective goals. Furthermore,
constitutive power relations describe how “particular social relations are responsible for
producing particular kinds of actors” (Hall 2008, p. 84). Therefore, such actors are bestowed
with the constitutive powers to determine social relations.
Using their argument of the lack of dynamism in institutional theory, Barley and Tolbert
(1997) offer a combination of institutional theory and structuration theory to delineate a more
dynamic approach to institutionalization. The fundamental concept is the habitualized
interactions between agency and modalities (e.g., rules and resources). Such habitualized
interactions become rational and taken for granted (Giddens 1984; Orlikowski 1992; Orlikowski
2000; Orlikowski et al. 1995; Walsham 1993; Walsham and Han 1991). These habitualized
interactions are then institutionalized as actors become familiar with their routine activities in a
formal organization, characterized by the creation of orderly interactions called a script (Barley
1986; Barley and Tolbert 1997). The script serves as a link between action (represented by realm
of action) and institution (represented by institutional realm).

3.3.1. Institutional Realm
Central to this concept is the resentment of change that is a fundamental characteristic of
an institution (Scott 2008). Institutional scholars (e.g., Barley 1986; Barley and Tolbert 1997)
have sought to add the concept of resistance to change to the duality of structure. Thus has
developed a concept of a dynamic structure that seeks to maintain social order and stability,
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creating an institutional realm. Institutional realm, or the “realized structure” (Barley 1986), is an
abstract framework of typifications of habitualized actions (Berger and Luckmann 1966) which
actors use to make sense of their actions based on their cumulative past experience with their
actions (Barley 1986; Barley and Tolbert 1997). The three social structures – signification,
domination, and legitimation – are abstracted within the institutional realm and are continuously
produced, maintained, and altered.
There are various interpretations of the institutional realm in relation to social structures.
Orlikowski (1992) states that institutional properties such as organizational culture and business
strategy promote the interactions between agency and artifacts (e.g., technology). She denotes
that institutional properties embody social structures. Furthermore, Barley (1986) and Orlikowski
(2000) support the notion of continuous production of institutional realm as a result of situated
action (Barley 1986) and knowledge of an actor’s experience with the use of artifacts
(Orlikowski 2000).
As indicated earlier, the institutional realm appears in different aspects. Barley (1986)
introduces the concept of evolution of structure, taking into account sociologists’ observations of
organizational differences as a result of structuring processes and the production and
reproduction of structures as a result of situated action. In her more recent work, Orlikowski
(2000) presents a recursive structurational use of technology in which an agency draws on the
knowledge of their past experience with the use of technology and the current situation, the
resources available to him/her, and the rules that dictate his/her interaction with technology, and
apply all such modalities to produce the structurational usage. As such, this explanation provides
positive evidence that structuration theory demonstrates that social processes are continuous
processes recurring across time and space (Giddens 1984).
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3.3.2. Realm of Action
The realm of action is defined as the “actual arrangements of people, objects, and events
in the minute-by-minute flow of the setting’s history” (Barley 1986) or the “social life’s
unfolding” (Barley and Tolbert 1997). This realm, also called the “interaction order,” represents
the continuous interaction between an agency and all three modalities (Barley 1986) in an
ordered manner (Orlikowski 2000). Modalities, particularly artifacts and regulations, are the
agency’s creation and become meaningful only through their interaction with the agency
(Orlikowski 1992; Orlikowski 2000). The social construction of reality (Berger and Luckmann
1966) denotes an instance of meaningful use of modalities when these modalities are used by the
agency in an ordered manner (Orlikowski 1992). The ongoing use of artifacts (e.g., technology)
may create different patterns of structured use of artifacts as the agency interacts with different
artifacts (Orlikowski 2000).

3.4.

Theoretical Framework
This section seeks to encapsulate and synthesize concepts presented in previous chapters.

The objective is to construct frameworks that will guide observations and organize findings.
There are four assumptions as to how social scientists approach their subjects: ontology,
epistemology, human nature, and methodology (Burrell and Morgan 1979; Lee 2004). As stated
in the previous sections, the theoretical framework borrows the nomalism view of ontological
stance. This is due to the nature of social construction of reality which social scientists need to
internalize, meaning that a social scientist is expected to understand his subjects by diving into
the mind of his subjects (Schutz 1962-66; Berger and Luckmann 1966; Burrell and Morgan
1979). By doing so, the social scientist is able to conclude that no behavior is irrational and that
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certain circumstances lead to certain behavior. A major distinction between positivism and
interpretivism is that the former ignores the fact that human subjects have the ability to
communicate.
The institutional theory, including one that is combined with elements borrowed from
structuration theory, embodies all such assumptions of interpretive social science. It is the
combination that appropriates the use of interpretive scheme, since structuration theory involves
the communicative interaction among subjects; a property captured only by using the interpretive
scheme (Berger and Luckmann 1966; Giddens 1984). The combination introduced by Barley and
Tolbert (1997) is primarily used to model the inter-level institutionalization. The multilevelinstitutional-processes framework by Scott (2008) used for the intra-level institutionalization is
appropriate to delineate relationships between institutions and a central governing body in
governing and implementing information security.
The use of institutional theory also best represents the situational illustration of
information security practices in organizations. The information security practices in
organizations involve maintaining the integrity of three dimensions of information security:
technical controls (i.e., technological aspects such as hardware and software as well as technical
aspects such as encryption), formal controls (i.e., management, governance, and control of
information security practices), and informal controls (i.e., socializing security practices and
increasing security awareness such as training and education programs) (Dhillon 2007).
Technical-controls dimension alone does not suffice to maintain effective and efficient
information security practices (Blakley et al. 2001; Dhillon 2007). Furthermore, maintaining the
integrity of these three dimensions involves the use of various social actors; hence depicting the
institutionalization of information security in organizations (Dhillon 2007).
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3.4.1. The Inter Level: A Structuration View of Institutionalization
The lower-stratum institutionalization, henceforth termed as inter-level institutionalization,
is constructed using elements of structuration theory, particularly the “duality of structure”
(Giddens 1984, p. 25). Researchers explain the duality of structure as a manifestation of synergic
relationship between agency and structures, whereby social structures are produced and
continuously reproduced by human actions and interactions, and as such become a routine that is
taken for granted (Giddens 1984; Orlikowski 1992; Orlikowski et al. 1995; Orlikowski 2000;
Walsham and Han 1991; Walsham 1993). The use of institutional theory in conjunction with
structuration theory provides social scientists with dynamic, recursive and iterative production
and reproduction of institutions (Barley and Tolbert 1997). Structuration theorists and
researchers have also lent the concept of “institutional realm” to the social structure, with the
addition of the concept of resistance to change (Barley and Tolbert 1997, p. 97; Giddens 1984;
Orlikowski 1992; Orlikowski et al. 1995; Scott 2008). These researchers contend that human
interaction with technology creates institutional properties of structured technological practices
(Barley and Tolbert 1997; Orlikowski 1992; Orlikowski et al. 1995; Orlikowski 2000).
The general picture of structuration begins with the duality of structure. Giddens (1984),
Walsham and Han (1991), and Walsham (1993) state the importance of power when illustrating
structuration. Studies have demonstrated that deontic power, constitutive power, and facilitative
power are an appropriate concept to explain status functions and social relations of constitution,
for instance in banking-sector context (Smith and Searle 2003; Larner and Le Heron 2005; Hall
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2008). Constitutive power has been shown to be an exclusive property of central bank due to its
governance functionality and its impact on constitution (Larner and Le Heron 2005; Hall 2008).
Moreover, the notion of resources or artifacts has widely been espoused by structuration
scholars. Such notion is essentially in context of IT artifacts, represented by the view that IT,
e.g., hardware and software, is an object that is manufactured, used, or modified by humans
(Orlikowski and Iacono 2001). In this sense, the technical-control dimension of organizational
information security can be considered as being that of the information security artifacts. This
view is enhanced using the notion of exploring beyond the “technical means of protecting
information resources” (Dhillon and Torkzadeh 2006). In support of this artifact notion,
Orlikowski (1992) has maintained that technology is created by an agency, but is dynamic since
the structure of technology is repeatedly created through the routine use of technology.
Social structures, associated with the property of change resistance, create an institutional
realm. Enmeshing information security artifacts, deontic and constitutive powers, and risk
policies and regulations in the structuration context creates an institutional realm of structured
information security practices in institutions. The structuring of information security practices in
each institution therefore experiences continuous production and reproduction. The institutional
process that includes exercising control, i.e., institutionalization, in the inter level is conducted
by the agency that directly structures information security practices in a particular institution.
Moreover, in a lower stratum institution, agency’s actions and interactions may be affected (i.e.,
governed and controlled) by higher-stratum agency’s sanctioning. This level borrows the
structuration view of institutional theory (Björck 2004) and is constructed by combining
institutional theory and structuration theory.
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The theoretical framework for the inter-level institutionalization is largely built upon the
concept of duality of structure. Taking into account the approach introduced by Barley and
Tolbert (1997), however, causes some modifications to the traditional concept of duality of
structure. Barley and Tolbert (1997) develop a combination of structuration theory and
institutional theory to model an institutionalization of habitualized actions. This model embraces
the institutional realm and the realm of action, and proposes recursive instances of an
institutionalized structure. The recursive instances depicting the social structure reflect an
attempt to maintain stability or social order (Berger and Luckmann 1966). Each episode of
institutionalization depicts a unique structure affected by certain phenomena or a particular
incident (e.g., security breach). Barley (1986) terms the episodic institutionalization as the
evolution of structure. The model hence produces a series of information security
institutionalizations involving a script for each episode, serving to support the recursive
institutionalization. The script is characterized as the “observable, recurrent activities and
patterns of interaction characteristics of a particular setting” (Barley and Tolbert 1997, p. 98).
The script, however, should not be regarded as one of the three modalities as in the original
structuration theory. This is because a modality is a tool that is used by the agency or is used to
support the interaction between an agency and other modalities.

	
  
	
  

56

Legend:
 Script encoding: a,
e, i.
 Principles
enactment: b, f, j.
 Script revision and
replication: e, g, k.
 Patterned-actions
objectification and
externalization: d, h,
l.
 T1, T2, or T3: a
distinct episode of
security
institutionalization.

Figure 3.2 - Inter-level Institutional of Information Security Governance Using Barley’s Model of
Institutionalization (1986)

Figure 3.2 depicts the institutionalization episodes as described by Barley and Tolbert. The
model introduces two general streams of institutionalization: the effects of action on structure
and the effect of institutional constraints upon action. Each stream constitutes two processes that
shape either action or structure. The processes corresponding to the institutional constraints on
action involve the process of encoding principles in the script in a specific episode (see arrows a,
e, and i) and the process of enactment of the principles in the script by actors (see arrows b, f,
and j). Script encoding refers to the moment when policies and regulations are successfully
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formulated and begin to be adopted in a formal organization, while principles enactment entails
social actors beginning to realize and accept such policies and regulations that guide actors’
behavior. The other processes (i.e., those that correspond to the effects of action on structure)
include the process of script revision or script replication (see arrows c, g, and k) and the process
of “objectification”1 and externalization of patterned actions (see arrows d, h, and l). Script
revision and script replication explain the moment when scripted behavior is replicated in the
institutional abstraction. However, this process can also be used to explain the moment when
policies and regulations that have been successfully adopted are revised after a negative incident.
Patterned-behavior objectification and externalization denote the moment when both the
regulatory aspect and behavioral aspect in a formal organization becomes successfully
implemented and habitualized. As shown in figure 3.2, each box depicts an episode of
institutionalization. Arrow a and arrow b in the left box (episode T1) is similar to arrow e and
arrow f in the middle box (episode T2) and arrow i and arrow j in the right box (episode T3).
These arrows are diagonal arrows that describe how the institutionalized structure directs and
controls the agency’s action (represented by the realm of action). The vertical arrows (arrow c
and arrow d in episode T1, arrow g and arrow h in episode T2, or arrow k and arrow l in episode
T3) describe the agency’s actions that institutionalize social structure (represented by the
institutional realm). The episodes may be infinite since institutions are always evolving after they
come into existence, are always being challenged, and hence keep on changing their facets. Each
transition between two episodes (e.g., a transition between T1 and T2) signifies an institutional
change (e.g., institutional development or re-institutionalization). Such institutional change can
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Barley (1986) and Barley and Tolbert (1997) introduce the notion of objectification to demonstrate how patterned
actions become an abstract entity (i.e., principles) that occupies the institutional realm.
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be triggered by an exogenous event (e.g., technological change or security breach), an
endogenous event (e.g., implementation of new rules and standards), or a combination of both
exogenous and endogenous events (e.g., security breach that prompts the central bank to create
new guidelines for new security policies).

3.4.2. The Intra Level: Macro-Prudential Supervision of Information Security Practices
Figure 3.3 shows the holistic information security governance in banking sector, henceforth
termed as the information security macro-prudential supervision. This framework depicts the
practices of information security governance in separate institutions, centrally governed by one
institution as the higher authority (i.e., the central bank). The framework in figure 3.1 can be
seen to represent a component of this holistic theoretical framework. Such a framework shows
that each institution structures its own information security practices. The central bank, however,
possesses powers (deontic, constitutive, and facilitative powers), which enable the central bank
to govern and control commercial banks. This action represents the top-down process of
institutional creation and diffusion (i.e., institutional process (Scott 2008)). Hence, the central
bank possesses the authority to govern and control security practices of commercial banks.
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Figure 3.3 – The Macro-Prudential Supervision of Information Security Governance in Banking Sector
(Reproduction of Scott’s Model of Multilevel Institutional Processes (2008))

Commercial banks reciprocate the conformity governed by the central bank through
policies and regulations. Commercial banks are also required to report information security
governance and practices, directed internally by each commercial bank’s institutional
management (e.g., board of directors, senior executives, steering committee, and CISO). This
action represents the bottom-up process of institutional process (Scott 2008). As such, in this
context, institutions affect one another via their agency. In other words, the intra level of
institutional process involves interactions among agencies of institutions. This level assumes the
legitimacy view of institutional theory (Björck 2004).
Therefore, both processes affect the structuration of information security practices in each
institution, whereby each institution sanctions and informs security practices in two directions
(i.e., between higher-stratum institution and a lower-stratum institution). The institutionalization
of two-level information security governance presented in this framework mimics the multilevel
institutional processes.
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3.5.

Research Design
Research activity is socially constructed and is approved and conducted by scientists and

scientists are instruments of their research activity, i.e., observation (Berger and Luckmann 1966;
Lee 1999). The methodology is designed to influence research activity by providing guidance
using theoretical framework. This study uses the interpretive case-study research since the use of
structuration theory that supports the institutional theory involves communicative interactions
among respondents (i.e., subjects). Such interactions can only be captured using the interpretive
scheme (Berger and Luckmann 1966; Giddens 1984). The interpretive scheme of research
methodology requires that such methodology begin “from the position that our knowledge of
reality, including the domain of human action, is a social construction by human actors”
(Walsham 2006, p. 320). To preserve the interpretive nature, this study therefore incorporates a
case-study research in the tradition of Walsham (1993; 1995) and Eisenhardt (1989).
The unit of analysis for this study is the banking sector in Indonesia. Three institutions
have been observed for this study. The first institution is the nation’s central bank. The other two
institutions are large commercial banks. These banks are selected due to their great influence on
the nation’s economic welfare. The first bank, Centro Metropolitan Bank, is a large governmentowned commercial bank that is known for its substantial assets, loans, and deposits. The second
bank, Blue Sequoia Bank, is the nation’s largest private commercial bank that owns a large
number of ATM machines distributed in almost every geographical region in Indonesia. Data
collection is performed in the respondents’ natural setting. While there are various data
collection methods for case study research, this study uses interviews as its main data source.
The interviews involved approximately 30 respondents, ranging from an entry-level analyst to a
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senior executive. There are 18 respondents from the Earl Capita Bank, 8 respondents from
Centro Metropolitan Bank, and 4 respondents from Blue Sequoia Bank.
In a case study research, building theories from case studies involves a “frequent overlap of
data analysis with data collection” (Eisenhardt 1989, p. 538). Such an overlap provides flexible
data collection and allows for a head start in analysis. While the primary source of data is
interviews, other sources include secondary materials such as pamphlets as in the case of Blue
Sequoia Bank and magazines, which are supporting materials to analyze the CentroMetropolitan-Bank case. Interviews are tape recorded and transcribed to provide easier analysis
of patterns and categories (e.g., reputational risk, security policies, institutional relationship).
Since interviews are tape recorded, interviews are semi structured and open ended to allow for
casualty and flexibility in probing respondents. Translations are derived from the transcription.
Analysis of patterns and recognitions as well as theory building is developed from the
translations.
Data analysis in interpretive scheme, however, is not expected to attend to issues of
generalizability. This is due to the ideographical nature of its methodological stance, as opposed
to the nomothetical view of positivist scheme. Nomothetical view dictates the necessity of
controlling formal procedures and provides evidence of “formal propositions, quantifiable
measures of variables, hypothesis testing, and the drawing of inferences about a phenomenon
from a representative sample to a stated population” (Klein and Myers 1999, p. 69; Orlikowski
and Baroudi 1991). Furthermore, positivism has dictated the use of “certain criteria of validity,
rigor, and replicability in the conduct of scientific research” (Orlikowski and Baroudi 1991, p.
12). Such positivist features are clearly distinct from those of an interpretive scheme as adopted
for this study. According to Lee and Baskerville (2003), a theory conducted as an interpretive
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based study in a single setting is valid by the nature of interpretive scheme and can be applied to
other settings. Therefore, generalizability in interpretive scheme can be achieved by applying the
theory that has been confirmed in one setting to descriptions of other settings (Lee and
Baskerville 2003, p. 233).

3.6.

Conclusion
This chapter seeks to explore and build theoretical frameworks and to develop a research

design for this study. The social phenomena under investigation are essential for achieving social
order, and instrumental in determining the consequences of not doing so. Drawing on the
elements of information security governance, institutional theory has been found suitable for use
in modeling the conceptual framework of this study. Björck (2004) denotes that
institutionalization can be used to “explain why formal security structures and actual security
behavior differs” (Björck 2004, p. 5). Several similarly important elements between institutional
theory and information security governance include the intentness of authorities, governance,
and regulations.
Since this study uses theoretical frameworks that mandate communicative interactions
among respondents, the interpretive case-study research is selected to capture such interactions.
Research in information systems and security has demonstrated the wide use of institutional
theory for capturing structuration and legitimacy issues. The next three chapters cover case
studies of the three banking institutions, beginning with the central bank case study.
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4

THE CASE OF EARL CAPITA BANK

4.1. Overview
The objective of this chapter is to present a thorough analysis of the nature of
information security governance in Earl Capita Bank. Earl Capita Bank., the highest
authority in banking sector, alludes to the fact that no other institution in the sector directs
and controls the institutionalization of information security in Earl Capita Bank. The
initiative comes within the purview of the institution’s community itself, which in this
case are the Earl Capita Bank’s personnel. The institutional instances of information
security governance are examined from the internal perspective and also in terms of the
institutional relationship that exists between the central bank and commercial banks in
general. The case study concerning the internal practice is organized according to the
model introduced by Barley and Tolbert (1997) to delineate the institutionalization of
information security. Four processes are identified as the themes for the case study: the
script encoding, the principles enactment, the script revision and replication, and the
patterned actions objectification and externalization.
Section 4.2 describes the nature and characteristics of Earl Capita Bank as the
nation’s central bank. This section details the institution in terms of its position as a
central bank, its historical background, and its organizational structure. Section 4.3
presents the empirical analysis for the Earl Capita Bank case. This section contains the
following subsections: the internal security practices that define the micro-level
institutionalization of information security governance within Earl Capita Bank, and the
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Earl Capita Bank’s relationship with commercial banks by employing the macroprudential supervision of information security governance. This section also provides a
discussion at the end of each subsection. Section 4.4 concludes this chapter.

4.2. Organizational Background
4.2.1. Earl Capita Bank as the Central Bank
As the Central Bank of Indonesia, Earl Capita Bank’s primary objective is to
achieve and maintain the stability of the nation’s currency. In 2004, Earl Capita Bank
became an independent state institution and consequently free from influences and
interferences by all external parties, including the government. In support of such a
statement, Schooner and Taylor (2009) and Ullrich (2007) denote that a Central Bank
needs to be independent of political control so that it can be free to determine interest
rates. As such, Earl Capita Bank possesses the autonomy to fully formulate and
implement its authority as a deontic monetary institution. This is because as an
institution, it manifests power that arises from a specific form of constitution, distinct
from other financial institutions (Hall 2008). Furthermore, Earl Capita Bank has the
authority to issue policy rules and regulations as a public legal entity, meaning that it
possesses constitutive power because of its deontic status (Hall 2008). Consequently, as
a civil legal entity, the bank also has the right to represent itself in and outside a court of
law.
In order to achieve the above mentioned objectives, while maintaining its right and
authority as a legal institution, Earl Capita Bank is obligated to upholding the principles
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of accountability and transparency in implementing its duties, authorities, and budget.1
Given such obligations, Earl Capita Bank has to maintain information symmetry between
public, government, and commercial banks. The dilemma lies in the provision of
information, which in the Earl Capita Bank is expected to be handled and disseminated as
is done in all financial institutions. Information security breach, however, may negatively
impact institutional reputation and even harm the nation’s economic stability. In addition,
Earl Capita Bank, as a premier authoritative institution, realizes the need to protect and
preserve its own information. In doing so, Earl Capita Bank maintains judicious internal
information security and supervises the governance of information security in other
commercial banks.

4.2.2. History of Earl Capita Bank
The history of Earl Capita Bank can be divided into two eras: the colonial and post
independence era and the reformation era. The colonial era of Earl Capita Bank can be
traced back to the founding of De Javasche Bank by the Dutch East Indies government in
1828.2 The bank was developed for circulating and issuing currency. Despite this
seemingly crucial function, the bank was merely operating as a commercial bank. It
continued to operate until the colonial Dutch government transferred sovereignty to
Indonesia in 1949. In 1953, it was nationalized (post independence era) as the Republic
of Indonesia’s circulation bank3. In 1953, the government of Indonesia passed the Act of
Earl Capita Bank and declared the establishment of Earl Capita Bank and endowed it
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
1	
  Source: http://www.bi.go.id/web/en/Tentang+BI/Fungsi+Bank+Indonesia/Akuntabilitas/
2

Source: http://www.bi.go.id/NR/rdonlyres/FC7439FE-0C50-44F1-A0422CFB6FE5CA43/18316/07_sejarah_rev1.pdf
3
Source: http://www.papermoney-indonesia.com/de-javasche-bank-1828-1953-still-under-construction/
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with the additional central bank status held previously by the De Javasche Bank. In
addition to being a commercial bank, the newly founded Central Bank performed the
following functions: monetary, banking, and the payment system. The bank also held
supplementary duties in relation to the government. In 1968, the government passed the
Act of Central Bank, detailing the status and functions of Earl Capita Bank as a Central
Bank and hence abolishing the bank’s previously commercial bank status. In addition to
the aforementioned three core tasks of a central bank, Earl Capita Bank provided
assistance to the government, functioning as a development agency supporting real sector
productivity and developing and creating employment opportunities aimed at public
welfare.
After the downfall of the new era regime and the rise of the reformation era, Act
No. 23/1999, which concerns Earl Capita Bank, restated the objective of Earl Capita
Bank yet again as one aimed at achieving and maintaining the stability of the nation’s
currency. In 2004, the government issued act concerning Earl Capita Bank was amended
to place more emphasis on critical aspects of the bank’s mandated tasks and authorities,
including the strengthening of its governance. In 2008, the government issued another
regulation in lieu of law No. 2 of 2008 concerning the second amendment of Act No.23
of 1999, which identified Earl Capita Bank as a part of the efforts to maintain financial
system stability. The amendment was designed to strengthen the resilience of Indonesian
national banks in facing the global financial crisis by improving any bank’s access to the
Short-Term Funding Facility provided by Earl Capita Bank.
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4.2.3. Organization Structure
Earl Capita Bank is managed by a Board of Governors; led by a Governor who is
assisted by a Senior Deputy Governor (Vice Governor) and several Deputy Governors.
The Board of Governors oversees the directors of the main sectors: Monetary, Banking,
Payment System, and Internal Management.

Figure 4.1 – The Higher-Level Organization Chart of Earl Capita Bank

Each main sector consists of several departments and each department is managed
by a director. Departments under the monetary sector mostly deal with tasks of
controlling money supply and interest rates. Hence these departments do not deal directly
with commercial banks and financial institutions. The departments under the Banking
sector and Payment System sector deal mostly with commercial banks and financial
institutions. The Internal Management sector includes departments that manage the
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operability of Earl Capita Bank. The respondents for this dissertation are personnel of
departments other than the monetary sector.
The internal security practices of Earl Capita Bank include the provision of the
information-security governance practice which is overseen by departments that handle
information processing and technology within the institution. These departments, namely
the Information Technology Department and the Information Management Division, are
divisions of the Internal Management Sector.
Internally, each department of Earl Capita Bank attempts to safeguard access to its
information according to unique regulations and cultures prevalent within that particular
department. Each department maintains and regulates its own information systems where
as the Information Technology Department manages the technical maintenance for these
information systems. In the past, each department possessed absolute authority over the
control and use of information extracted from its own information systems, including the
electronic data warehouses installed in each department. In 2002, Earl Capita Bank
established the Information Management Division to oversee the manipulation and
distribution of information within Earl Capita Bank and from Earl Capita Bank to
external parties. However, internal departments still reserve the right and authority for
information access and manipulation of such information within their own departments.
In other words, each department is the sole administrator of its applications, whereas the
Information Technology Department is the administrator of systems databases and
networks. The Senior Analyst at the information management division states that:
“Our campaign is to raise awareness across the bank that any particular department
doesn’t own information. Information belongs to the bank. And raising this awareness is
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very hard work for us since this practice has been established for a long time and has
become an institutional norm. It’s very difficult to change.”

Security Policies and Supervision

Figure 4.2 – A Partial View of the Internal Governance of Information Use and Security

The roots of internal governance of information, its use and security within Earl
Capita Bank are embedded in the Information Technology Department and the
Information Management Division. The internal governance includes the formulation of
regulations and policies as well as the supervision and enforcement of regulations and
policy. The Information Technology Department oversees the technical control of
information security while the Information Management Division supervises the formal
control of information security. Both departments, however, create and supervise the
informal control of information security by educating employees and raising their
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awareness levels about the importance of information security4. For instance, the
Information Technology Department does so by distributing flyers which describe the
dangers of password cracking while the information management division reminds
personnel of the importance of information security by holding seminars on newly
developed software packages. Correspondingly, the Information Technology Department
manages the password control while the Information Division Management determines
which information is considered confidential and unsuitable for sharing with the public.
Despite the demarked responsibilities of formal control and technical control between
these two departments, Earl Capita Bank also maintains the three information-security
controls: technical, formal, and informal (Dhillon and Moores 2001; Dhillon 2007). The
implementation detail of governance practice varies within each department and is
dependent on each department’s culture and functionalities.

4.3. Empirical Analysis
This section contains a case study that is organized according to two objectives:
Inter- Institutionalization and Intra-Institutionalization. The Inter Institutionalization
adopts the Barley and Tolbert’s Model Of Institutionalization. Institutionalization
comprises of four processes: the process of encoding principles in the script in a specific
episode (or script encoding), the process of enactment of the principles in the script by
agency (or principles enactment), the process of script revision or replication (or script
revision and script replication), and the process of objectification and externalization of

	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
4	
  Both departments share the same responsibility for enforcing the informal control of information security
in addition to their primary roles within the institution. This statement is based on the author’s deduction.
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patterned actions (or patterned-actions objectification and externalization). The Intra
Institutionalization borrows Scott’s Model of Institutional Creation and Diffusion.

4.3.1. Inter-Level Institutional of Information Security Governance
4.3.1.1. Script Encoding: As the premier authoritative institution, Earl Capita
Bank’s main concern is its reputation. Even a minor information-security breach can
destroy the institution’s credibility, leading to financial chaos and even political
instability. The Head of Risk Management Team says:
“As a public institution, we are expected to be transparent. However, there are some rules
of the game, specifically the rules regarding information disclosure. Whether or not it is
confidential, information, especially about policies, if disclosed before formal approval or
leaked out can lead to information asymmetry in the financial market. Some market
players who feel they have never received the ‘disclosed’ information may think that we
have favorites as regards providing information. This can disrupt the market and damage
our reputation by leading to our being perceived as unfair and unprofessional. This is one
of the major downsides of information leak.”

To preserve confidentiality of its information, Earl Capita Bank formulates
regulations and supervises compliance concerning the production and dissemination of
information within itself and to external parties. Security issues in an organization are
often recognized when a security breach occurs (Bodin et al. 2008; Gordon et al. 2003) or
when security risks are acknowledged. The Risk Management Team assists other
departments in identifying risks. The Head of Risk Management Team explains such
assistance as follows:
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“Departments know exactly what they need. Every three months, departments submit a
report of risks profile through an integrated system. They indicate the types, events,
incidents, and measurement, indicating whether a risk is low, moderate, or high. If a risk
is indicated to be high, or red, then the department needs to devise a mitigation plan.
Especially for prospective risks, the mitigation plan is absolutely required. For example,
the Information Management Division would want to submit to us a risk profile regarding
information risk and create a mitigation plan.”

Once the risk profile and the mitigation plan have been created and submitted, the
department in charge manages and oversees the risks mitigation. It has been indicated
that information risk is the responsibility of the Information Technology Department and
the Information Management Division. The existence of the Information Management
Division, however, is disrupted by authority issues, despite its relatively strong and
equitable position vis` a vis` other departments. This division is regarded as the stepchild
in the institution. One of the Information Management Division’s major tasks is the
creation of an information-confidentiality category, with the highest rating (top
confidential) to be accessed only by the Board of Governors and executive directors. The
lowest category is for public consumption such as information posted on the institution’s
homepage. The Information Management Division hence views information security as a
users’ issue. Such categorization is regulated and communicated to users of all other
departments within Earl Capita Bank. Other departments identify the category and apply
it to the hardcopy and electronic documents they are producing. Any violation of the
security of these documents is considered a felony and the penalties, regulated and
enforced by the Human Resource Department, may include work termination and
incarceration.
	
  

73

The division, however, has little power to convince departments to integrate their
data; hence centralizing information is a difficult task. Despite the uniform security
policies, the implementation and the enforcement of the policies varies amongst
departments, partially attributable to the data ownership issue. The success achieved by
the division is apparent in the formulation of the Board of Governors Regulation of
Information Management in Earl Capita Bank.

Senior Analyst at the Information

Management Division elucidates:
“According to the Board of Governors Regulation of Information Management in Earl
Capita Bank, information is stated not to belong solely to a department or to a division.
This was because during the 1999 transformation program, many still considered
information to be his or her power domain. During the financial crisis, the governor
would announce the currency rate early in the morning and suddenly the senior governor
deputy would announce a different rate at mid morning due to their sources being from
different departments. We then stated that information belongs to Earl Capita Bank only.
Basically, we aim to change each department’s perception regarding data ownership.”

As described earlier, a departmental request to another department for sharing its
data and information is relatively difficult to accommodate due to the issue of data
ownership. Each department behaves like a kingdom and assumes full authority to
determine what part of the information under its control can be distributed to other
departments, to personnel of other departments, and even to the public5. Surprisingly,
there is a distinct possibility that there could be an instance or occasion when a document
may be pronounced top confidential by a department but is treated as belonging to a
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
5	
  This statement is based on the author’s deduction after several interviews with the respondents from the
information management division.
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lower confidentiality bracket by another department, depending on its usage purpose. The
Information Management Division merely watches over how the confidentiality category
is implemented but does not have the power to determine the detail and implementation
of any category. Although this information management division has seen limited
success, Earl Capita Bank is beginning to witness centralized information usage and
centralized information confidentiality management directed by the Information
Management Division.
Current practice denotes that the Information Management Division manages how
information should be used, whereas the Information Technology Department maintains
devices by which information is processed and used. The other departments reserve the
right to use and distribute this information. The Information Technology Department has
full authority over the implementation and maintenance of technology in Earl Capita
Bank. The department regards information security as an issue that is strongly related to
those in hardware and software. The department enforces office-hour access to websites,
for instance, by not allowing employees to access social-network websites during office
hours. It conducts password maintenance, upgrades antivirus software and firewall
applications, etc. The department also initiates disaster recovery and business continuity
plans. In essence, both departments also educate personnel of the other departments of
the importance of information security and attempt to raise their awareness. The Head of
Information Technology Department expresses that:
“The business continuity plan (BCP) that we designed is probably one of the exemplary
BCPs in the nation. We take pride in our BCP despite the fact that our disaster recovery
center is located in the same geographical area as our headquarters.”
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The formulation of policies and regulations directing the secured use of
information asset signifies the dual centralized authority, equally divided between the
Information Management Division and the Information Technology Department. The
difference, however, is that the sole authority to formulate policies and regulations
regarding the use of software and hardware is with the Information Technology
Department while the authority to use that information is with the Information
Management Division.

4.3.1.2. Principles Enactment: Information usage is interpreted and implemented
according to their own discretion by departments and varies according to each
department’s goal and functionalities within Earl Capita Bank. Departments also interpret
and apply various confidentiality categories to their information assets.

The

interpretation process creates an institutional structure by which departments within Earl
Capita Bank recognize the need to attach different levels of confidentiality of their
information asset, hence safeguarding their top confidential information which is to be
consumed only by the Board of Governors and executive directors. Despite such
variations, the goal of the information management division is ultimately achieved: which
is to have each department classify, mark, and safeguard its electronic and hardcopy
information.
Designating departments to manage their own data and information creates a notion
of information stewardship. Information stewardship allows departments to own and
manage their own data warehouses with a sense of departmental ownership. While Earl
Capita Bank in a larger context owns an Electronic Data Warehouse (EDW) managed by
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the Information Management Division, other smaller data warehouses are distributed to
departments to house information systems that may serve as links to external parties (e.g.,
commercial banks and financial institutions). According to an Analyst of the Information
Management Division:
“About information stewardship, this functionality is given to each department that owns
and operates information systems in Earl Capita Bank. Each department selects a person
responsible as the information steward. This person manages data and chooses which
data to share with selected people outside the department.”

In addition to managing their own data and information, departments own the right
to operate their information systems as part of their information-stewardship
functionality. Some of these information systems, which are the institution’s most critical
systems, include:


The LHBU (“Laporan Harian Bank Umum” or “Commercial Bank Daily
Report”) system, which is owned by several departments. The ownership depends
on the usage context; for example: the Accounting and Payment System
Department oversees the electronic-payment report of the LHBU system.



The RTGS (“Real-Time Gross Settlement”) system, which are co-owned by the
Accounting and Payment System Department and the Information Management
Division.



The SID (“Sistem Informasi Debitur” or “Debitor Information System”) system,
which is exclusively owned by the Directorate of Bank Licensing and Banking
Information.
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The SIMWAS (“Sistem Informasi Manajemen Pengawasan” or “Supervision
Information Management System”), which is exclusively owned by the
Directorate Of Bank Licensing and Banking Information.



The SOSA (“Sentralisasi Otomasi Sistem Akunting” or “Centralized Automated
Accounting System”) system, which is exclusively owned by the Accounting And
Payment System Department.



The SKN (“Sistem Kliring Nasional” or “National Clearance System”) system,
which is co-owned by the Accounting and Payment System Department and the
Directorate of Banking Research and Regulation.

Information stewardship can be used to grant partial access to data and information
to external users of the departments. These external users are Earl Capita Bank’s
personnel, commercial banks, and financial institutions. The procedure for external users
to obtain data and information is, as stated by an Analyst of the Directorate of Bank
Licensing and Banking Information as follows:
“If there are external users wishing to access data and information from systems that we
administer, they simply need to come to us. The procedure they need to follow is a formal
one regardless of whether they are Earl Capita Bank’s staff. They need to create a memo
and send us this memo, informing us of their intention to use our information systems,
stating their affiliation, which data or information they need to use, and the purpose of
using our systems, data, or information. We will decide whether to grant them access to
our systems, data, and information. And if granted, we will request user names and
passwords to be created for them. The role and privilege are limited according to their
needs and we monitor how they use our systems.”
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This seemingly intricate procedure to obtain access to a department’s information
systems as well as their content boosts the security of these systems. The implementation
of data ownership seems to create a sense of power on one hand and security on the other
hand. This concept affects not only selected individuals that can interact with the
systems, but also imposes a restriction on the interactions and how these interactions are
practiced. The Analyst of the Directorate of Bank Licensing and Banking Information
further confirms the security effect of such a procedure:
“As far as I’m concerned, there has never been any record of a breach of our systems and
those of the other departments. There has also been no record indicating the misuse of our
data and information, or even of those across Earl Capita Bank.”

Despite such selectivity and monitoring practices, departments do not hold the
capacity to create usernames and passwords. The creation of usernames and passwords
belongs to the Information Technology Department. The Information Technology
Department possesses the sole authority to formulate policies and regulations regarding
the use of usernames and passwords and to supervise such usage. The Senior IT
Researcher reaffirms such authority:
“Based on the legislation by the Board of Governors, the IT department holds the full
authority to govern the internal IT systems of Earl Capita Bank. This also includes sole
authority to govern the security of IT systems and the disaster recovery plan of Earl
Capita Bank.”

The seemingly rigorous selectivity and monitoring practices, however, do not seem
to cause the same restrictive effect on internal personnel of the owner department.
However, the procedure and regulation tightly restrict external users’ access to systems,
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data, and information of each department. With regard to the procedure and regulation,
the Analyst of the Directorate of Bank Licensing and Banking Information states that:
“We have to make a formal request to access permission if we want to use a system that
belongs to any other department. The same procedure is followed by other departments if
they want to get access to our systems. We also need to request permission to use and
analyze data and information processed by other departments. Let’s say, we request a
permission to view the electronic-payment report of the LHBU system. For that, we need
to create and send a memo to the accounting and payment system department before they
can order the IT department to grant us the permission to view the report.”

Any data and information transmission or use of information systems other than
those regulated or proposed through the information steward is considered a felony, the
impact of which can jeopardize the personnel’s career and can even lead to fine and
incarceration. Once there is a violation of the use of the institution’s asset or properties by
personnel, the matter is handed over to the Human Resource Department and the penalty
is imposed according to the severity of the impact caused by the misconduct. The Senior
IT Researcher states that:
“We regard our information technologies, data, and information as our asset and
property. We regulate the conduct and the use of our systems. For example, we create a
firewall that also controls which websites our personnel can access during office hours.
We block websites such as porn sites and even Facebook and Twitter. So basically we
hope that they access only websites relevant to their work and don’t waste their
productive hours by browsing around cyberspace. Any staff member who manages to get
away with this and gets caught later on will be handed over to the Human Resource
Department and will be charged accordingly. Thank goodness there hasn’t been any such
incident in recent years.”
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The issue that now arises is whether the same procedures and regulations apply to
external users that are not personnel of Earl Capita Bank. The procedure and regulations
are enforced for access to Earl Capita Bank’s information systems as well as its data and
information content if their confidentiality category is not categorized as public data and
information (example of public data is the information content on the Earl Capita Bank’s
official website). Individuals, commercial banks, or financial institutions wishing to get
access to Earl Capita Bank’s information systems need to request a formal permission
from Earl Capita Bank. The Analyst of the Directorate of Bank Licensing and Banking
Information states such a procedure and regulation to be as follows:
“If someone wants information about a person’s credit score or record, he needs to come
to us and make a formal request for that information. He needs to provide valid
documents such as his own existing credit validation, ID, and whatever he has as proof
that validates his need. We will consider the request to be a fraud if he manages to obtain
the data but fails to provide any evidence or valid document. The penalty is a Rp.-50million fine per one piece of information.”

The penalty for misconduct and misuse of Earl Capita Bank’s information systems
is managed by the general court according to the severity of impact caused by the
misconduct. . The fine is regulated for ID Rp. 50 million (approximately US $5,807.20)
per one piece of data or information.

4.3.1.3. Script Revision and Script Replication: The script replication in Earl
Capita Bank occurs when an individual’s behavior becomes entrenched and minor

	
  

81

deviations of behavior occur which are not worthy of causing a stir in the
institutionalization process (Barley and Tolbert 1997). Script revision, on the other hand,
emerges only when major incidents such as a security breach or policy change cause a
radical change. As stated earlier, Earl Capita Bank does not have any record of security
breach in the past few years. Since there has been no major exogenous incident (e.g.,
security breach), then personnel are likely to reinforce their actions in order to conduct
habitualized actions. This is the core concept of script replication.
The practice of script replication and revision becomes visible when there is a
growing need to accommodate technology change. Whenever information technologies
need to be upgraded or replaced, policies and regulations that direct the use of such
technologies are revised as well. The artifact and regulatory revision is an authority that
belongs to the Information Technology Department. An elaboration of such authority by
a Senior Analyst at the Information Management Division is as follows:
“The authority to upgrade and replace IT hardware, software, applications, and suchlike
belongs to the Information Technology Department. The procedure requires that a
department requesting for a technology upgrade forward a formal request to the
Information Technology Department. When the Board of Governor agrees and a budget
has been allocated, the upgrade takes place. The Information Technology Department
usually sends expert staff members to deal with the upgrade. They also formulate and
socialize new policies and regulations for using the new technology. Of course, they will
also assign access privilege and security to the new technology.”

Earl Capita Bank has not undergone radical institutional change of its information
security. The focus of this subsection shifts to script replication instead. The script
replication emerges when agencies become familiar with what is expected of them and
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begin to internalize such expectations. The difference between the script replication and
revision phase and the earlier one is within the consciousness of action. Whereas the
previous phase denotes the personnel’s willingness to accept the regulation that shall
dictate their behavior, this phase depicts the threshold of behavior according to such
acceptance and deviations from approved behavior that might occur during the
acceptance. Regarding the issue of data ownership, for instance, the Senior Analyst at the
Information Management Division describes such an issue:
“Data ownership is part of the culture in Earl Capita Bank. It’s an ugly truth, yes. People
here do it anyway and it’s very difficult for us to change. This is mainly because they
think of us as the baby in Earl Capita Bank, or the stepchild that the Board of Governors
would get rid of sometime soon. It took us several years to finally convince them to
change their mindset that data and information belong to Earl Capita Bank, and not to a
particular department. They gradually accept this concept but yes, it does take time. But
I’m very confident that information systems in Earl Capita Bank will be completely
centralized in the future. Everything related to information systems, whether it’s about
data, software, hardware, and even security. We at the Information Management Division
are working hard to make this happen.”

The issue with unconscious script replication seems to relate to corporate culture
and maintenance of status quo, which is closely linked to social stability. The dataownership issue reflects a slow deviation from the status quo. Regardless of the attempt
to deviate data ownership towards centralized information systems, the security of Earl
Capita Bank’s information systems is well maintained. Many of the institution’s
personnel confirm that there has never been a case of security breach in Earl Capita Bank.
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Information security has been widely accepted as mandatory in Earl Capita Bank
and personnel have acknowledged its importance and identified procedures to implement
it. Despite the issue with data ownership, departments have enforced security practice and
have controlled access to their information systems according to the prescribed policies
and regulations. The prescribed policies and regulations are a privilege assumed only by
the Information Management Division and the Information Technology Department. The
unconscious implementation of information security, signifying institutionalized
information security, marks the final phase of information security institutionalization.
This phase delineates the objectification and externalization of patterned informationsecurity actions and behavior amongst the community of Earl Capita Bank.

4.3.1.4. Patterned-Actions Objectification and Externalization: The issue with
objectification and externalization of patterned actions emerges as an agency begins to
accept the revised script and behave accordingly (Barley and Tolbert 1997). The focus is
therefore on how actions and behavior become habitualized and rational, and how they
replicate the script prior to objectification and externalization. In the case of Earl Capita
Bank, personnel have begun to accept security policies and regulations, and interact with
technologies and security artifacts according to laid down policies and regulations.
The acceptance of and interaction with technologies and security artifacts denote
the typification of habitualized actions by Earl Capita Bank’s personnel. When the
actions and behavior become habitualized, the personnel unconsciously strive to maintain
information security in Earl Capita Bank. The Senior IT Researcher states that:
“Again, we have the best BCP in the country. So what I can tell you is that our staff and
management take the regulation and penalty for the same under serious consideration.
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We put every effort into becoming an example of dedication and conformity. If you ask
me, I personally believe in our integrity and commitment as a community of Earl Capita
Bank.”

Earl Capita Bank maintains a high standard of integrity and commitment as regards
its personnel. Earl Capita Bank regards information security as a socio-organizational
issue and is particularly confident of the integrity and commitment of its personnel. The
institution relies exceedingly on its policies and regulations that even restrict internal
behavior. This is in line with the position of the institution as a premier governing body
that formulates and enforces law, policies, and regulations. The Head of Risk
Management Team describes Earl Capita Bank and its personnel as:
“… a governing public institution that takes care of commercial banks and monetary
issues in Indonesia. We understand the risk regarding personnel’s misconduct that can
severely damage our reputation as an institution. That’s why we try to keep the risk as
minimum as possible, even zero. If we fail to manage our own integrity, the public’s trust
is at stake.”

According to the concept of patterned-actions objectification and externalization,
the integrity and commitment of Earl Capita Bank’s personnel creates high resilience
towards minor changes (e.g., technology upgrade) to the institutionalization of
information security in Earl Capita Bank. In addition to the integrity and commitment of
its personnel, the fact that Earl Capita Bank enjoys the highest authority in banking sector
in Indonesia contributes to the high resilience.
The objective of patterned-actions objectification and externalization is therefore to
highlight the interaction between social actors (i.e., agency) and artifacts, which in this
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case are technologies and security artifacts. Information and technology are the media,
i.e. artifacts, for structuring information security in organizations, including Earl Capita
Bank. As one of the modalities that that an agency socially constructs, the technologies
are used to routinely produce and reproduce social structures (Orlikowski 1992;
Orlikowski et al. 1995; Orlikowski 2000). Through agency’s interaction with these
media, behavioral and cognitive, (e.g., power, communication, sanction, etc.) properties
in the structuration of information-security institution emerge. Technology is regarded as
a tool to assist personnel in processing information and completing their day-to-day tasks
whereas technological use leads to information, which is the processed object. Earl
Capita Bank relates the use of technology to operational risk. Any information security
breach is one of the greatest lurking threats that can harm Earl Capita Bank’s reputation.
Despite there being no record of such a security breach, the central bank realizes the
potential for such incidents. Therefore governance of the use of technology is highly
enforced by the Information Technology Department and by the department that owns the
technology. The Head of Risk Management Team states that:
“As a public institution, the government and the people demand us to be transparent.
However, there are certain parts that need to be kept confidential. Potential leak is what
we call an operational risk and such a leak may create information asymmetry that can
harm the market. We have rules that regulate information which is for public
consumption and specific times when this information can be made available.”

The Information Technology Department manages the technical controls of
information security, conducting one of the department’s functionalities within Earl
Capita Bank. In addition to maintaining the operability of Earl Capita Bank’s Information

	
  

86

Technologies System, the department maintains the security of the technologies and
asserts the necessity to safeguard the use of these technologies. The department is also
responsible for raising the awareness about the importance of safeguarding the use of the
Earl Capita Bank’s information technologies amongst its personnel. The result of this is
the usage and implementation of secure information technologies by personnel and the
regulatory act to safeguard their use of these technologies. This implementation and act
has become a habitualized routine whereby personnel realize the importance of keeping
their username and password to themselves6. From the technological perspective, the
habitualized routine practices of technical controls and informal controls of information
security therefore socially structure the institution of information security in Earl Capita
Bank.

4.3.1.5. Discussion: The high emphasis on legality and regulation placed at Earl
Capita Bank identifies it as an information-systems focused institution. The issue with
data ownership, however, seems to be the most prominent stumbling block in efforts to
centralize information systems. Regardless of the seemingly disparate control and
ownership of information systems, data and also information within Earl Capita Bank, the
governance of information security is in reality under the authority of the Information
Technology Department and Information Management Division. The informationsecurity governance of the logical content belongs to the Information Management
Division, while the Information Technology Department assumes full authority on the
governance of the security of the institution’s technology and infrastructure.
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The security culture of making use of a username and password in Indonesia is so low that an employee
may share their office username and password with any “trusted” colleagues, hence allowing them access
to their personal professional information.
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The governance of information security within Earl Capita Bank is not centralized;
i.e., the governance practice is not directed by a single department. Rather, the concrete
responsibility is dichotomized and empowered to two departments (i.e., the Information
Technology Department and the Information Management Division)7. While the
Information Technology Department directs the technical controls of information
security, the Information Management Division manages the formal controls of
information security. The two departments share the responsibility to oversee the
informal controls of information security (e.g., raising personnel’s awareness of the
importance to secure the distribution and dissemination of information and providing and
promoting education of the personnel concerning the importance of safeguarding their
username and password). These three dimensions of information security are
continuously enforced so that they become grounded as a regular practice of safeguarding
the Earl Capita Bank’s information asset. Hence the practice of governing and
implementing these three dimensions forms social structures that have become routine
and are highly resilient, creating an institution (Björck 2004; Scott 2008). Other
departments simply determine which information systems, data, and information to share,
and select which users can gain access to their systems and access and utilize the
departments’ data and information. The other departments have the freedom to determine
the implementation of information-security practices and are required to contribute to the
security culture which is in turn governed by the two departments.
The data ownership issue, however, may hinder the effectiveness of information
security governance within Earl Capita Bank, interrupting the continuous reproduction of
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The dichotomized concrete responsibility is one that embodies the technical controls and the formal
controls. These are two of the three dimensions of information security as envisioned by Dhillon (2007).
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institutionalized information security. Each department within Earl Capita Bank
possesses power over the use of and access to information processed from its own
information systems. Personnel of each department are very knowledgeable about
managing and processing the information of their department’s information systems.
However, they can only access processed information from other department’s
information systems under permission of the department concerned. These personnel can
only procure a read-only access to information from someone else’s department and use
the end-result for analysis only. Each department has its own regulations concerning the
use of and access to its information systems and sanctions only such use and access. This
depicts the strong data ownership system that has its own merits and drawbacks. The
advantage is the guaranteed security of the access to Earl Capita Bank’s information
systems. The drawback is the uncoordinated and dispersed information that is supposedly
derived from the same data, but mostly leads to the creation of “the lack of architecture
interoperability, incompatible data standards, lack of relevant integration expertise, and
the existence of legacy processes” (Lam 2005). Figure 4.3 depicts the flow of authority
and responsibility among departments in Earl Capita Bank.
Figure 4.3 depicts the dual governance of information security, which is shared
between the Information Technology Department and the Information Management
Division. Process P1, denoted by the blue arrows, delineates the implementation of
information-confidentiality category by the Information Management Division and
information stewardship. Other departments such as the Information Technology
Department, the Directorate of Bank Licensing and Banking Information, and the
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Accounting and Payment System Department, implement the categorization and the
stewardship according to their function and need.

Legend:
 P1: order for
confidential
category.
 P2: request for
systems access
and grant of
such access.
 P3: IT
department’s
right and
responsibility
to create and
grant access.
Figure 4.3 – The Flow of Information-Security Authority and Responsibility in Earl Capita
Bank

The bidirectional red arrows of process P2 demonstrate the requests for systems
access and the granting of such access among departments. The green arrows of process
P3 highlight the right and responsibility of Information Technology Department to create
and grant technical access (e.g., username and password) upon request or when any
technological change takes place.
Despite the data-ownership issue that constrains the authority of the Information
Management Division, the consistent effort to safeguard the Earl Capita Bank’s
information asset creates the continuous structure of an institutionalized information
security. In an attempt to resolve the data-ownership issue, the Information Management
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Division created an information-stewardship concept, which highlights “trust and
competency; adoption of technology” (Rosenbaum 2010). This concept allows
departments to decide which of the data and information under their management can be
shared with users outside their departments. The practice is to ask departments to assign
different levels of confidentiality category to their data and information. Despite the rigid
procedure for external users and even internal personnel to gain access to data,
information, and information systems, Earl Capita Bank possesses one of the most
reliable and secure information-security systems in the nation. The effort is partially due
to the institution’s pledge as a public institution and a central governing body.
The summary of the institutionalization of information security in Earl Capita Bank
can be elucidated using the institutionalization model by Barley and Tolbert (1997). The
institutional realm signifies the structure of information security in Earl Capita Bank
while the realm of action signifies the agency and the behavior that shapes the structure.
Furthermore, since Earl Capita Bank is the highest authority in the nation’s banking
sector, external forces of information security institutionalization are due to technology
change or environmental change that initiates strategic change. The first process, namely
the script encoding, signifies the moment when, for example, the Information
Management Division introduces the information stewardship concept or the Information
Technology Department puts a new policy regarding the use of social network websites
during office hours in place. When personnel begin to acknowledge the new regulations
and departments begin to socialize these regulations, the principles of this script become
enacted as evidence imbedded in the agency’s behavior. Several stumbling blocks such as
the data-ownership issue might lead to similarities
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behaviors. They are, however, resolved through behavior revision and are replicated back
in the script as principles that emerge from personnel’s interaction with artifacts
(Orlikowski 2000). The behavior revision is progressing slowly as the data-ownership
issue has not been completely resolved in Earl Capita Bank. Finally, the replicated script
is permanently recorded in the institutional realm when personnel’s behavior becomes a
rationale amongst one another and is recognized as having become habitualized and
accepted as the norm in Earl Capita Bank.

4.3.2. Relationship with Commercial Banks
4.3.2.1. The

Macro-Prudential

Supervision

of

Information

Security

Governance: Earl Capita Bank is the regulator and supervisor of commercial banks and
other financial institutions in Indonesia. As a means to achieving financial system
stability, Earl Capita Bank also undertakes crisis management among commercial banks
and conducts banking intermediation. Earl Capita Bank attempts to maintain the nation’s
financial stability as depicted in its function to formulate financial regulations and
policies that are to be adhered to by commercial banks and financial institutions. It also
supervises banks and institutions in ensuring their adherence to such regulations. Such a
function elevates Earl Capita Bank’s status as an authorized auditor and supervisor of
commercial banks and renders it the deontic power. Evidence in support of this statement
is the historical fact of Earl Capita Bank being a governmental institution whereby its
Governor was a member of the Cabinet.
Today, Earl Capita Bank possesses the freedom to maintain financial stability. It
monitors and ascertains current domestic and international economical stance and
determines financial regulations in support of this stance. In doing so, Earl Capita Bank
	
  

92

regards information as a crucial aspect and recognizes that any failure to safeguard it may
harm the nation’s financial stability. Earl Capita Bank supports and protects information
confidentiality belonging to each commercial bank and encourages commercial banks to
safeguard its information from unauthorized and inappropriate access. Three departments
within Earl Capita Bank, the Accounting and Payment System Department, the Banking
Research and Regulatory Department, and the Bank Supervisory Department, are in
charge of regulating and governing the information access of commercial banks.
Various matters related to credit card payment, debit card payment, electronic
banking, or SMS (text-messaging) banking are handled by the Accounting and Payment
System Department. This department issues regulations concerning processing and
accessing of payment information. It also grants permission to commercial banks for
launching new electronic related banking products. The department is therefore
responsible for the security of this information. It owns several information systems
which are used to process information for electronic related banking products and card
payment products. Users from other departments wishing to have access to these
information systems can only do so with permission granted by the Accounting and
Payment System Department. The department also has the right to independently audit
and supervise commercial banks on their electronic-banking activities and card payment
functionalities. In fact, the accounting and payment system department is the only
department that oversees electronic related banking products and card payment products.
As evidence of this fact, the Head Payment Information Systems Supervisor denotes that:
“If we want to further investigate their security system report, we can summon them for
verification or we can pay them a visit in order to audit their system.”
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Furthermore, the department possesses sole authority to impose penalties on
commercial banks that fail to follow electronic banking or card payment regulations.
Failure to adhere to these regulations may result in several implications for commercial
banks, ranging from payment of fine to losing the permit to run their electronic related
banking products or card payment products. According to the Head of Payment
Information Systems Licensing:
“After the first and the second reminder, we always coach them. We don’t just leave
them to figure out what to do themselves. However, if they still fail to follow the rules after the
third reminder, then we have to decide that they are not suitable for owning such a banking
product.”

Other auditory and supervisory tasks are handled by the bank’s supervisory
department. In general, this department is divided into three subdivisions: the State Banks
Supervisors (Bank Supervisory Subdivision 1), the Foreign Banks Supervisors (Bank
Supervisory Subdivision 2), and the Private National Banks Supervisors (Bank
Supervisory Subdivision 3). The department assumes similar responsibilities as those of
the Accounting and Payment System Department in more general areas. It performs
annual regular audit and random audit. Annually, the department dispatches a group of
auditors responsible for visiting a bank according to the legal status of a bank. The
auditory team may consist of up to 10 personnel. For instance, subdivision 1 dispatches
auditors for a state bank. The Senior Private Bank Supervisor explains that:
“We make annual auditory visits to each bank. Prior to these visits, we create the annual
Audit Booking Plan, which is based on the bank’s current performance and future
potential risks. Specifically for Blue Sequoia Bank, we focus on three risks: credit risk,
operational risk, and strategic risk.”
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Such a visit involves auditing a commercial bank’s information systems, including
the security of such systems. For instance, the auditors determine the appropriateness of
network and server location, installed firewalls, regular updates of antivirus software, etc.
Random auditory visits, however, usually involve incidents (e.g. security breach) that
potentially threaten the reputation and operability of the bank.
Unlike the Accounting and Payment System Department, however, the Bank
Supervisory Department does not possess legal authority to formulate regulations. This
right is owned exclusively by the Banking Research and Regulatory Department. This
department formulates and develops policies and regulations concerning currency rate,
financial stability, and commercial banks. The Senior Researcher of the Directorate of the
Banking Research and Regulation explains the formulation of regulations as following:
“These are not the regulations or policies that dictate the practice of information security
in commercial banks. These are just guidelines that we have created that banks can
follow and modify according to their own conditions. I call them guidelines since these
contain basic information security principles that commercial banks need to meet, along
with the privilege of modifying them to meet their conditions. When we created this
guideline document back in 2006, I personally had less than five hours of sleep almost
every night. And it took us a year to complete the formulation process. We hosted several
sharing sessions where we invited large commercial banks and consultants to share their
ideas and experiences with information security. Although the guidelines are exclusively
reserved for use by commercial banks, we also incorporate some of the very essential
ideas for our internal use. This is exemplified by the use of ISO 27001 as the basic
framework for our internal security policies and regulations.”

	
  

95

Figure 4.4 – A partial view of the Information-Security Chapter codified in the Earl Capita
Bank’s Guidelines
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Due to the diverse conditions prevailing in commercial banks, the department is
obliged to formulate abstract and general regulations applicable to any condition and
technological advancement. Hence, these policies and regulations need to be further
enhanced by each bank to satisfy its personal circumstances. As a result, these policies
and regulations can even accommodate the needs of manual information-processing
banks (i.e. those with no automated/electronic information systems). Figure 4.4 depicts a
partial view of the guidelines, suggesting the required basics that commercial banks need
in order to satisfy the implementation of information security. The Senior Researcher of
the Directorate of the Banking Research and Regulation elucidates this notion as follows:
“Banks are a complicated entity. Some of them would actually come to us, asking us to
reconsider enforcing our guidelines. They would be whining about their legacy networks
and servers, their security system that is not up to date, and they would even beg us to
consider their manual information systems. I told them that the guidelines are meant to be
guidelines for every bank for creating policies and regulations according to their own
situations. You could probably hire more security officers if you have a manual
information system, heighten your existing security policies and regulations, or improve
your employee satisfaction for better commitment. Just because your system doesn’t have
a sophisticated security feature or is not automated, doesn’t mean we have to bend the
rules just for you. A rule is a rule- you have to deal with it.”

4.3.2.2. Discussion: The macro-prudential supervision framework highlights the
relationship between Earl Capita Bank as the governing body and commercial banks. The
relationship consists of two reflexive processes: the governance and control process by
Earl Capita Bank and the conformity and report by commercial banks.
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The macro-prudential supervision of information security governance uses the
legitimacy view of institutional theory (Björck 2004). The top-down lines labeled as the
governance and control lines as depicted in the macro-prudential supervision framework
(see figure 3.3) represent the supervisory acts by the Earl Capita Bank. These supervisory
acts include formulating and enforcing security policies and regulations, regular auditory
visits, and random auditory visits. The reciprocity acts (i.e., the bottom-up lines in figure
3.3) include the conformity actions taken with respect to the security policies and
regulations governed by Earl Capita Bank and the reporting acts of routing practices of
information security as well as security incidental cases.
Another department that owns independent information systems and possesses
liberty to formulate policies and regulations for using in such information systems is the
Bank Licensing and Banking Information Department. This department exclusively owns
the debiture information systems, which connect commercial banks and financial
institutions to a customer’s credit score, and serves as the administrator for the use of this
system. The system connects commercial banks to financial institutions and the
department provides policies and regulations for using the system. The department also
owns the right to penalize banks that fail to follow the regulations and grants (and deny
them) access to the system. In a response to a statement by the Analyst of the Bank
Licensing and Banking Information Department about access permission, the Senior
Analyst of this department states that:
“We issue regulations for use of the debiture information systems and we also determine
who can have access to this system. For instance, if a bank wants to assign some of its
employees to become admin for its application that connects to our system, the manager
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needs to register his employees with us and they need to complete and sign a request
form and send it back to us.”

4.4. Conclusion
Earl Capita Bank is a premier institution that acts as the central bank of Indonesia.
The bank originated in the Dutch colonial government as a commercial bank that
functioned to manage inflation rate and currency. When Indonesia gained its
independence in 1945 and matured as an independent nation, the bank was renamed as
Earl Capita Bank and achieved a central bank status. Such a status empowers Earl Capita
Bank with a deontic power and constitutive power enabling the institution to audit and
supervise commercial banks and financial institutions operating in Indonesia. Such
auditory and supervisory privileges allow Earl Capita Bank to audit and supervise the
practices of information security in commercial banks and other financial institutions. As
an independent institution, however, Earl Capita Bank also implements the practices of
information security internally.
The objective of this chapter is to present and discuss the empirical analysis of the
practices of information security of Earl Capita Bank. The practices of information
security are therefore divided into internal practices and auditory and supervisory
practices. The empirical analysis delineates the implementation of the three dimensions
of information security: technical controls, formal controls, and informal controls. The
implementation of these dimensions is not centralized, however- meaning that it is not
directed by a single department. Rather, two departments initiate the first two dimensions
and together, these departments manage the other dimension with respect to their main
obligations. All units in the institution reciprocate thereby socially constructing the
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structure of information security practices and continuously reproducing this structure,
creating an institution of information security.
Externally, Earl Capita Bank possesses the deontic power and the constitutive
power to audit and supervise the information security practices in commercial banks.
Empirical analysis has shown that the power property endows the authority and
government status to Earl Capita Bank. Commercial banks and financial institutions
respond to such status through conformity and adherence. The institutional theory used to
reflect such a relationship depicts two lines with opposite arrows: one line describes the
governance and control of information security regulations and practices by Earl Capita
Bank and the other line denotes conformity with the information security regulations and
reporting of the information security practices by commercial banks.
The issue of data ownership has long been shrouded in ambiguity at Earl Capita
Bank. The data ownership issue creates inconsistency of data and information in Earl
Capita Bank. Such an inconsistency may interfere with the practices of information
security, particularly in terms of the formal controls of information security. Reasons for
such interruption (e.g., lack of architecture operability, incompatible data standards, lack
of integration expertise and use of legacy processes) are evidence of the practice of
inconsistent information in Earl Capita Bank. Personnel need to be vigilant against
information risk as security threat has the potential to become a distinct possibility.	
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5

THE CASE OF CENTRO METROPOLITAN
BANK

5.1. Overview
This chapter presents a case study of an instance of the implementation of
information security governance at a commercial bank amidst considerable government
participation. The case study is also an example of a commercial bank’s conformity with
the central bank’s security regulations and policies as well as its compliance with
reporting norms concerning information security practices s laid down by the central
bank. As an independent commercial bank, Centro Metropolitan Bank has the authority
to put into place a routine practice of information security, thus creating an
institutionalized information security in Centro Metropolitan Bank. In addition, this
chapter presents a security specific case whereby the bank attempts to resolve such an
issue with the involvement and interference of the central bank. Such involvement and
interference are elaborated upon in more detail at a subsequent section, using the
institutional theory to depict the top-down process (i.e., governance and control) and the
bottom-up process (i.e., conformity and reporting) between Earl Capita Bank as the
central bank and Centro Metropolitan Bank as the commercial bank.
This chapter therefore aims to present a comprehensive description and depiction of
information security practices and governance in Centro Metropolitan Bank. The
practices and governance have been theoretically prescribed to involve external parties
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such as the central bank and external threats. In this chapter, institutionalization of
information security reflects both the internal and external information security
governance that is strongly influenced by the central bank. The organization of this
chapter is as follows: section 5.2 presents the history of Centro Metropolitan Bank as
well as its characteristics. Section 5.3 provides the empirical analysis for the Centro
Metropolitan Bank case. Various aspects such as the internal security practices elucidated
by a combination of institutional theory and structuration theory, the relationship between
the bank and the central bank as depicted by the institutional theory, and the descriptive
security incident or case study of electronic data-capture fraud. Section 5.4 summarizes
and closes this chapter.

5.2. Organizational Background
5.2.1. A Government-Owned Commercial Bank
Centro Metropolitan Bank is a large government-owned bank and is considered to
be the nation’s financial backbone. The bank is the largest bank in the nation in terms of
assets, loans, and deposits. As a government-owned bank, Centro Metropolitan Bank
receives full attention from the government and from the central bank in particular. By
December 2006, the bank had grown into one of the nation’s essential and key economic
and financial players and had even established three principal subsidiaries: Bank Syariah
CMetro, CMetro Sekuritas, and AXA CMetro. As a commercial bank, Centro
Metropolitan Bank is obliged to fulfill the following duties: (1) act as a financial
intermediary, (2) create and process information about firms, and (3) participate in the
nation’s payment systems (Scott et al. 1992). The financial service that Centro
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Metropolitan Bank provides is one of the best examples of its kind in the nation,
reflecting its efficiency and effectiveness in transactions involving financial instruments
(e.g. auto loans, mortgage notes, bonds, demand deposit currency, etc.) (Fixler 1993).
Like other large banks in the nation, the bank is headquartered in Jakarta.
In support of its commitment as a financial entity with an unimpeachable
reputation, the bank “maintains independent Offices of Compliances, Audit and the
Corporate Secretary, and is under regular scrutiny from external auditors representing
Earl Capita Bank and the Supreme Audit Agency (BPK), as well as international auditing
firms” 1. Centro Metropolitan Bank has enjoyed a solid reputation in internal audit
practice, which audits every aspect of the bank including the information security
practices. In fact, the bank’s internal Information Technology Audit Services are one of
the major management tools for directing its information security (Da Veiga and Eloff
2007; Knapp et al 2009). Centro Metropolitan Bank has envisioned the abiding
commitment to prudential banking practices and displayed the willingness to comply
with regulations and laws. The objective is to maintain good relationships among the
bank’s various elements, including management, stakeholders, and the Board of
Commissioners, on the basis of ethics, corporate culture, and corporate value. As a result,
the bank prides itself on its strong commitment to corporate governance and has proven
this by receiving many awards for best corporate governance practice and banking
service excellence.
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5.2.2. History of Centro Metropolitan Bank
Historically, the bank has emerged as a result of the merger of four governmentowned banks and has undergone a series of major reorganizations. The bank was
officially founded on October 1998. The merger was accomplished in 1999 as part of the
government’s bank-restructuring program, which was one of its attempts to remedy the
economic crisis which befell the nation in 1998. The history of the bank can be traced
back to the existence of the four government-owned banks that no longer exist but that
served as the bank’s foundation. These banks are:
1. World Heritage Bank: This bank originated as a result of an exhaustive process to
nationalize De Nationale Handelsbank NV, a Dutch-owned bank, which became
Bank Umum Negara in 1959. In 1964, Chartered Bank, a British-owned bank,
was also nationalized and its operational right was given to Bank Umum Negara.
In 1965, Bank Umum Negara was merged into Bank Negara Indonesia, becoming
Bank Negara Indonesia Unit IV. Three years later, the Unit IV separated and
became an independent bank named as World Heritage Bank2.
2. National Commerce Bank: This was one of the oldest banks in the nation. It was
initially founded as Nederlandsch Indische Escompto Maatschappij in Batavia
(now Jakarta) in 1857. The bank was renamed as Escompto Bank NV in 1949 and
was then nationalized and renamed as National Commerce Bank in 19603. The
bank served to finance the industrial and mining sectors before it was merged
with the other three banks.
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3. Exima Bank: The bank’s name stands for Bank Ekspor Impor Indonesia. It was a
government-owned bank that financed import and export. The history of this bank
is traceable back to NV Nederlansche Handels Maatschappij, a Dutch-owned
firm, which was founded in 1842. The operational activities included banking
activities in 1870. The bank was nationalized in 1960 and was merged into Bank
Negara Indonesia to become Bank Negara Indonesia Unit II. In 1968, the Unit II
was divided into two separate units, of which one served specifically to handle
exportation and importation. This subunit was then renamed as Exima Bank4.
4. Bapindo: Bapindo stands for Bank Pembangunan Indonesia, which originated in
1951 as Bank Industri Negara. Unlike the other three banks, Bank Industri Negara
was founded by the government of Indonesia and immediately served as a
government-owned commercial bank. The bank was intended to support the
nation’s economic sector, particularly in areas such as farming, industry, and
mining. The bank was renamed as Bapindo in 1960. In 1970, Bapindo served to
help direct the nation’s development process, specifically serving to finance the
manufacturing, transportation, and tourism industries.

All these banks have had significant impacts on the nation’s economical welfare
and have immensely contributed to it also. Hence the economic and financial turmoil that
tremendously impacted the nation in 1998 also hit the banks severely. The government
decided to merge these four banks, restructuring and reorganizing the new bank thus
formed. As of today, the bank has about 956 branch offices, 6 overseas branches and
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representatives, 2500 ATM machines, and three principal subsidiaries (CMetro Syariah
Bank, CMetro Sekuritas, and AXA CMetro)5.

5.2.3. Organization Structure
Centro Metropolitan Bank is directed by an executive management team of Board
of Directors, headed by a President Director. The management and governance are
supervised by the Board of Commissioners appointed directly by the nation’s Ministry of
State-Owned Enterprise.
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Figure 5.1 – Organization Chart of Centro Metropolitan Bank
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As a large institution, Centro Metropolitan Bank contains divisions each of which is
managed by a director. Each division oversees a subdivision (i.e., group), which plays a
significant role in conducting the bank’s operational activities. The governance and
practices of information security are managed by the IT security department, which is a
part of the IT Planning, Architecture, and BCP (Business Continuity Plan) group. This
group is structured under the Technology and Operations Division, which is responsible
for overseeing all issues regarding the implementation of Information Technology
System in the bank and by the bank’s customers.
Unlike those of Earl Capita Bank, the internal information-security practices in
Centro Metropolitan Bank are initiated solely by the IT Security Department. The Vice
President of the IT Security Department states the following:
“The vision and mission of the IT security department is based on the idea of
safeguarding our information assets. The formal statement is prescribed in the
functionality statement of our department, which states that it is our responsibility to
conduct the analysis, formulation, synthesis, development, implementation, and
evaluation of an IT security instrument to ensure the security of information technology
as an asset, whether physical or logical (i.e., data and information) of the bank in the
short term and in the long term.”

Hence the governance of information security within the bank is centralized around
the IT security department, involving controls of the technical aspects, formal aspects,
and informal aspects of security (Dhillon and Moores 2001; Dhillon 2007). The
department’s main responsibilities include:
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1. To coordinate the implementation of IT security solutions including
infrastructure, application, and operating system in which all functions
aiming at safeguarding the bank-wide information and data security.
2. To evaluate the internal IT security system and the best practices to create,
develop, and implement the bank-wide IT security blueprint and
infrastructure.
3. To coordinate the review process for business strategy, operation and
business process and application development, aiming to develop,
synchronize, and implement the IT security blueprint and strategy.
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Figure 5.2 – Organizational Structure of the IT Security Department

4. To ensure that user ID assignment and access right is in accordance with
policies, and to direct the custodian user ID and password using security
administrator, key management, as well as the public key infrastructure
certificate to ensure confidentiality and security of the Information
Technology System.
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5. To monitor and direct the implementation of the IT strategic plan and
architecture so as to safeguard the integration of the IT security
infrastructure as well as its synchronization even through changes in IT as
a whole.
6. To manage the administrative process, human resource, and budget in the
IT Security Department in order to ensure the implementation of
regulations at the departmental level, optimize resources (e.g., personnel
and budget) allocation, and develop personnel’s capability by providing
training and structured assignments.

As shown in figure 5.2, the IT Security Department consists of three subunits: (1)
the IT security solutions unit that conducts the IT security systems development, (2) the
IT security access and control unit that oversees the user access and privilege, and (3) the
IT security strategy and planning unit that formulates the IT security strategic plan and
blueprint as well as the IT security policy and procedures. These units respectively
provide effective information security governance and practices which are synchronous
with information security best practices, the bank’s culture and identity and the
technologies owned by the bank.

5.3. Empirical Analysis
This section delivers a theoretical review of the Centro Metropolitan Bank case
study. Drawing upon institutional theory and structuration theory, the case study
elucidates the institutionalization of information security from a sociological stance.
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Unlike the Earl Capita Bank case study, this case study includes a presentation of a
security breach incident, which is essential to delineate an instantiation of reinstitutionalization. Similar to the previous case study, the organization of this case study
is structured on the basis of the internal security practices as an inter-level
institutionalization and the relationship with the central bank regarding practices of
information security.

5.3.1. Inter-Level Institutional of Information Security Governance
5.3.1.1. Script Encoding: Just as Earl Capita Bank considers reputational risk as
its consequential threat, so does Centro Metropolitan Bank. Centro Metropolitan Bank
regards reputational risk, which is closely linked to operational risk, as a leading cause of
crowding out customers, potentially creating financial losses. With regard to information
security and technological security Centro Metropolitan Bank identifies access to
information and use of technology as potentially damaging risks if they are not properly
handled. The bank characterizes such risks as an operational risk and abides to the
handling of such risk using Basel II framework as a guideline. The Operational Risk
Management Team Leader defines risks within the bank as follows:
“We use the common definition for risk as a potential loss that may harm the
bank. We define operational risk using Basel II’s definition of operational risk,
which we believe all banks should refer to. This definition states that this risk is
a harmful risk that is caused by dysfunctionality, or inadequacy, or failure, and it
damages the bank through its people, procedures, systems, and events.”
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Risk related to systems, or the use of technology, is closely linked to reputational
risk as it may harm the bank’s customers. For instance, if the bank’s information systems
are down, the resultant impact is manifested in the form of customers’ dissatisfaction
whereby such dissatisfaction can lead to negative publicity that harms the bank’s
reputation. As such, the bank regards operational risk as more damaging than financial
risk.
Hence the bank rigorously maintains its information systems and their security.
Consequently, it possesses some of the most solid corporate information systems in the
nation. The bank prides itself on the fact that its most precious information (i.e., its
customers’ data) has never been found susceptible to any leakage. The information
technology security is maintained and preserved by the IT Security Department. One of
the department’s goals is to ensure the security of information technology assets, either
the physical or logical components (i.e., data and information), both in the short and long
run. This department also formulates policies and regulations on how information
technology and electronic applications are to be used to preserve information security.
Electronic applications include the bank’s intranet system, electronic banking, ATMs,
electronic data capture (EDC) machines, etc. In addition to ensuring the proper use of
information technology, the department also educates stakeholders and raises their
awareness about the importance of information security. The Head of IT Audit Unit
maintains that:
“All tasks that include regulating, enforcing, controlling, and revising standard
operating procedures or policies regarding risk of using IT are performed by the
Information Technology Department. They assume full responsibility for these
tasks.”
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Policies and regulations in Centro Metropolitan Bank are recognized as the
Operational Guidance Standard (OGS). This guidance standard is specifically developed
for operational activities and is used to manage operational risk, including information
technology and its security. Information security as part of the operational activities is
given special consideration. As a policy and regulation, the information security SPO is
formulated by the IT security department. The Vice President of IT Security Department
says about the information security SPO:
“When I create policies to secure information, or security policies, before they are
enacted, they have to be tried by the ORC (operation risk committee). And then, we give
presentations about these policies, and the ORC reviews and challenges the policies.
When the policies get through, the Board of Directors, particularly the Risk Director and
the Technology and Operation Director, sign the policies.”

In general, information-security policies and regulations are formulated based on
international framework and references in order to ensure rigor and functionality. These
framework and references include COBIT, ISO 17799, and ISO 27001 from which the
Centro Metropolitan Bank has received a certificate of excellence. However, the drive to
formulate and enforce policies and regulations is based on Earl Capita Bank’s guidelines
concerning information security governance and practice. Centro Metropolitan Bank
creates information-security policies and regulations according to its needs and culture,
blending all framework and guidelines given by the central bank. The Vice President of
IT Security Department states that:

	
  

114

“Earl Capita Bank does provide regulations and guidelines for use of information
technology and for securing their use. However, we want to modify such guidelines to
suit our culture so that we can use technology according to what we need and become
what we want to be in a cultural context.”

Hence, the IT security department owns the quasi-exclusive governance of
information security in Centro Metropolitan Bank. The department oversees matters of
technical controls, formal controls, and informal controls of information security,
although some matters may be shared with other departments within the bank. Despite
the privilege of formulating policies and regulations, the IT security department does not
assume the responsibility of regulating e-information usage.

Consequently, other

departments control the access to information, what information can be accessed, and
permits for such an access.
To quote an example, the Electronic Banking Group, which falls under the micro
and retail banking division, initiates and maintains procedures and regulations related to
the use of electronic banking products, including SMS (text messaging) banking, phone
banking, EDC machines, debit or credit card payment etc. Such a responsibility enjoins
the group to invent electronic-banking products, whereby the technology creation and
maintenance aspects are handled by the IT Planning, Architecture, and BCP group. The
Electronic Banking group also has to formulate and enforce the formats and the use of
personal identification number (PIN) for electronic-banking products among others. As
such, the group enforces how these products are to be properly used to maintain
information security. According to the Assistant to the Mass-Banking Vice President, the
framework to maintain the information security of an electronic-banking product is:
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“First of all, staff members that are involved in developing the card are sworn by
employment contract to protect the information about such a product. We regard the
development of a banking product as a program or project. Hence the staff members also
understand their duties and know what information is confidential or which of it can be
put up for public consumption who again vary according to the categories they have been
assigned. For instance, news reporters will be asked to identify themselves, the
organization to which they are affiliated, why they need to access our information, etc.
Another example is our newly launched program by which a customer shops at a local
market and receives a local brand of juice for free. We cooperate with the local market
that sells the juice and the juice distributor. We agree by law and contract that we won’t
disclose each other’s data. For instance, if we would like to disclose to our customers that
they can receive similar benefit at other local market, we need to ask permission of the
local market that is bound to us via our legal cooperation.”

The formulation of information-security policies and regulations, particularly the
SPO, marks the script encoding in the Centro Metropolitan Bank case. As a large
financial institution and a formal organization, Centro Metropolitan Bank initiates such
formulation based on risk management.
In the later section that describes an actual case, the formulation of policies and
regulations came to be initiated after an incident of fraud. The policies and regulations
serve as guidelines for governing and practicing information security in Centro
Metropolitan Bank.

5.3.1.2. Principles Enactment: The regulatory body of information security in
Centro Metropolitan Bank is assumed to be the Information Security Department. In fact,
all actions concerning information security from the level of branches to even the
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headquarters is centralized from the information security department. The department
assumes full authority and responsibility for overseeing information security in the bank.
Using a technical illustration based on the network and infrastructure, the Vice President
of IT Security Department states about the centralization as follows:
“The technology infrastructure and network of the bank is star-shaped. Probably it can
also be likened to the star network topology. It goes up from branches to headquarters.
Right here at the IT security department is where security is enforced and controlled. We
are the center for ensuring information security for the bank. All areas of IT operational
are protected using relevant tools.”

The branches are equipped with workstations, but do not maintain databases and
function merely as clients. Servers (i.e., the core-banking) are installed on the 4th floor in
the bank’s headquarters and make use of IBM AS/400 machines. Servers installed at
branches therefore only connect branches to headquarters. From a non-technical
perspective, any action occurring at the branch level should be reported to headquarters.
The report could be an initiative report, particularly reports for incidental cases such as
any security breach. These reports are intended to report new products, organizational
reformation or incidents. Branches have an autonomous right exclusively to maintain
their lower-level operations (e.g., hiring and delegating branch staff). As indicated,
however, maintenance of information systems and their security is a function which
belongs to headquarters, with the information-security governance and control being
delegated to the IT security department.
Other departments determine what information can be accessed, how it can be
accessed, and who can access it through the aid of the IT Security Department. As for
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information security, the other departments provide conceptual plans for informationsecurity implementation and delegate the technical implementation to the IT Security
Department. The Electronic Banking Group also determines the logical implementation
of security identification for electronic-banking products. For instance, to access the
bank’s electronic banking feature by using text messaging (i.e., the SMS banking
feature), the bank regulates and enforces two modes of phone banking using PIN:
•

Plain text: consumers may simply type in transactions using keypads.

•

Real-time menu: consumers experience interactive banking transactions.
All data is encrypted during transmission from server to customer’s cell
phone).

Whatever be the nature and type of the products it develops and maintains, the
group consults and requests assistance from the IT Planning, Architecture and BCP
group, particularly the IT Security Department, for the development of the products’
security. Hence, the technological aspect of these products is developed and maintained
by the Information Technology Department. In addition, any issue regarding these
products, including security breach, is handled by a special investigation team comprising
of the IT Security Department, the Mass Banking Group, the IT Audit Unit, and Board of
Directors.
The implementation and practice of SMS banking, which is the bank’s signature
electronic-banking product, provides one such example. Similar to the case of Earl Capita
Bank, data ownership seems to be the major parameter that determines how information
and data can be shared among personnel of different departments within the bank. As
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such, other departments requesting access to data and information from a particular
department need to provide a formal request to that particular department. Furthermore,
the department that receives such a request needs to request access to the IT Planning,
Architecture, and BCP group since data and information belong to the IT Planning,
Architecture, and BCP group, which is physically housed at the 4th floor of the
headquarters building. The group finalizes the request and provides the access
permission. For example, personnel from other departments are required to provide
formal request to the Electronic Banking Group should they intend to access e-banking
data. The E-Banking Product Manager verifies this notion:
“If a department wants our data, they have to make the request to me. For instance, it
could be a request by the Customer Care Department for the purpose of producing a
report on the total new customers for this month. That request should be addressed to me,
the owner of that product. But in order for me to get that data, I have to request the data
from the IT Planning, Architecture, and BCP group. But again, we act as the final
doorkeepers to the data because they’re not supposed to make such a request to the group
directly. All requests to access e-banking data and information should be made through
us."

Therefore, the difference between data ownership in Centro Metropolitan Bank and
Earl Capita Bank is in the power and authority of the division/department that oversees
information security. The data ownership issue displays a strong sense of power over the
use of and protection of data. Information stewardship as in Centro Metropolitan Bank on
the other hand merely emphasizes on data protection and recovery (Baldwin et al. 2011).
In Centro Metropolitan Bank, while departments address a formal request to an
information-steward department, that department is required to submit another request for
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grant of access to the main IT department, which is considered the owner of the data and
information. Centro Metropolitan Bank also has developed a dual-approval procedure,
which is a manifestation of exercising control as is directed by the central bank. This
essentially refers to a procedure of applying for approval to two bodies of authority
before a request can be granted. The data access request is an example of a dual approval,
whereby the teller has to request an approval from the head teller when the head teller
faces the decision to act beyond her authority.
The principles of the enactment of information security institutionalization in
Centro Metropolitan Bank can be summarized as a framework aimed at preventing and
managing fraud. The components of such framework include details such as:
•

Multiplicity of personnel performing duties: each task is performed by
several personnel, departments, or a taskforce consisting of personnel
from different departments.

•

Individualized access levels: this concept is similar to the access privilege
whereas each personnel involved in a specific task is given an access right
according to his or her unique role in the task.

	
  

•

Dual control and approval.

•

Supervision.

•

Transaction and post transaction control.

•

Exception reports: reports generated to detect unusual transactions.

•

Workflow.
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•

One-way passwords: each transaction request needs to pass the system
supervisor. The system supervisor determines the access eligibility of the
individual presenting such a request.

5.3.1.3. Script Replication: As a commercial bank with nationwide operations,
Centro Metropolitan Bank owns branches, ATM machines, and EDC machines
distributed throughout the geographical expanse of the nation. The operational aspects of
these entities are managed by regulations issued by headquarters and these regulations
reflect the unique culture of Centro Metropolitan Bank as a corporation. The Operational
Risk Management Team Leader says:
“All policies and procedures are determined at management levels. There is no way
anyone can create and implement procedures if there is no referring policy. These
procedures are not just for people at headquarters, but also for every stakeholder of the
bank. These procedures reflect our culture.”
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Figure 5.3 – The Triangle of Regulations of Centro Metropolitan Bank

The procedures, regulations, policies, and culture of Centro Metropolitan Bank are
depicted as a triangle. The top of the triangle, which comprises the policies, is depicted as
the highest level of regulations and functions across the bank. Policies are translated into
procedures, which are strategic and end-to-end6. Each procedure pertains to a certain
business unit within the bank and needs to be acknowledged and agreed upon by the
board of directors. An example of procedures is the procedure to handle payment cards.
These procedures belong to the mass-banking group. The procedures include:
a. Procedures to create payment cards.
b. Procedures to issue payment cards.
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This means that procedures need to be explicit and clear, and depict operational procedures from
beginning to the end.
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c. Procedures for use of payment cards by customers.

The lowest level, which is very unique to each branch or each merchant that uses
the EDC machines, represents the technical and implementation guidelines. These
guidelines are to be acknowledged and agreed upon by the head of business unit.
Illustrating this point is the requirement that the use of EDC machines needs to be
acknowledged and agreed to by a store manager before the machines can be adopted.
Another example is the implementation of dual-approval procedure at local branches. The
Operational Risk Management Team Leader talks about these risks:
“We have to maintain and heighten controls at our branches and at stores that use our
EDC machines. They are physically away from us here at the headquarters. We can’t bear
any consequences due to our failure to identify risks relating to people and procedure.”

At these levels, all regulations are adopted and implemented according to the orders
issued from the headquarters. Personnel and stakeholders (e.g., customers) at the lowest
level reciprocate this sensitivity to security to support the bank’s identity and culture. The
replication of such regulations (i.e., scripted behavior) is present across the bank: from
top level to bottom level and from headquarters at the nation’s capital to regional and
local branches. The paths of translating policies to technical and implementation
guidelines signify the script replication whereby principles contained in policies are
transferred and further developed from business units at the headquarter to guidelines at
local branch offices.
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5.3.1.4. Patterned-Actions Objectification and Externalization: Due to the
great diversity and the number of people involved in the bank’s operational activities,
control is rigorously implemented at branch level and merchant level (for EDC
transactions). This is because the likelihood of people- risk and procedure -risk becomes
much more apparent at these levels. The degree of control required for handling such
risks is higher to prevent manipulation by personnel. The E-Banking Product Manager
says:
“Once we had a case of deception by our branch staff. They were found to be playing
around with our dual-approval procedure. That one time, a customer registered for our
product and did not fill out his phone number. But a customer relation staff used her own
number and asked her supervisor to approve the form. That could happen and it did
happen. And then, when this form was verified, we found out that the phone number was
the phone number of the staff’s cousin. This incident was reported to us, and we
immediately started thinking of steps needed to be taken to make our dual-approval
procedure more effective. So my team and I sat down with IT, market operational risk,
compliance, and audit, and discussed how to improve the procedure.”

The biggest issue which arises with diversity is the protection and perpetual
strengthening of the organizational culture. Due to the eclectic and diverse ethnic groups
in Indonesia, diversity in culture causes Centro Metropolitan Bank to emphasize utmost
on assigning authority to the headquarters. Local branches adhere to such authority. In
information security, such authority in general determines how production, distribution,
and storage of data is implemented. The biggest issue is, however, lack of security
awareness. The Vice President of the Head Corporate Center Audit specifies this
concern:
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“The biggest problem that we have is the lack of security awareness, especially at our
lowest level. We put the onus to increase awareness responsibility upon our branch
managers. They are then made responsible to raise awareness of local branch staff and
customers alike. This responsibility allows managers to enforce the disciplinary act on
staff failing to comply with security guidelines. The penalty is hierarchical and is
categorized as follows: mild, medium, and severe. If there is a security breach at a local
branch, the penalty is considered medium. The staff involved will receive warning and
their misconduct will be recorded. They will also receive a salary cut for 6 months and a
poor annual performance appraisal.”

As such, branches are technologically linked with workstations connected to
headquarters to enforce control. Every activity at branch level has to adhere to the
policies and procedures enforced and are supervised by the Board of Directors and the
Board of Commissioners. The dual-approval procedure is strictly enforced to ensure that
personnel at the branch level comply with the policies and procedures. This procedure
consists of verification steps that a supervisor needs to implement in order to verify the
validity of a transaction.
As for EDC machines, merchants need to comply with rules about the use of EDC
machines which are prescribed by the acquiring bank and the central bank. Centro
Metropolitan Bank admits to the difficulty of controlling the EDC implementation,
particularly when the bank is the issuing party7. This is because it is impossible for
Centro Metropolitan Bank to supervise and control the use of its card products on EDC
machines that have offline feature. The only opportunity that the Centro Metropolitan
Bank has is to control its own EDC machines through regulatory mechanism and
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This means that Centro Metropolitan Bank is the issuing bank whose card product is used on an EDC
machine that belongs to another commercial bank (i.e., the acquiring bank).
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technology control. Centro Metropolitan Bank employs some of the strictest and most
rigorous procedures for merchants who wish to obtain the bank’s EDC machines (see part
B of subsection 5.3.1.3). In addition, the bank maintains the security of its EDC machines
by employing the following features:


Content security: this feature uses various cryptography schemes.
o Terminal line encryption (TLE): an encryption method that encrypts
data before it is transmitted from the EDC machine to the host.
o Pretty good privacy (PGP): this encryption method involves a third
party (e.g., Visa or Mastercard). Data is encrypted before it is
transmitted from Centro Metropolitan Bank to the third party.
o Triple data encryption system (3DES): this is a feature to encrypt PIN
numbers.



End point security: this is a feature to secure entities such as laptop
computers, servers, hosts, etc.
o Host-based intrusion prevention system (IPS): a system that detects
unusual activities at computer hosts end.



Security management:
o To consolidate monitoring of security tools.
o To adhere to international and local standards and frameworks.

The drive to conduct such practices is a part of the bank’s effort to maintain its
vision and mission and to better serve its customers. These practices demonstrate how
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doing so or using the given tools becomes a rational habit and a routine among not only
bank personnel, but also its customers and third-party card issuers.

5.3.1.5. Case: Electronic Data Capture (EDC) Fraud: This subsection presents
the security breach incident that occurred at Centro Metropolitan Bank in late December
2009. The case has never been publicized and is still undergoing investigation. This
subsection is divided into two parts: the incident and the aftermath.
A.

The Incident: In general, the EDC fraud case is an information security

breach case in which a fictitious merchant, a fictitious customer, and subsequently a
fictitious transaction resulted in financial loss to a commercial bank. Parties other than
the fictitious merchant and customer directly involved in this case, which occurred in late
December 2009, include Centro Metropolitan Bank and another commercial bank, Silver
Blue Bank, which suffered from financial loss. This case also drew attention and
intervention from Earl Capita Bank, which acted as an intermediary between the two
banks and also as a consultant. This case indirectly involved a credit card issuer, which in
this case was Visa. The case has never been made public as it is capable of causing
significant damage to the reputations of both commercial banks involved.
The case became a subject of serious attention when Silver Blue Bank, as the
acquiring bank, sent a chargeback on February 2010 after settlement (Base 2 transaction)
occurred. However, the Base 1 transaction, which was the requesting transaction, had
never occurred. This is due to the fact that Silver Blue Bank had allowed the use of
offline transactions involving debit card, a feature that should not be permitted for noncredit transactions in Indonesia. Debit card is less secured compared to credit card since
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debit card relies only on magnetic strip as an identification mechanism. Furthermore,
magnetic strip is not embedded with fraud detection aids. Since the Base 1 transaction
never existed, the credit card issuer could not debit the issuing bank (i.e., Centro
Metropolitan Bank); hence payment could not be made in favor of Silver Blue Bank. If
the transaction had been made online, Centro Metropolitan Bank would be able to
immediately reject the transaction during the Base 1 transaction. However, the offline
transaction allowed only for card number verification but was not able to verify the
magnetic strip.
The perpetrator of this fraud was very familiar with Centro Metropolitan Bank’s
Bank Identity Number (BIN), which comprise of the first five digits of a debit card
number. The perpetrator also had knowledge of transaction procedures using debit card
and the offline transaction feature that Silver Blue Bank offers. The perpetrator was able
to withdraw more than US $ 1 million and committed the crime from various spots in
Jakarta. To commit the crime, the perpetrator created and used a fake debit card that used
Centro Metropolitan Bank’s debit card characteristics and obtained an EDC machine
from Silver Blue Bank using a fictitious identification and false requests. The ease with
which he was granted a product shows the leniency of the procedures in Silver Blue
Bank. Centro Metropolitan Bank’s procedures require prospective customer to provide
proof of merchant permit, location permit, and applicant validity. Centro Metropolitan
Bank also demands proof of administrative legality and business continuity (i.e., product
shall not be granted if business is on the verge of bankruptcy).
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Figure 5.4 – Two Modes of Credit Card Transaction

Figure 5.4 describes the transaction processes using a credit card. The top box
depicts a credit-card transaction process using an online mode EDC. An online-mode
EDC transaction allows for direct customer verification as depicted by the base-1
procedure. When a customer enters his credit-credit identifiers (e.g., credit-card number
and expiration date) or swipes his credit card, the merchant’s EDC machine forwards the
identifiers to the acquiring bank that owns the EDC machine, requesting for customer
verification. The acquiring bank acknowledges the request and forwards the request to
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the credit-card issuer (e.g., Visa or American Express). The credit card issuer
acknowledges this request and forwards it to the issuing bank, which is the bank to which
the customer belongs, for verification and validation. The issuing bank then verifies the
validity of the customer and sends back the verification. The objective of the settlement
process, which is depicted in the base-2 transaction, is to make the payment request to the
issuing bank by the merchant through his acquiring bank. In an online electronic creditcard transaction, the merchant requests for the payment by sending a request to the
acquiring bank. The acquiring bank sends the request to the credit-card issuer, which
forwards the request to the customer’s issuing bank. The issuing back acknowledges the
request and deducts the payment from the customer’s account.
The lower box, however, depicts the offline electronic credit-card transaction. This
type of transaction is one that was implemented by the Silver Blue Bank and the
perpetrator for the EDC fraud case. The base-1 transaction demonstrates the merchant’s
assumption that the customer is valid during the initial transaction. In the offline-mode
base-1 transaction, the merchant accepts the payment that will be credited during the
settlement at a later time. In other words, the merchant does not immediately validate and
verify his customer. The merchant does so when he sends a payment request to the
customer’s issuing bank. The problem emerges when the customer or the credit card is
fictitious. When the acquiring bank sends a request for a payment that is based on either a
fictitious customer or a fictitious credit card, the issuing bank rejects the request as shown
in the base-2 settlement transaction. Unable to retrieve the payment, the credit-card issuer
requests the payment from the acquiring bank instead causing the acquiring bank to pay
up and lose money.
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In this instance, after Centro Metropolitan Bank rejected the chargeback, Silver
Blue Bank and Centro Metropolitan Bank both contacted their respective bank
supervisors at Earl Capita Bank. They also consulted about the case with their respective
accounting and payment system supervisors at Earl Capita Bank. Both banks realized that
if the case became public, they would suffer damage to their reputations and credibility in
the eyes of the public. In addition, Silver Blue Bank suffered a financial loss of more than
US $ 1 million. The accounting and payment system supervisors of Silver Blue Bank
examined Centro Metropolitan Bank systems and demanded progress reports on
resolution, action plan, and mitigation progress from Centro Metropolitan Bank through
the Audit Department. Progress was monitored and reports were requested and delivered
from January 2010 to March 2010. In addition, Earl Capita Bank also conducted random
inspections of all EDC machines as an attempt to ensure that EDC machines were being
used for online transaction only. One of the members of the perpetrator syndicate was
apprehended. The case is still under investigation as of now.
B.

The Aftermath: When an exogenous event such as an incidental case

occurs, a formal organization strives to return to social stability. In the case of Centro
Metropolitan Bank, such an effort entails attempts to diminish any damaging impact
caused by the EDC fraud incident. Internally, Centro Metropolitan Bank formed a
taskforce to handle this case. The objective of the taskforce formation is to investigate
any serious incident such as the EDC fraud incident and to coordinate the implementation
of preventive measures and actions. The taskforce consisted of personnel from the IT
audit unit as well as the team coordinator, IT Security Department (a subsidiary group of
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IT Planning, Architecture, and BCP subdivision), Customer Care Group, and Electronic
Channel Operation Unit. The duties of the taskforce are as following:
•

Assessment of the losses suffered by Centro Metropolitan Bank.

•

Indicating latent risks that potentially threaten Centro Metropolitan Bank
in the long run.

•

Remedying the acquiring process of Centro Metropolitan Bank’s EDC
machines.

•

Planning actions to remedy any loss and to prevent similar incidents in the
future.

•

Reporting the action plans to the Board of Directors.

In addition, Centro Metropolitan Bank also launched the following projects of:
•

Enhancing the security of Centro Metropolitan Bank’s EDC machines.

•

Reformatting the merchant acquisition policies to ensure the existence of
no fictitious merchant.

•

Forming a new unit whose task is to monitor transactions involving debit
card and guarding against any misuse or fraud concerning the card. This
was done because earlier this unit was a part of the credit card unit.

•

Modifying/reformatting

the

back

office

that

handles

electronic

transactions so that it is able to immediately detect a transaction that is
marked or indicated as a possible fraud.
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These efforts can best be described as controlled maintenance. Controlled maintenance
can be perceived as a period in time when structure becomes stabilized and hence rules
and habits become typified and grounded. Controlled maintenance is ultimately stated as
a post condition to the institutionalization and a priori condition to an incidental or
exogenous event. As such, when institutionalization occurs, controlled maintenance
emerges over time through habitualization of resource use. Controlled maintenance,
however, also signifies an activity that is initiated as a result of a security breach incident
after which the enforcement becomes heightened due to the strong involvement of the
central bank. Therefore, the objective of controlled maintenance is to promote social
order and stability in the organization. In terms of electronic banking transactions, the EBanking Product Manager describes this controlled maintenance as follows:
“We provide policies for customers who wish to use our SMS (i.e., text-messaging)
banking system and educate our customers on how to use this system. For example, they
are required to create a PIN during feature activation and we show them how to do this
through pamphlets. This breakthrough program is not a required electronic banking
product decreed by the central bank.”

The objective of the Bank’s controlled maintenance and task-force formation is
therefore to maintain social order and preserve social stability. The patterned-actions
objectification and externalization is a final process preceding a re-institutionalization,
creating a new episode of institutionalization. Centro Metropolitan Bank, suffering from
a serious incident that threatened its reputation, has put every effort into retaining the
already formed patterned-actions. The result of implementing controlled maintenance and
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taskforce formation is an implementation of preventive measures, which the Head of IT
Audit Unit concurs with:
“We continue to take serious steps to prevent any case similar to this EDC fraud case
from happening in the future. For example, we created a new unit that specifically
monitors and controls electronic debit-card transactions and enforces the policies of such
transactions. We also reformatted our back office that handles electronic transactions to
enable early detection of suspicious transactions. This case also attracted several
preventive actions by the central bank. The central bank has ordered that all EDC
machines are to be used for online transactions only. So no more offline EDC machines!
There is a six-month grace period to allow all commercial banks to change their EDC
machines.”

The newly reformatted back office emphasizes on the importance of reporting
unusual transactions (e.g., a base-2 transaction that is not preceded by a base-1
transaction for debit-card transactions). The initial focus was on the use of technology.
However, the mere utilization of technology has proved to be less reliable due to human
creativity and the general customer’s lack of security understanding. The Vice President
of IT Security Department confirms this statement:
“Most security cases are not caused because of technology failure. People can be very
creative. They can simply put a stick of cigarette matches inside the ATM’s card reader
so that any card inserted gets stuck. When the gullible customer gets confused, and
obviously starts panicking, the criminal steps in, disguised as our technical support.
When he succeeds in getting the card back, he gives a false instruction to our customer,
telling her to hand over the card and her identification to him for further investigation.”
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The reporting mechanism is therefore a combination of human effort and
technology operation. In addition to reformatting its back office, Centro Metropolitan
Bank also enhanced its EDC machine features, mainly to prevent offline transactions.
Such efforts depict Centro Metropolitan Bank’s intention to reorganize its operational
activities by addressing the major obstacle (e.g., security breach incident). Such efforts
have redirected the operational activities into becoming a habit and an action that is taken
for granted.

5.3.1.6. Discussion: Centro Metropolitan Bank views technology as an artifact
that is created by humans and used by them to aid them in their daily activities. The
interaction between humans, who act as the agency, and technology, provides meaningful
attributes to the technology as it becomes useful to humans. Technology alone does not
commit any crime, the combination of humans and technology, however, has a potential
to cause damage to an institution, including Centro Metropolitan Bank. In addition to
technology, the bank therefore, carries a strong belief that threat to information security
may be due to human factor. The practice of securing its information is in compliance
with the definition of operational risk by Basel II. When auditing the bank’s information
systems, the auditory team of the audit unit investigates factors that contribute to
operational risk: people (e.g. faults due to human error or lack of responsibility), process
(e.g. false procedures), external factors (e.g. hackers or outsiders), and system (i.e.,
technology) (Scandizzo 2005; Flores et al 2006: p. 384). Many procedures and standards
are formulated in a way that belongs to and is comprehended only by bank’s personnel
and customers. These procedures and standards are developed using ISO 27001
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framework, particularly for specific scope such as one that regulates data center. To audit
the bank’s information systems and their security, the auditory team uses a combination
of ISO 27001 and COBIT (i.e., for high level maintenance use such as governing risks
related to the use of information technology). In addition to these frameworks, procedures
and standards are formulated to conform to and reflect regulations as issued by Earl
Capita Bank. These procedures and standards become a habit and are communicated
among personnel, forming and reflecting the culture of Centro Metropolitan Bank.
The view that humans and technology together may cause harmful impact is
adopted by Centro Metropolitan Bank. This view is a fundamental notion of the socioorganizational view of information security. Similarly, this interaction enables the
emergence of behavioral and cognitive (e.g., power, communication, sanction, etc.)
properties in the information security institutionalization. As such, the central notion to
this is that of technology as an artifact. The procedures to access technology in Centro
Metropolitan Bank are centralized as they are maintained by the IT Security Department.
As such, the interaction between personnel and technology is regulated by the bank
whereby such interaction shapes the bank’s structure and needs to be secured in order to
maintain the bank’s existence.
The practices and implementation of information security in Centro Metropolitan
Bank are almost exclusively directed by the IT Security Department. The IT Security
Department enjoys the privilege to direct the three information-security controls (i.e.,
technical, formal, and informal). The formal control, however, is shared with other
groups or departments that own and manage the manual format of the automated banking
feature or product. The technical control and the informal control are therefore the
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exclusive privilege of the IT Security Department. Unlike that of the Earl Capita Bank,
the governance of information security in Centro Metropolitan Bank is centralized.
Centro Metropolitan Bank relies on Basel II’s definition of operational risk. This
definition highly emphasizes on people, process, external factors, and system and
believes that the functions of any system depend on people and process. Centro
Metropolitan Bank mandates one department- the Information Technology Department,
to maintain and regulate information systems and security, through its IT security unit,
within the bank. The IT audit unit functions to ensure that the operations of Centro
Metropolitan Bank’s information systems support the operations of Centro Metropolitan
Bank in general. Security breach cases in Centro Metropolitan Bank are generally
individual cases of security fraud at branch level and hence the appropriate actions are
usually taken by the branch management. Each branch has autonomy (i.e., independent
power). Each branch usually delivers regular reports regarding any activity as well as any
newly launched product, reorganization, or incidental case to headquarters. However any
action involving the use of information systems and security needs to involve the bank’s
headquarters. The Head of IT Audit Unit explains:
“Autonomy here means that branch may formulate its own policies within its
scope. If it involves system, management needs to report to the ones ‘above’.
For instance, if a branch says they want an IT operational staff, they will have to
make a request to the headquarters. If branch were given autonomy for the entire
system, that would be very difficult since our systems are very diverse.”
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Legend:
 P1: request for
data access.
 P2: request for
security and
data access to
IT security
department.
 P3: self-request
of owned data
to IT
department.
 P4 and P5: IT
department and
its subdepartment’s
authority to
grant security
and data access.

Figure 5.5 – The Flow of Information Security Authority and Responsibility in Centro Metropolitan
Bank

Unlike Earl Capita Bank, each department in Centro Metropolitan Bank needs to
send a request to the Information Technology Department in order to access data, as IT
Department is supposedly the information steward. Hence, access to data is regulated by
the IT security department, while other departments own the privilege to process data
according to their own need. For instance, if the electronic banking group needs to
request for access to the Internet banking data, the group sends the request to the IT
Security Department. According to its needs, the electronic banking group is given the
access and modification privileges to process and analyze the Internet banking data to
recreate other electronic-banking products and regulations. Figure 5.5 above shows the
implementation and practices of information security among divisions in Centro
Metropolitan Bank. P1 denotes divisions requesting for electronic-banking data and
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access to such data to the electronic banking group. P2 entails the electronic banking
group making security and access requests on behalf of the divisions to the IT security
department. Interestingly, P3 entails the electronic banking group making data request for
itself as well as other divisions to the IT planning, architecture, and BCP group. P4 and P5
denote the divisions’ authority to grant data access and security access, with P4
specifically denoting permission to use data by the IT planning, architecture, and BCP
group while P5 denotes access privilege by the IT security department.
The institutionalization of information security in Centro Metropolitan Bank can be
simplified according to episodes T1, T2, and T3. Each episode denotes all the four
institutionalization processes: script encoding, principles enactment, script replication and
or revision, and patterned-actions objectification and externalization. Episode T1 denotes
a condition prior to the EDC fraud incident. Episode T2 depicts a situation when the
incident took place in which each process demonstrates the efforts undertaken by Centro
Metropolitan Bank to cope with the impact. Episode T3 emerges as an effect of such
efforts in episode T2, in which social order and stability have successfully been
maintained. Script encoding in episode T1 describes a situation when Centro
Metropolitan Bank adopted the guidelines given by Earl Capita Bank, taking into account
Centro Metropolitan Bank’s unique culture and additional regulative frameworks (e.g.,
Basel II, ISO 27001). When principles are enacted in this episode, Centro Metropolitan
Bank’s personnel began to adopt the recently formulated regulations into their everyday
operational activities. Moreover, personnel manage to habitualize their action as script is
further replicated. This is because there is no incident or event that affects a change in
Centro Metropolitan Bank as an institution. An example of this situation is the regular
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practice of information security and governance, which pervades every place from
headquarters to local branches. Finally, the moment when personnel’s action becomes
successfully habitualized and hence institutionalized denotes the patterned-actions
objectification and externalization. In episode T2, script encoding is preceded by the
EDC fraud incident, resulting in much of the encoding effort initiated by the strong
influence of the central bank. The subsequent institutionalization processes denote the
bank’s struggle to overcome the impact of the incident by implementing the orders issued
by the central bank. Script revision applies in lieu of script replication since the incident
caused a dramatic change in the institution and personnel are aware of such change and
crave for improvement. Script encoding in episode T3 depicts a situation when regulatory
efforts take into consideration previous efforts in episode T2. The subsequent processes
in this episode repeat the processes of principles enactment, script replication, and
patterned-actions objectification and externalization in episode T1 with the difference
being that these processes signify successful maintenance of social order and stability.

5.3.2. Relationship with the Central Bank
5.3.2.1. The

Macro-Prudential

Supervision

of

Information

Security

Governance: A risk that becomes an actual threat with the potential to cause a
devastating impact on the bank and public in general is regarded as a reputational risk.
Any imminent threat related to reputational risk will often invite the central bank - Earl
Capita Bank to interfere and help in finding solutions to combat such a threat. As a
regular practice in adherence with Earl Capita Bank’s policies and regulations, Centro
Metropolitan Bank, as a commercial bank, delivers regular (e.g. weekly, monthly, or
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annual) reports to Earl Capita Bank and welcomes auditory visits by a team dispatched by
Earl Capita Bank. Owing to its own diligent reporting practice, Centro Metropolitan Bank
attempts not to involve Earl Capita Bank in issues that it is confronting; rather the
commercial bank strives to conform and abide with Earl Capita Bank’s policies and
regulations and to consult with Earl Capita Bank when necessary. The interference by
Earl Capita Bank often results in bad publicity for a commercial bank since it may be
perceived as being unreliable and unable to resolve its own problems.
Despite the effort to avoid interference by Earl Capita Bank whenever issues or
emergencies arise, regular activities (i.e., regular reports by Centro Metropolitan Bank
and regular auditory visits by Earl Capita Bank) are administered through “one single
door”, which is the Compliance Department. This department assumes a major
responsibility to deliver reports and written progresses to Earl Capita Bank. It also assists
departments in composing reports so that the requirements and format of deliverables
conform to those enforced by Earl Capita Bank. The Compliance Department is the
backbone for the bank’s institutional relationship with Earl Capita Bank. The Vice
President of Compliance Group confirms this in terms of the bank’s institutional
relationship with the central bank in the following words:
“The objective of our group is to represent our bank in maintaining institutional
relationship with the central bank. This relationship hinges on our obligation to provide
any activity report to the central bank. In return, they are watching over us too. An
important impact of this relationship is that we are required to adopt and implement
statutes and guidelines enacted by the central bank. All commercial banks are required to
abide by the laws enacted by the central bank and penalties are enforced on banks that
fail to abide. Of course, we select and evaluate only those that are relevant to our culture.
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Keep in mind that not all the statutes and guidelines can have significant impacts on our
operations.”

The practice of regular reporting begins with creating lists, which depict the
recognized and inventoried bank’s responsibilities. These lists are passed to the
corresponding departments in charge of maintaining practices of certain items in the lists
and the person in charge within such department is to elaborate upon the report. In
essence, this department strives to maintain good institutional relationship between
Centro Metropolitan Bank and Earl Capita Bank. Penalties are, however, imposed
whenever there is an error in reporting or late delivery. The Vice President of the
Compliance Department remarks on penalties, whereby:
In general, penalties are awarded when report delivery passes its due date. Another
reason for penalty is due to typing error in the report. For instance, there was an incident
by which a branch was trying to submit a report online, instead of typing of 3 million, the
person in charge typed 3 thousand. But this incident was immediately red-flagged and
handled so that penalty could be avoided.”

As the central bank, Earl Capita Bank, equipped with its deontic power, controls all
operational activities of commercial banks, including Centro Metropolitan Bank. The
implementation of such a control is based on the principles and guidelines that Earl
Capita Bank issues and enforces. Such control is also applied to operational routines
(e.g., e-banking products monitoring) in addition to control practices for incidental cases.
This control lays much less emphasis on punishment unless extraordinary impact takes its
toll on operational routines. In addition to the statement on electronic banking products,
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the E-Banking Product Manager makes another statement regarding the central bank’s
control on electronic banking products:
“…This breakthrough program is not a required electronic banking product decreed by
the central bank. The central bank, however, pays close attention to this service to ensure
that it’s working properly and it does not harm confidential data and information.”

Not only does Earl Capita Bank oversee the governance and implementation of
information security in Centro Metropolitan Bank, but Earl Capita Bank also exercises its
deontic power to interfere into Centro Metropolitan Bank’s incidental cases, including
security breach incidents. Earl Capita Bank plays its role as an external governing body
by summoning Centro Metropolitan Bank’s representatives for risk education, demanding
intensive reports on mitigation progress, and dispatching auditory teams. With regard to
the EDC fraud incident, the Head of IT Audit Unit says:
“…The central bank also dispatches a team to randomly inspect merchants whether their
EDC machines have been changed by their host bank to conduct offline transactions
only.”

In terms of information security case, the reporting practice is similar to the
reporting practices of other cases and itemized reports. The reporting practice of
information security case may be delivered by the Compliance Department, or not. . This
decision depends on the nature of complexity of the report. If the case to be reported is
delicate, the report is then composed with the assistance of the Compliance Department
and is also delivered by the Compliance Department. If the case involves inputs from
various departments in addition to the IT Security Department, the Compliance
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Department shall act as a coordinator for these departments. Before the report is delivered
to Earl Capita Bank, it is reviewed once more by the IT Security Department and passed
on to the Board of Directors to be challenged and debated. The final draft is then signed
by the Board of Directors and delivered to Earl Capita Bank.

5.3.2.2. Discussion: This section can be summarized using Scott’s multilevel
institutional processes, similar to the discussion of the same section in the previous
chapter. The focus of this section is trained on Centro Metropolitan Bank’s institutional
relationship with the central bank.

Figure 5.6 - The Institutional View of Information Security Governance Focusing on the Governance
Relationship between Earl Capita Bank and Centro Metropolitan Bank

Figure 5.6 depicts the institutional view of the information security governance of
Centro Metropolitan Bank which is governed and controlled by Earl Capita Bank. Similar
to the theory covered in the same section of the previous chapter, the line with the arrow
facing towards Centro Metropolitan Bank depicts the governance and control of
information security practices by Earl Capita Bank. The governance and control practices
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include controls on operational routines such as overseeing of the correct implementation
of electronic banking products according to prescribed regulations (Van Greuning and
Bratanovic 2000), demanding reports on information security implementation, raising
information security awareness, and auditing information security implementation. The
line with the opposite direction depicts the conformity and report of information security
practices by Centro Metropolitan Bank to Earl Capita Bank. This one-to-one governance
and supervisory relationship, which focuses on individual institutions, signifies the
micro-prudential supervision relationship (Khoury 2009; Krauskopf and Steven 2009).
As indicated earlier, the micro-prudential supervision of information security in Centro
Metropolitan Bank is administered by the Compliance Department in a manner called
“single door.” The representative tasks include providing regular or requested reports to
Earl Capita Bank and assisting Earl Capita Bank’s audit team during auditory visits. The
formal relationship between Earl Capita Bank and Centro Metropolitan Bank, particularly
in terms of information security governance and practices, stems from uncertainty
avoidance and power distance between the two institutions (Shankarmahesh et al. 2003).

5.4. Conclusion
Centro Metropolitan Bank is a large government-owned commercial bank which
has come into being as a result of the merger of four large government-owned
commercial banks. Three of the four government-owned commercial banks originated
from Dutch commercial banks and underwent the nationalization process after Indonesia
gained its independence in 1945. The economic crisis that hit almost all nations in Asia,
including Indonesia, in 1998 plunged the country into financial difficulty. Troubled
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commercial banks were either abolished or merged and restructured. The four large
government-owned commercial banks were merged and restructured to become what is
now known as Centro Metropolitan Bank.
The objective of this chapter is to discuss and analyze the case study of information
security in Centro Metropolitan Bank. Centro Metropolitan Bank is deemed to become an
example for other commercial banks in terms of IT and security governance practice.
Unlike Earl Capita Bank whose information security governance is shared by two
departments, Centro Metropolitan Bank empowers its IT security department to oversee
the governance of information security. The governance, however, is not exclusively
enjoyed by the department. The department is required to share the implementation of the
logical security regulations. An example of this being the regulations that require the use
of username and password to gain access to the Internet Banking, formulated and
governed by the Electronic Banking Group.
An incidental case, such as the EDC fraud, demonstrates government’s intervention
through the deontic power and constitutive power possessed by Earl Capita Bank. The
case depicts a fictitious transaction using credit card made possible by an offline-mode
EDC. In addition to the delineation of deontic power and consecutive power, the case
also demonstrates that implementing information security is a responsibility shared
among all subjects within an institution. This evidence is obvious as Centro Metropolitan
Bank formed a taskforce that consists of not only personnel of the IT security department,
but representatives of other departments to investigate the case of fraud.
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6

THE CASE OF BLUE SEQUOIA BANK

6.1. Overview
Similar to the case presented in the previous chapter, the case of Blue Sequoia
Bank also provides insightful depiction of the governance and practices concerning
information security in a large commercial bank. Blue Sequoia Bank is one of the large
banks in Indonesia and is a private commercial bank that has the capacity to leave
substantial systemic impacts on the nation’s financial well being. As a commercial bank,
the bank provides a wide array of services to its customers, including electronic banking,
deposit accounts, export-import facilities, and foreign exchange facilities. This chapter
focuses on the implementation of governance and practices of information security in a
private commercial bank.
In Blue Sequoia Bank, the information security implementation invites lesser
intervention from the government compared to Centro Metropolitan Bank as outlined in
the previous case study. Therefore, it can be safely assumed that the difference between a
government-owned commercial bank and a private commercial bank may lie in the extent
of government involvement. As in the previous case study, the case of Blue Sequoia
Bank also begins with the background description. It proceeds with details about the
governance and practices of information security within the bank and the impact of the
Central Bank’s governance on the internal practices of this bank.
The objective of this chapter is similar to the objective of the previous chapters: to
provide a theoretical depiction of information security practices and governance in Blue
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Sequoia Bank. The organization of this chapter is as follows: Section 6.2 provides the
historical background and characteristics of Blue Sequoia Bank. Section 6.3 provides the
empirical analysis for the Blue Sequoia Bank case, consisting of the following: the bank’s
internal security governance and practices modeled using the structuration view of the
institutional theory, the relationship between the bank and the Central Bank depicted by
the institutional theory, the descriptive security incidental case of the skimming of
automated teller machines, the interconnection between the structured security practices
and the institution of information security, and the impact of technology on structured
information security practices and vice versa. Section 6.4 provides the closing remarks
and summarizes this chapter.

6.2. Organizational Background
6.2.1. A Private Commercial Bank
Blue Sequoia Bank (BSB) is one of the largest private banks in Indonesia. It is
probably one of the few banks in Indonesia that own a large number of ATM machines
distributed in almost every geographical region across Indonesia. It is also the bank that
has the largest number of EDC machines used by merchants everywhere in Indonesia and
provides sponsorships for many social and entertainment events. The bank provides a
wide range of useful, efficient, and convenient services, which can be attributed to1:
1. A highly professional management team that is always on top of national
and international banking policies and regulations.
2. Highly trained, customer-oriented human resources.
3. A bouquet of innovative products and services that meet real needs.
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4. Appropriate use of the most advanced technology.
5. Relentless efforts to maintain the highest level of banking security.
6. A large network of branches and sub-branches throughout Indonesia.
7. A broad choice of distribution channels to ensure maximum banking
convenience.
8. As on March 31, 2010 BSB has around 6710 cash ATM, non-cash ATM,
and Cash Deposit Machines installed at strategic places throughout the
country.

Blue Sequoia Bank’s underlying objective is to always focus on the evolving
customer requirements. The bank strives to achieve this objective by continually
enhancing their products and services, i.e., adding more features to increase customerbanking convenience. For example, the bank rigorously adds more facilities such as
ATMs, features and services for Internet banking, features and services for mobile
banking, etc. In addition, the bank further tailors its services for its commercial and
business customers. The following is a list of services provided by Blue Sequoia Bank:

Types
Deposit Accounts
Credit Cards
Electronic Facilities
Banking Services
Loans
Bank Guarantee
	
  

Name of Products or Services
TAHAPAN savings, TAPRES savings, Demand Deposit, Time Deposit,
CD
BSB Card, BSB Master Card, BSB Visa, BSB JCB
ATM BSB, DebitBSB, TunaiBSB, KlikBSB Internet Banking, m-BSB
mobile banking, BSB Link,Call Center
Safe Deposit Box (SDB), fund transfer, travelers cheques, clearing,
foreign currency
KPR (mortgage), KKB (vehicle loan), capital loan, syndicated loan, export
credit, trust receipt
Bid bond, payment bond, advance payment bond, performance bond, and
Import Duty Exemption and Refund Center
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Export-Import
Facilities
Foreign Exchange
Facilities

LC, negotiation, bill discounting, documentary collections, bankers
acceptance
Spot, forward, swap and other derivative products

Table 6.1 – Products and Services Provided by Blue Sequoia Bank

6.2.2. History of Blue Sequoia Bank
The bank was founded on August 10, 1955 as the “NV Perseroan Dagang Dan
Industrie Semarang Knitting Factory” and commenced operations as the Blue Sequoia
Bank on February 21, 1957. In the 1970s, the bank provided additional channels, as it
became the Foreign Exchange Bank in 1977. During the 1980s, the bank expanded its
branch network and enhanced its information-technology services by establishing an
online system for its branch office network. It also added new products such as saving
accounts.
In the 1990s, the bank developed an ATM network as an alternative delivery
channel and installed 50 ATMs in Jakarta and its vicinity. To enhance the ATM deliverychannel service, the bank cooperated with the nation’s premier telecommunication
provider and Citibank. This cooperation allowed customers to pay their phone bill or their
Citibank credit-card bill through the bank’s ATM. Throughout its long history, this bank
too has undergone a lot of ups and downs. It most notably survived the severe 1997
economic crisis that hit Indonesia. However, the panic rush forced BSB to seek assistance
from the government. As a result, BSB was one of the banks that were restructured and
reorganized by the Indonesian Banking Restructuring Agency (IBRA). Eventually, the
bank overcame the crisis in the following year due to its exceptional management and
decision-making savvy.
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The recovery was clearly evident: assets increased from US $5.9 million in
December 1997 to US $7.5 million in December 19982. Public confidence was fully
restored and IBRA released BSB to Earl Capita Bank in 2000. BSB became a public
company the same year and hence its shares were slowly diverted from IBRA until the
agency had finally released 51% of its shares by 2002. A Mauritius-based financial
institution, Farindo Investment Ltd., won the tender. Today, BSB holds the distinction of
being one of the banks that exhibit good corporate governance, sound risk management,
and strong commitment to the needs of customers. It also boasts of being the bank in
Indonesia with the largest number of ATMs; by virtue of having 6000 ATMs distributed
across Indonesia.

6.2.3. Organization Structure
The management structure and organization of Blue Sequoia Bank is similar to
that of Centro Metropolitan Bank. The executive management team is the Board of
Directors, led by a President Director. Similarly, Board of Commissioners, headed by a
President Commissioner, supervises the management and governance practices in Blue
Sequoia Bank. The only difference is that the Board of Commissioners is not appointed
by the nation’s government. For instance, the bank’s main shareholder, Farindo
Investment, appointed an American citizen to become the Chairman and President
Commissioner of the bank in 20023.
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Figure 6.1 – Organizational Chart of Blue Sequoia Bank

	
  

152

Similar to the structure of Centro Metropolitan Bank, each division within Blue
Sequoia Bank is managed by a Director and each division manages groups that perform
certain functionalities and roles that support the bank’s operational activities. The
practices and implementation of information security in Blue Sequoia Bank are governed
by the Enterprise Security Group. This group is listed under the Information Technology
and Operation Strategy Division. This division is part of the Corporate Support Business
Unit, which is one of the bank’s four business units (i.e., Branch Banking Business Unit,
Individual Banking Business Unit, Corporate Banking Business Unit, and Corporate
Support Business Unit). Similar to the case of Centro Metropolitan Bank, the governance
and practices of Blue Sequoia Bank are the sole responsibility and privilege of the
Enterprise Security Group. In general, the Enterprise Security Group is responsible for
not only the IT security system of the bank, but also the business continuity plan (BCP)
for the bank. The Head of the Enterprise Security Group asserts this in the following
words:
“Our group manages the following: information security, physical security, and business
continuity. Yes, this means that we also deal with business continuity. We have a unit
that specifically handles business continuity and crisis as well as incident management.
This special unit manages our disaster recovery plan and actions. The Business
Continuity Management ensures that our operation is always continuous and crisis
management takes care of incidents that could lead to a possible crisis such as dealing
with power outrages.”

With respect to this assertion, the Enterprise Security Group deals largely with the
infrastructure and technical aspect of information security. The bank prides itself on
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having one of the most reliable Disaster Recovery Centers amongst all the institutions in
the nation. Unlike those of the other institutions covered in this dissertation, the Disaster
Recovery Center of the bank is located in a different geographical location from
headquarters. The credit for these measures can be attributed to the group’s belief that
disaster recovery and business continuity represent the ‘availability’ element of
information security’s core elements: confidentiality, integrity, and availability.

6.3. Empirical Analysis
6.3.1. Internal Security Practices (Inter-Level Institutional of Information Security
Governance)
6.3.1.1. Script Encoding: Similar to that of Centro Metropolitan Bank,
information security implementation and practices at BSB too are handled by one
department: the Enterprise Security Group. This department oversees issues in physical
or architectural security and business continuity. Any policy regarding information
security is initiated and conceptualized at the level of the Enterprise Security Group.
Hence this department assumes the responsibility and privilege of formulating and
enforcing policies and procedures regarding information security and business continuity.
The initiation of these rules is based on corporate needs. For example, a security policy is
initiated due to a need which has been analyzed and initiated by the Enterprise Security
Group or in response to a need for a tighter application procedure for new customers’ at a
branch due to the localized culture and higher crime rate in the area where the branch is
located. The Head of the Enterprise Security Group says:
“The initiation is often made by us, especially if we feel there is an urgent need to make a
new security policy and regulation. But sometimes, a branch feels the new policy restricts
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their freedom to conduct business and may request the modification of a policy in order
to make it fit their needs better. Anyway, it doesn’t have to be so rigid. We are very
flexible.”

As with policy frameworks for Centro Metropolitan Bank, the BSB uses ISO
27001 and ISO 27002 as its base frameworks for security policies and procedures. The
main framework reference the BSB uses is ISO 27001 so that the bank can fully comply
with regulations governed by Earl Capita Bank. Hence, the implementation of
information security in Blue Sequoia Bank shows a similarity to security implementation
in Earl Capita Bank. In Blue Sequoia Bank, divisions possess the authority and
ownership to own and process information assets. The implementation in Blue Sequoia
Bank however differs from that in Earl Capita Bank in terms of physical data ownership.
This practice in BSB is rather similar to security implementation practice in Centro
Metropolitan Bank. The Head of the Enterprise Security Group states this differentiation
as follows:
“Divisions own the right to own and manage their own data and information. If there is a
request received to access data belonging to some division, the permission needs to be
requested from that division. But we’re the one that give the final access to the data. Take
this case for example: a user from division A wants access to information which is owned
by division B. Then, division A needs to make a request to division B. After which, we,
the Enterprise Security Group, provide access to the information.”

Similar to Centro Metropolitan Bank, even if a group or division is the Information
Steward, the Information Steward still needs to make a request to access its data to the
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Information Technology and Operational Strategy Division. The Head of the Electronic
Banking Operation Group states the following:
“That’s right, we own the data. But we still need to make sure that they, the IT people,
provide us access to our own data, this is because they have the server.”

In practice, new information security policies and procedures are formulated by a
task force which is coordinated by the Enterprise Security Group. This task force
analyzes the gap between the bank’s needs and the requirements by Earl Capita Bank.
These rules are then finalized and approved by the Board of Directors. In terms of
business continuity, the formulation procedures include studying the impact analysis,
formulating strategies and procedures, and educating stakeholders. Through the
Enterprise Security Group, the bank seeks helps from consultants or higher institutions to
formulate business continuity procedures.
While the social and behavioral (i.e., human related) aspects of information security
of certain banking products are mostly handled by departments that own such products,
the Enterprise Security Group owns the privilege to deal with the physical and technical
aspects of the information security of such products. The department manages
installations and upgrades of IT systems security tools (e.g., anti virus software or
firewalls) and maintains the use of security management applications (e.g., identity
management application or user ID management application). The department reviews
these applications annually to assess the needs for further enhancement. Security tools
enhancement depends on availability of new patches or versions of such tools. These
maintenance and enhancements depend upon:


	
  

User (i.e., the bank’s personnel) request.
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Policies made by the Enterprise Security Group or by the Information
Technology Department (usually for development of new hardware).



Demand by a business unit or a department (e.g., the need to develop a
new banking product).

Regarding the maintenance and enhancements issue, the Head of the Enterprise
Security Group states that:
“Yes, the process is that way. So, if you ask me about any changes of technology and
security, there are three sources for such changes. These are the user, the policies issued
by IS or the IT and Operation Strategy Division, and a demand made by a business unit.
If a request comes from a business unit, it’s usually because of a new product or a new
service. So if a business unit makes a proposal request, we will assess the need based on
the IT requirement, security requirement, and service requirement, before it’s
implemented. All these could dramatically change the existing information security. But
you can also say that a user request represents a request by a business unit because a user
is the bank’s staff and a member of a certain business unit.”

In addition to the above mentioned security policies, the Enterprise Security Group,
has the authority to formulate and enforce policies regarding the bank’s Business
Continuity Plan. Policies and procedures regarding Business Continuity Plan are
considered complex policies and procedures.

6.3.1.2. Principles Enactment: In general, the bank classifies security risk as
internal risk or external risk. The bank believes that security risk often generates outside
of the bank and therefore feels the need to ensure transaction security and convenience
for its customers. However, the bank also realizes that risk can be an internal issue, which
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is likely to be caused due to unethical conduct by the bank’s personnel. An example of
this is data leaked by an employee for monetary exchange. Given this premise, the bank
feels the need to develop and implement integrated information security governance.
Despite the fact that breach incidents are often caused by human conduct, the focus of
security governance in Blue Sequoia Bank is largely on procedures to secure technology.
Just like any other institution, the bank also believes and does realize that security
risk is closely related to people- failure (i.e. socio-engineering issue) as stated by the
Head of the Enterprise Security Group:
“Security is not simply a matter of technology. Therefore, security is linked to the process
and people aspects. So we’re trying to make sure that the policies and procedures that we
have formulated meet the current technology development as exists out there.”

A shift towards more “human and organization oriented” security governance has
actually been initiated. Blue Sequoia Bank considers reputational risk to have a more
destructive impact than financial risk. As an attempt to implement a more human and
organization oriented security governance, the bank’s focuses on raising security
awareness, using standards prescribed by the International Standards Operation (ISO).
Some of these efforts include:


Annual security campaign by issuing encouraging statements to personnel.



Security education, for example displaying videos on security best practices
for personnel.



Customers’ awareness: efforts have been made as a part of the security
campaigns. These campaigns are short advertisements on national television
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or statements on how to securely type in a PIN number in an ATM, which
are published in newspapers and magazines.

Figure 6.2 – An Example of Security Campaign Using Sticky Note Aimed at Bank Personnel

Figure 6.2 depicts an example of the Annual Security Campaign which shows
statements aimed at the bank’s personnel. This statement is printed on a sticky note that is
distributed to the personnel. It is seen, and then is implemented internally by personnel.
The statement is loosely translated as “Is your computer anti-virus application in its
latest version?”
The practice of addressing a business unit or any specific demand by a department
starts by the Board of Director’s evaluating procedures and services for implementation
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of the new product. The implementation is then supervised by the Enterprise Security
Group. When such a demand is addressed, new policies are circulated and distributed
throughout the Headquarters and to branches. Branches receive the new policies and
procedures through electronic copies or via Local Area Network (LAN). Complex
policies and procedures (e.g., policies and procedures for Business Continuity Plan)
require socialization of the entire hierarchy from the branch manager to the lowest
functionary or clerks. As an effort to socialize staff to the new policies and procedures,
Enterprise Security Department personnel visit the bank branches to provide solutions for
the implementation of these new policies and procedures. Such solutions are the
conduction of workshops, developing information kits, providing instructional videos,
etc.
While the Enterprise Security Group deals with the physical and technical aspects
of security, the Electronic Banking Operation Group, for example, handles electronic
banking products such as ATMs, Internet banking, mobile banking, phone banking, debit
and cash electronic payments, and the Flazz® card. This department proposes and
develops new electronic banking products and maintains such existing products. Despite
the security requirements and applications being maintained and managed by the
Enterprise Security Group, new product proposals are handled by the Operation and
Service Support Group. Hence all policies related to electronic banking products are
formulated by the Operation and Service Support Group. Together with the Electronic
Banking Operation Group, the Operation and Service Support Group evaluates user
requirements for any new electronic banking product. This department also formulates
the policies and procedures related to the use of any new product. Security policies and
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procedures for a new electronic banking product, however, are still formulated and
enforced by the Enterprise Security Group. For example, when the Enterprise Security
Group formulates security policies for the purpose of electronic payment using a debit
card, the department reflects the policies already enshrined in the debit-card payment
policies which are distributed and enforced by Earl Capita Bank. However, as the Earl
Capita Bank requires a standardized format for debit cards, this mandatory compliance
requirement delays BSB’s attempt to enhance its security feature for its debit-card
payment.

6.3.1.3. Script Replication: Among commercial banks in Indonesia, Blue Sequoia
Bank is known for its large number of ATM machines and branches distributed
throughout the nation. Such a large number of ATMs and branches gives rise to various
challenges as far as promoting secure electronic and banking transactions in a nation with
a large population is concerned. The obvious challenge that the bank faces is in the form
of the various interpretations of security culture which are prevalent among Indonesians.
Owing to low Internet penetration, most security breach cases occur at branch level and
involve unaware or even gullible, customers. The Head of the Electronic Banking
Operation Group states:
“Security breach… Cases in security breach usually are caused by customers not
knowing the importance of keeping their information and transaction data to themselves.
It’s simply a question of customers being unaware of security. Indonesian customers are
different from western customers. Security breach cases in Indonesia often occur not
because of sophisticated attacks, for example hacking cases such as in the west. Here in
Indonesia, customers are not avid Internet users. In fact, not many people know about the
Internet and ICT, except those in major metropolitan cities such as Jakarta. Customers
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are so gullible that criminals take advantage of the lack of security awareness and prey on
these customers. Customers are tricked into handing over their private and sensitive
information to undercover criminals. That is what’s happening here.”

While state-of-the-art technologies and security applications have been the bank’s
primary concern, Blue Sequoia Bank does realize the importance of the people aspect in
information security. The bank understands that a strong security culture begins with
security-savvy and well-educated personnel. In general, the practice of information
security governance in Blue Sequoia Bank is closely related to and is embedded in the
bank’s business process. Any newly employed staff member is educated about
information security awareness, particularly on security rules. These rules are initiated
and formulated by the Enterprise Security Group. The rules are particularly enforced at
the bank’s touch points, which are points where personnel directly relate to and
communicate with the bank’s customers (e.g., local branches). Any violation of these
security rules is considered a fraud. An example is a staff member’s failure to follow
procedures for money transfer.
As a private, non government-owned institution, Blue Sequoia Bank has a more
straightforward culture and a less vertical chain of command. Already formulated rules
are studied by a task force. The objective of doing so is to analyze and ascertain if the
rules have satisfied both the requirements of the Central Bank and also the needs of Blue
Sequoia Bank. If not, then a revision is rendered necessary. All rules, including those for
information security, once formulated and revised are proposed to the Board of Directors
for approval. Once they are approved, a new policy is expanded to include the details of
the newly formulated rules in standard procedures. The procedures are implemented for
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the benefit of all personnel in all strata at various branches (see figure 6.3 for rules and
behavioral transfer).
Headquarter

Regional Offices

Main/Regional Branch Offices

Local Branch Offices

Figure 6.3 – Rules and Behavioral Transfer at Blue Sequoia Bank

As such, the new policies and procedures require thorough and rigorous
socialization at each branch, from the branch manager to the lowest level personnel. In
order to do so, the Enterprise Security Group at headquarters sends a delegate to each
branch. The delegate provides education and solutions of issues arising from the
implementation of these policies and procedures. Examples of policies and procedures
education and solutions include conducting workshops, distributing pamphlets, and
showing videos. Moreover, local branch managers have a right to connect directly with
headquarters through the operational development and service division to report and
register request for revision. The Head of the Electronic Banking Operation Group
expands on the issue of educating and socializing staff about the security rules for
electronic banking in the following words:
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“Education and raising awareness of e-banking products and their uses are done by us, the Electronic
Banking Operation Group. Our efforts include the education and raising of awareness about secure
electronic banking. The message is conveyed to customers and our staff using various communication
channels, such as emails and newspaper ads. We also put up flyers and banners at local branches.”

6.3.1.4. Patterned-Actions Objectification and Externalization: Blue Sequoia
Bank has the most sophisticated technology and information-security technology among
its peers in Indonesian banking sector. As the bank realizes that security is also largely
connected with people and organizational issues, the bank enhances its technical security
features so that people cannot trespass easily. In addition, the bank promotes concentrated
campaigns to increase security awareness among its stakeholders and educate its most
precious stakeholders- the customers.

Figure 6.4 – Electronic Token Device
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The bank has put comprehensive and sophisticated IT security systems in place.
The bank prides itself on its security coverage. The BSB was the first public institution to
issue electronic token for online-transaction authentication. The bank prides itself on
being the pioneer in the use of token for authenticating electronic transactions. In addition
to username and account, certain systems that are prompted for payment using BSB card
require a dynamic password that is generated by the token. The token, provided by
VASCO Data Security International Inc., is available free to bank customers provided
they are able to verify their account validity. The Head of Enterprise Security Group
reasons that:
“Authentication is important as it allows us to differentiate between those who own the
right to gain access and those who don’t. In the past, authenticating internal users was
easy since these are employees. However, development of technology and Internet has
provided the external users, our customers, with the capacity to access our systems.
Hence we figure that we need to create usernames and dynamic passwords.”

Other authentication technology includes biometric authentication. The bank has
incorporated biometric authentication since 1996, which is a system that works by
authenticating user’s fingerprint. Biometric authentication is used merely for internal
users, i.e. bank personnel. The bank is very serious about its information systems security
and pays particular attention to security technology. The followings are some of the
bank’s security technologies:


Technologies to preserve authenticity: these technologies are intended to
authenticate users. Common applications are ones that use user ID and password.
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o Electronic token device (see figure 6.4): This device generates dynamic
password (i.e., single-use password).
o Biometric (e.g., fingerprint scanning): This technology has been around
since 1996 and is for branch supervisors to approve any teller transaction
that is over the limit (e.g., a deposit of over US $2500 and a withdrawal of
over US $5850).
o External applications: These applications are used by customers such as
ones using web banking, requiring PIN or dynamic passwords generated
by the electronic token device.


Security infrastructure: Technologies and applications which are for network use.
o Firewall.
o Host intrusion prevention system: Works in a similar way to a firewall
operation but is used on a personal desktop or a personnel’s terminal. The
goal is to limit online access to the desktop.
o Network segmentation: The concept of dividing network security based on
priority and critical impacts on the bank.
o Tripwire: An integrity checker tool that continuously monitors a server to
prevent unauthorized changes in the server’s content.
o Fraud monitoring system: A system that alerts staff about any unusual
transaction.
o Antivirus application.
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Tools are also used to monitor the bank’s ATMs. In addition, the bank uses
surveillance cameras in ATM vestibules and is attempting to migrate its debit card from a
magnetic strip to a chip card; a feature found in credit cards. Of BSB’s 6000 ATMs, only
200 ATMs do not have the capability to read chip cards. Another tool used, Hewlett
Packard® Open View, does not relate to security functionality, however, and is used to
monitor and detect the life of the bank’s servers and applications.

6.3.1.5. Case: Automated-Teller Machine (ATM) Skimming: This subsection
provides a similar overview as the same subsection in the previous chapter, pertaining to
the Centro Metropolitan Bank. Since the emphasis is on security breach incident, this
section draws upon an incident of script revision resulting from an exogenous event
rather than script replication. An automated-teller-machine (ATM) skimming incident is
presented in this section.
A.

The Incident: The ATM skimming case can be used to describe the

information-security institutionalization at Blue Sequoia Bank. The case involved
installing equipment on an ATM to steal card’s identity. Similar to the incidental case of
Centro Metropolitan Bank, the perpetrator of this ATM skimming at BSB case is a
syndicate or an organized group of criminals. Episodes of this case were detected in
January 2009 when there were instances of unauthorized debit from Bulgaria and
Canada. More than ten customers complained that their accounts were debited without
their knowledge.
Once these unauthorized debits were identified, the bank discovered skimming
equipments (the skimmer and disguised surveillance cameras) mounted in ATM
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vestibules in 13 locations in Bali. The bank immediately blocked international
transactions for debit cards that had been used in ATMs in Bali during the period from
August to September 2008.
In January 2010, a huge increase in complaints by customers was addressed to Blue
Sequoia Bank. The complaints came from customers whose debit cards were not
debarred from initiating international transactions. The incidents showed unauthorized
debits from Bali and Australia. The bank then immediately terminated all debit cards that
had been used in ATMs in Bali during the period of August to September 2008 and
replaced these cards with new debit cards for the customers whose debit cards were
terminated.
The bank immediately performed an investigation and discovered the following
patterns:


The victims had transactions in Bali.



Unauthorized

transactions

(i.e.,

debits)

always

occurred

abroad,

specifically in Bulgaria and Canada. The authentic customers were able to
provide evidence that they had never been abroad when the transactions
occurred.

Based on these facts, the bank inferred that there was a syndicate that installed
ATM skimming equipments in several ATM vestibules active in Bali in 2008. The
syndicate was a team of Indonesians who are capable of using skimming technology from
Eastern Europe. The bank initiated preventive action, which concerned mainly securing
the PIN pad of ATMs. The ATMs were then equipped with a PIN pad cover so that the
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disguised camera installed by the perpetrator would not be able to capture the PIN
numbers which were fed in by the genuine card holder. Another measure taken by the
bank to combat skimming was to install anti-skimming equipment such as jitter
technology.

Figure 6.5 – An ATM Equipped with Jitter Technology

In addition to the technical prevention, the bank issued new procedures for use of
ATMs: improving ATM installation standards and procedures especially in remote areas,
the use of PIN pad cover for all ATMs, and installing surveillance cameras in ATM
vestibules and ensuring that these cameras functioned properly.
When the case first came to light in 2009, Blue Sequoia Bank immediately reported
the incidents to Earl Capita Bank and sought advice and assistance. The case was
reported as an ATM-transaction fraud. The bank initiated meetings with the Central Bank
personnel to discuss reports and complaints from the bank’s customers. Meetings were
conducted mainly with the Central Bank’s Accounting and Payment System Department.
This resulted in a complaint from the Central Bank’s supervisor, which is the subdivision
of the Private National Banks Supervisors (i.e., the Earl Capita Bank’s bank supervisory
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department subdivision 3), citing that the report should have been addressed to the
Central Bank’s Supervisory Department. This complaint, however, showed up the lack of
communication among departments within the Central Bank. In March 2010, when the
incidents became more prevalent, Earl Capita Bank dispatched an auditory team to study
and investigate the ATM skimming incidents in Blue Sequoia Bank.
B.

The Aftermath: Contrary to what Centro Metropolitan Bank experienced,

Blue Sequoia Bank suffered from reputational damage due to ATM skimming incident.
While there was no sizeable financial damage, the bank experienced significant loss of
customers’ trust in terms of using ATM machines for card transactions. The Head of the
Enterprise Security Group mentions about the reputational damage as follows:
“To be honest, there wasn’t that much financial damage caused by this skimming
incident. The biggest impact is on our reputation though. This is why we actually wanted
to use control. By this I don’t mean controlling our reputation, but we want to better
manage our reputation so there won’t be any negative impact on our reputation. For a
bank like us, the financial loss caused by this kind of incident is absolutely nothing
compared to the larger impact that could haunt us every year to come. So if you pay
attention to the larger impact, which could lead to reputational risk, it’s like we are
getting huge attacks. Why?..Because in the long run people will never trust our ATM
transactions. They are scared of using their debit cards on our ATM machines. This is by
far our biggest fear when it comes to security breach incidents such as this one. Not just
us, but I believe also all other banks in Indonesia.”

The extent to which the ATM-skimming incident impaired Blue Sequoia Bank is
delineated by its effort to undo damages caused by the incident. Similar to Centro
Metropolitan Bank, Blue Sequoia Bank has been forced to form a task force to handle the
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ATM-skimming incident. This task force consists of the bank’s personnel representing
divisions involved in the otherwise normal operational conduct of debit card transactions
as well as ATM support and maintenance. The main objective of this task force is to
investigate these incidents. The task force consists of personnel from the following
business units:


The Enterprise Security Group, which acted as the task-force coordinator.



The Technology Division of the Operation Strategy and Design Group.



The Operation and Service Support Group, whose primary task was to inform
customers who were victims of the incidents of disputed transactions.



The Public Relation Division.



The Information Technology Group, whose task was to investigate transaction
pattern.



The Legal and Compliance Group, who communicated the incidents and any
recovery-act progress to Earl Capita Bank.



The Risk Management Committee, which ensured that all recovery acts had
minimum risk impacts.



Division management and the Board of Directors.

Several steps that the bank undertook to prevent similar incidents from occurring in
the future are:

	
  



Improving standards for ATM installation.



Implementing the use of PIN pad cover.



Distributing and installing surveillance cameras in every ATM vestibule.
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Most importantly, migrating debit cards from magnetic strip to chip card.

In addition to such steps, the bank conducted a massive campaign to educate its
customers on the importance of secured ATM transactions. The objective is to raise
security awareness in general and to educate customers on how to securely use ATM
cards and make transactions on ATM machines or EDC machines. For doing so, the bank
distributed educative brochures and pamphlets, announced messages of information
security and debit card transactions on television commercials, and even conveyed the
same messages via the bank’s biweekly television program called “Gebyar BSB4.” Figure
6.6 depicts a sample of an online brochure that educates customers on how to securely
use their debit cards in ATMs. The Head of the Electronic Banking Operation Group
says:
“We are making every effort to raise our customers’ awareness about secured electronic
transactions, especially in the aftermath of the ATM skimming incident. This is one of
our efforts to gain back our customers’ trust and to show them that we are very serious
about this. We distributed pamphlets and brochures that tell customers how to use their
debit cards in ATM machines and EDC machines when they visit one of our branches or
when they do grocery shopping at one of our partnered local stores. Oh, did you watch
‘Gebyar BSB’? We educated our customers using our show. The audience nationwide
can benefit from this free entertainment show as well.”
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“Gebyrar BSB” is a national television program run by Blue Sequoia Bank to communicate with its
primary stakeholders (i.e., customers). The program is run every other week and is intended to be
entertaining and educative.
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Figure 6.6 – Online Customer Education about Debit Card Transaction

Blue Sequoia Bank has set a long-term objective to prevent a similar incident from
occurring in the future. The bank has developed a chip-card enabled debit card for ATM
and EDC transactions. As the bank adds more ATMs throughout the country, the ATMs
are enabled with the capacity to read chip cards. As already mentioned, out of 6000
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ATMs, only 200 ATMs of the bank do not have the capacity to process chip-based debit
cards. EDC machines on the other hand are able to read chip cards since these machines
were originally designed to accommodate credit cards, which are chip cards.

6.3.1.6. Discussion: Blue Sequoia Bank is of the view that technology can only be
harmful if it is misused by the human actor (i.e., the agent). Technology is regarded as an
artifact that aids personnel in their works but it is understood that it can also be harmful
for the bank and may even tarnish the bank’s reputation. Information security risk is often
attributed to the ignorance of the bank’s customers about the usage of the technology
provided by the bank. This unfamiliarity is often used by criminals to swindle money
from the customers. Hence securing technology at the customer’s end is the bank’s
priority in order to maintain its security. The Head of the Electronic Banking Operation
Group states:
“From the customers’ point of view, security is a must. What I meant was the security
feature for customers’ transactions. Once we fail to secure their transactions, our
reputation is damaged. This is because customers will never want to use our products due
to the mistrust issue.”

The bank therefore regulates the use of technology and the dissemination of data
and information as an important asset. The belief is that the regulated interaction between
bank personnel as the agent and technology creates a structured implementation and
practice of information security which is an attempt to safeguard the bank’s data and
information. As stated earlier, the bank mandates the Enterprise Security Group, which is
a subdivision of the Information Technology and Operation Strategy Division. The
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structured implementation and practices of information security in Blue Sequoia Bank
leads to the creation of the institution of information security in the bank, which is
governed centrally by the Enterprise Security Group.
Despite the seemingly technology-centric orientation of the bank, Blue Sequoia
Bank believes that information security is an organizational issue, involving people,
organization, and technology. The Enterprise Security Group therefore handles
information security issues from the technological, people, and organizational perspective
as well. Similar to the practices and implementation of information security in Centro
Metropolitan Bank, the practices and implementation of information security in Blue
Sequoia Bank are a quasi privilege assumed by the Enterprise Security Group. The
Enterprise Security Group, however, is given exclusive responsibility to govern the
technical control of information security in Blue Sequoia Bank. As such, some forms of
information-security governance acts are shared between the Enterprise Security Group
and other groups (e.g., the Operation and Service Support Group). The Enterprise
Security Group therefore has the privilege to direct the three information-security
controls- which are the Technical control, Formal control, and Informal control. The
formal and informal controls are shared with other groups within the bank while the
Enterprise Security Group retains the right to direct the technical controls. Specifically,
the formal control and the informal control are shared with other groups or departments
that own and direct the non-automated format of a banking product. An example of such
responsibility sharing is the customers’ security education and awareness which is shared
between the Enterprise Security Group and another division depending on the product
(e.g., Electronic Banking Operation Group for ATM transaction).
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Legend:
 P1: request for
data access.
 P2: request for
security and
data access to
enterprise
security group.
 P3: self-request
of owned data
to IT &
operational
strategy
division.
 P4 and P5: IT
department and
its subdepartment’s
authority to
grant security
and data access.

Figure 6.7 – The Flow of Information Security Authority and Responsibility in Blue Sequoia Bank

Only the technical form is governed solely by the Enterprise Security Group.
Similar to Centro Metropolitan Bank, the governance of information security in Blue
Sequoia Bank is therefore centralized. Figure 6.7 depicts the practice of information
security in Blue Sequoia Bank. The BSB’s implementation of information security bears
a total resemblance to security implementation in Centro Metropolitan Bank, with one
division requesting access to information being required to send such a request to the
information-steward division before the actual access is granted by the Enterprise
Security Group. If a group wants to request an access to electronic banking data and
obtain such data, as depicted by process P1, then the group has to make a formal request
to the Electronic Banking Operation Group. If the group permits such a request, the
Electronic Banking Operation Group creates a request to the Enterprise Security Group to
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unlock access to the requested data, depicted by process P2. Similar to the situation in
Centro Metropolitan Bank, all access requests for the data5 need to be addressed to the
Information Technology and Operational Strategy Division, as depicted by process P3.
Finally, P4 and P5 denote access to data by the Information Technology and Operational
Strategy Division and access privilege by the Enterprise Security Group respectively.
The institutionalization of information security in Blue Sequoia Bank consists of the
following three situations: T1 depicts the condition before the ATM skimming incident
took place, T2 depicts the situation when the ATM skimming incident occurs, and T3
refers to an episode after the incident occurs and the social order has been reinstalled. In
episode T1, Blue Sequoia Bank adopts and implements the security guidelines formulated
and issued by the central bank by creating a set of regulations marking the script
encoding, the bank’s personnel begin to internalize such regulations which denote the
principles enactment, and implement them. This implementation finally becomes a habit
which demonstrates the patterned-actions objectification and externalization. Similar to
the case of Centro Metropolitan Bank, the implementation of regulations and principles
in episode T1 denotes the script replication, signifying a normal practice when social
order is in place. Episode T2 depicts the situation during the occurrence of the skimming
incident: the latter processes (processes principles enactment, script revision, and
patterned-actions objectification and externalization) are preceded by the ATM skimming
incident and draw the bank’s attention towards reprimanding the perpetrators and
reinstating order after the incident. Since episode T2 depicts security practice during a
breach incident, script revision takes into effect instead as personnel seek to improve
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The data is stored in the server owned and operated by the Information Technology and Operational
Strategy Division.

	
  

177

security governance and practices. Finally, episode T3 depicts processes that are similar
to processes episode T1. This is because episode T3 aims to recreate a momentum of
maintaining social order and stability. The difference is that episode T3 depicts processes
of maintaining social order and stability post a security breach incident.
Most cases in security breach are caused by external factors (e.g., the ATM
skimming case in 2010). Internal security-breach cases are rare, and are usually
attributable to improper conduct of employees, and are not directly related to technology
misuse. As such, these cases always involve human actors in addition to technology
artifacts. In general, the bank regards that incidental cases arise due to the ability of agent
(i.e., stakeholders) to exploit weaknesses in the technology. The bank believes that the
well being of its information security depends on the harmony between its people,
process, external factors, and system. The BSB appoints the Enterprise Security Group to
secure the interaction between the vital elements of the people, process, external factors,
and system. Similarly, as incidental cases are attributable to actions of the agent, only the
group is exclusively responsible for the technical control of information security. It has to
share, however, the formal control and informal control with other groups or divisions.
Unlike Earl Capita Bank and Centro Metropolitan Bank, user privilege and data access
are exclusive responsibilities of Blue Sequoia Bank’s Enterprise Security Group. Issues
of user privilege and data access are considered technical aspects of information security
and hence are some of the main tasks of the Enterprise Security Group.
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6.3.2. Relationship with the Central Bank
6.3.2.1. The

Macro-Prudential

Supervision

of

Information

Security

Governance: Earl Capita Bank regards BSB as the most cooperative commercial bank
under its purview. BSB views Earl Capita Bank as a partner and consultant rather than a
supervisor. The BSB consults and reports any progress without Earl Capita Bank having
to request such a report or progress. As a commercial bank, the bank has to abide by the
regulations of regularly reporting activities and progresses, immediately reporting
incidents and offering solutions to such incidents, and proposals to launch any new
banking product to Earl Capita Bank.
Similar to that of Centro Metropolitan Bank, the reporting activity at BSB is a
responsibility of the Legal and Compliance Group. Hence, during reporting cycle, each of
the other departments develops reports that are submitted to the Legal and Compliance
Group. These reports are delivered by the Legal and Compliance Group to Earl Capita
Bank. The Head of the Enterprise Security Group expounds on the responsibility of the
Legal and Compliance Group as follows:
“Our door to the central bank is the Legal and Compliance Group. They take care of any
matters regarding the central bank. If there is any problem that we want to address to the
Central Bank, we go to the Legal and Compliance Group. This includes problems in
information security and technology. We formally create a report and give it to the Legal
and Compliance People. And then they forward the report to the Central Bank. If the
Central Bank people come to visit us for any purpose, the Legal and Compliance People
will have to assist them. So no, our institutional relationship in information security is not
initiated by my division. We’re involved though, but not directly.”
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When Earl Capita Bank issues new regulations, each department within BSB will
study the new regulations that correspond to the department’s functionality. The Legal
and Compliance Group helps in reviewing the new regulations if a department faces any
ambiguity with the new regulations. On the 15th of every month, BSB, as well as other
commercial banks, deliver monthly reports online to Earl Capita Bank. These reports
include issues with and maintenance of IT security systems. Through its Bank
Supervisory Department, Earl Capita Bank conducts an auditory visit to BSB and sends
its findings to the bank for further confirmation. Auditory visit also includes auditing the
bank’s firewall, server location, password reliability, etc. The Compliance Advisor states
that:
“You know what- we are actually being audited by Earl Capita Bank, right here, right
now. Their auditory team is just a couple of floors above where we are now. In addition
to card-payment products which is an area belonging to the accounting and payment
systems, they’re auditing just about everything. Yesterday, they audited our IT systems,
including our IT security systems such as our server location, antivirus software, server
location, and all other such IT security related stuff. But I’m not sure exactly what they
did since it’s not my area.”

Since auditing IT security systems is a separate task, the responsible host is the
Enterprise Security Group. This is in accordance with Earl Capita Bank’s regulation that
it may determine a specific department to provide reports to Earl Capita Bank. Therefore,
such department will be the host during Central Bank’s auditory visit or be it’s primary
reporter. The Legal and Compliance Group will only supervise the institutional
relationship between Earl Capita Bank and the hosting department that essentially
represents the BSB. The Legal and Compliance Group, however, may assist the hosting
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department if materials requested by Central Bank are deemed ambiguous or
complicated. The institutional relationship of auditing security systems of card payment,
however, is managed by the Legal and Compliance Group since card-payment auditing
and reporting are handled by the Legal and Compliance Group.
As stated earlier, electronic banking and accounting payment systems are audited
by an auditory team consisting of personnel of both the Bank Supervisory Department
and the Accounting and Payment Systems Department of Earl Capita Bank. Audit is
committed via two forms: a random, special audit and a regular audit. Regular audit is an
annual routine audit that is holistic in nature and may be performed randomly at any
branch. IT audit is, however, a case of random audit, and so is the IT security systems
audit.

6.3.2.2. Discussion: Similar to that of the case of Centro Metropolitan Bank, the
institutionalization of information security in Blue Sequoia Bank cannot be sufficiently
illustrated without elucidating the institutional relationship between Earl Capita Bank and
Blue Sequoia Bank. This relationship describes the institutional view of the information
security governance of Blue Sequoia Bank as governed and controlled by Earl Capita
Bank. Similarly, the relationship is described using the multi institutional process6 (Scott
2008). While the top-down process denotes the governance and control act by Earl Capita
Bank to Blue Sequoia Bank, as well as to other commercial banks, the reciprocity action
by Blue Sequoia Bank signifies the information security conformity and reporting by
Blue Sequoia Bank, which is mediated by its Legal and Compliance Group. Similar to
that of Centro Metropolitan Bank, the institutional relationship of information security
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See figure 3.3 and figure 5.6 for illustration.
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between Blue Sequoia Bank and Earl Capita Bank is a form of a micro-prudential
supervision of information security, which connotes a one-to-one institutional
relationship between the central bank and a commercial bank focusing on the
implementation of information security.

6.4. Conclusion
Blue Sequoia Bank is a large private commercial bank in Indonesia. The bank
boasts of the most branch offices and ATMs distributed across the nation. The BSB
originated as a commercial bank specializing in financing textile and garment industry in
the nation. The 1997 economic crisis that hit the nation severely damaged the bank
whereby a panic rush caused significant financial damage to the bank. The loss prompted
it to seek government assistance for restructuring and reorganizing. Today, the bank is
one of the strongest and most financially influential commercial banks in the nation.
The objective of this chapter is to provide comprehensive empirical description of
practices and governance of information security in Blue Sequoia Bank. Blue Sequoia
Bank is the financial institution in the nation with the most advanced technology and well
diffused and adopted technology. Similar to the governance of information security in
Centro Metropolitan Bank, the governance in Blue Sequoia Bank is undertaken by a
department that functions only to direct the security practices and its implementation in
the bank.
The difference, however, is that the three security dimensional controls at BSB
are almost exclusively maintained by the Enterprise Security Group. The security of the
debit card provides an example of how the three dimensional controls are maintained by
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the group with the formal and informal controls being shared with the Operation and
Service Support Group. The highlighted difference is that, rather than completely
surrendering the formal and informal controls to other groups or divisions like the
responsibility-sharing which is common in Centro Metropolitan Bank, Blue Sequoia
Bank opines that the Enterprise Security Group maintain the formal control and the
informal control altogether with another group or division.
The incidental case of ATM-skimming of information security breach provides an
example that lead to immediate investigations and actions. The case demonstrates the
bank’s effort to resolve the incidents while preserving customers’ trust and convenience.
Similar to the incidental case in Centro Metropolitan Bank, the ATM skimming case
demonstrates that safeguarding information and implementing information security are
important responsibilities shared by all stakeholders, including the bank’s customers. Not
only did the bank form a task force comprising of various business units which were
involved in the crisis to deal with the incidents, but the bank also reestablished its trust
with its customers.
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7

7.1.

SYNTHESIS

Introduction
The previous three chapters have covered the implementation aspects of

information security governance in the central bank and in two commercial banks. These
three chapters, each of which acts as an intensive study of a single information security
practice and governance case, observe “the entire configuration of individuals, groups,
and social structure in the setting of an organization” (Lee 1989, pp. 119-120). By
pondering on the inferences of the last three chapters, the objective of this chapter is to
synthesize important concepts which have emerged from the three chapters and to apply
these concepts to reformulate the proposed theory. The emerging concepts are divided
into two broad categories: the inter level of security institutionalization and the intra level
of security institutionalization. The intra level aims to demonstrate the focal theme of
information stewardship, which is a concept that embodies and encompasses the three
security controls. Another emerging theme within the intra level is the habitualized
security routine. For the purpose of this study, all these topics are visited from the
security-control-dimension angle: technical controls, formal controls, and informal
controls.
The only theme that emerges based on the intra-level empirical observation is the
institutional relationship. Each Bank’s institutional relationship with the central bank is a
notion of the micro-prudential supervision of information security (Khoury 2009;
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Krauskopf and Steven 2009). Therefore, the notion of the macro-prudential supervision
superficially comprises a collection of micro-prudential supervisions.
To recapitulate, this chapter undertakes a comprehensive discussion on emerging
themes, which are institutional authority, habitualized security routines, information
stewardship, and institutional relationship. The discussion begins by revisiting concepts
and theories, wherein particular focus is on the theoretical framework. This chapter is
organized as follows: section 7.2 discusses the inter-level institutionalization, provides
details on script encoding (section 7.2.2), principles enactment (section 7.2.3), script
revision and script replication (section 7.2.4), and patterned-actions objectification and
externalization (section 7.2.5). Section 7.3 looks at the macro-prudential supervision of
information security practices, covering governance and control (7.3.2) and conformity
and report (7.3.3). Section 7.4 focuses on elaborating upon the emerging themes:
Habitualized security routines (7.4.1), information stewardship (7.4.2), and institutional
relationship (7.4.3). Section 7.5 discusses important concepts which have come to the
fore in the earlier section. It also closes this chapter, and provides a summary of the
earlier sections.

7.2.

The Synthesis: Inter-Level Institutionalization

7.2.1. Overview
Institutionalization is a process of instilling values and creating a social structure
(Scott 1987). As a process, an institutionalization depicts sequential and logical steps, and
delineates a scenario in each step. In the context of this study, the underlying institutional
theory borrows the regulative pillar as institutionalization depicts situations of rule
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setting, monitoring, and sanctioning (Scott 2008). This study is built upon the regulative
pillar based on Scott’s institutional pillars and carriers. Scott (2008, p. 52) cited the work
of Douglas North to depict a regulatory institution in the following words:
“[Institutions] are perfectly analogous to the rules of the game in a competitive
team sport. That is, they consist of formal written rules as well as typically
unwritten codes of conduct that underlie and supplement formal rules… the
rules and informal codes are sometimes violated and punishment is enacted.
Therefore, an essential part of the function of institutions is the practice of
ascertaining violations and the severity of punishment.”

The four avenues of institutional reproduction, the exercise of power, complex
interdependencies, taken-for-granted assumptions, and path-dependent development
process (Powell and DiMaggio 1991), are implicit to the four steps of institutionalization
in this study. The framework for institutionalization used in this dissertation borrows the
one introduced by Barley and Tolbert (1997), depicting the following processes: script
encoding, principles enactment, script revision and script replication, and patternedactions objectification and externalization. In this study, these processes are used to
demonstrate information security governance and implementation in banking sector. In
general, the institutionalization of information security is intended to build formal
security structures and to depict actual security behavior (Björck 2004).
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Figure 7.1 – The Information Security Institutionalization in Banking Sector – Theoretical
Framework

Moreover, the Central Bank lessens the rigid nature of regulatory compliance to
allow a certain degree of freedom to commercial banks to apply the information security
guidelines according to their specific organizational culture. The Central Bank very well
understands that regulations and policies need to correspond with organizational culture
to allow for effective acceptance (Hone and Eloff 2002). While the drives for security
rules adoption and implementation among commercial banks are compliance and
conformity, such adoption and implementation in the Central Bank are driven by
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narcissism or survival need. As a strategic-change drive, narcissism places an entity as a
confident rival to its counterparts (Nana et al. 2010). , In this case, narcissism stems from
the Central Bank’s desire to become a leading and exemplary institution in the banking
sector, including in the arena of information security. An empirical example of this drive
is the implementation of Earl Capita Bank’s disaster recovery plans and its desire to
possess and demonstrate exemplary Business Continuity Plans. The need for survival,
which is an exogenous drive, emerges in the form of efforts to remedy security
management inefficiency in the central bank. This exogenous drive is similar to the drive
to re-institutionalize information security among commercial banks when they are hit by
any security breach. An empirical example of this drive is the move to improve employee
productivity by using firewalls to prevent access to social network sites (e.g.,
Facebook.com and Twitter.com) during office hours.

7.2.2. Revisiting Script Encoding: The Creation of Security Culture
The first process that partially portrays the institutionalization of information
security is the script encoding. As the first process to occur in an institutionalization
episode, script encoding entails socialization and “involves an individual internalizing
rules and interpretations of behavior appropriate for particular settings” (Barley and
Tolbert 1997, p. 100). Barley (1986, pp. 83 – 84) explains that a script can be used as a
primer for action and behavior and formal organization serves as “the grammar of a set of
scripts.” Scripts, however, are not necessarily rules and regulations. Rather scripts are a
set of guidelines for patterned behavior which have been formulated according to recently
adopted rules.
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The security policies and rules formulation is initiated by the management
commitment to advance and safeguard information asset (Chandra 2008). As with any
other set of rules and regulations, security policies and rules are formulated to
institutionalize “a kind of order and a kind of social order” (Selznick 1969, pp. 8 – 9) that
maintains information security. This study has demonstrated that each institution assigns
an IT security subdivision to oversee and control the implementation of security policies
and rules. Except for the Blue Sequoia Bank case, the other cases show that rules
enforcement affects the organizational culture of the other two institutions. The data
ownership issue in the central bank leads to a deviation towards a more centralized and
integrated information security management. While ensuring the technical security
remains the privilege and responsibility of the IT division, such a deviation towards
integration leads to the creation of information stewardship amongst divisions owning
data and information. The Centro Metropolitan Bank case shows that implementing
security rules needs to be implimented with reference to

the innate organizational

culture, which allows leverage for implementation and security maintenance on banking
products that are unique to Centro Metropolitan Bank (e.g., the SMS/text-messaging
banking).
Any conduct that causes the script to be revised has its origins in incidents (e.g.,
security breach, economic downturn, technology change, etc.) that deviate from routines
(Barley and Tolbert 1997). Script encoding starts the moment social actors begin to
accept socialized institutional principles such as hiring personnel, evaluating
performance, or offering goods or services to customers (Barley and Tolbert 1997). In the
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context of this study, the script encoding1 may also begin during the moment when the
Central Bank decrees information security rules and commercial banks adopt the rules.
Commercial banks readily accept such guidelines that are formulated along with adopted
frameworks and strategic information systems plan. Commercial banks understand that
the effectiveness of their information security culture depends upon how well aligned the
formulated security rules are with their own strategic information systems plan (Doherty
and Fulford 2006).
To enforce the adoption and implementation of security rules, the Central Bank
utilizes its powers: both deontic and constitutive. The information security guidelines
formulated by the Central Bank are to be adopted and implemented by commercial banks.
This process therefore serves to underline the importance of power and institutional
relationship as well as regulations and compliance, which comprise the regulative pillar
of the underlying institutional theory (Scott 2008). The regulative pillar emphasizes the
use of rules and laws as symbolic systems of governance and control. As an attempt to
adhere to rules and laws enacted by the Central Bank, managements of commercial banks
are aware of the fact that if they do not support information security, then this lack of
support can inhibit information security practices (Khalfan and Alshawaf 2004). On the
other hand, management support has proven to be crucial for the enforcement of security
policies and for enhancing the organizational culture’s tolerance with good security
practices in commercial banks (Knapp et al. 2006).
According to scholars, policies and regulations as sanctioning modalities are one of
the three modalities that social actors (e.g., bank personnel and customers) use to produce
institution (i.e., structure) (Giddens 1984; Walsham and Han 1991; Walsham 1993).
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Policies and regulations are created by social actors to preserve social order (Selznick
1969) and are, as such, an artifact used in structuration/institutionalization. Scripts that
contain institutional principles of information security emerge as a result of meaningful
and continuous interactions between social actors and security artifacts and rules. These
institutional principles are a set of patterned actions that have been previously objectified
and externalized in a previous episode (TN-1) of an institutional realm. As such, these
institutional principles are more than mere policies and regulations, which are only a
notion of formal controls. The institutional principles of information security constitute
the experiences of the social actors’ which arise out of their use of (security) artifacts and
from their knowledge of using such artifacts (Orlikowski 2000). Examples include a set
of principles to secure the use of ATM machines and a set of principles to secure the use
of SMS (text- messaging-service) banking.
How do these institutional principles of information security emerge? A necessary
factor for their emergence is that technical security systems should be augmented by
adequate organizational support (formal controls) as well as by good information-security
governance and security culture (informal controls). Only by maintaining the integrity of
the three security-control dimensions shall information security prevail and become
institutionalized (Dhillon 2007). Once it becomes institutionalized, all information
security practices, originating from patterned-actions objectification and externalization
from a previous episode, manifest as a habit that may serve as principles that
continuously guide social actors’ security behavior. Drawing on institutional principles of
information security, bank personnel and customers will always encode these scripts as a
behavioral script prior to performing their action. In order to do so, bank personnel and
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customers own a set of institutional principles of information security that are embedded
in the institutional realm, built upon (habitualized) courses of actions drawn from
previous episodes.
The habitualized security actions that result compose a corporate security culture
which is unique to formal organization. A corporate information security culture supports
security rules, procedures, methods, and responsibilities, and becomes a natural habit or a
routine that is performed by personnel (Von Solms 2000; Chang and Lin 2007). The
objective of information security culture is to assist and guide stakeholders to think about,
act upon, and experiment with information security in their organization (Chang and Lin
2007). The major obstacle that hinders the creation of information security culture is
often the clash between security rules and the customary ways in which the social actors
have conducted their tasks over time (Chang and Lin 2007). Social actors are therefore
questioned in terms of their ethical conducts (Dhillon and Backhouse 2000) which form
the norm, to adjust to security rules and culture.
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Figure 7.2 – A Framework for Script Encoding at any Given Episode
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All institutions in the three case studies agree that effective and efficient
information security can only be achieved when controls are implemented simultaneously
on technical, organizational, and behavioral aspects (Dutta and Roy 2008). Based on
figure 7.2, three security-control dimensions form the corporate security culture and are
interchangeable. For example, experience (i.e., cumulative history of actions) of using
security artifacts is determined by patterned security behavior according to the already
prescribed security policies and procedures. Each dimension is triggered by a
combination of endogenous drive, exogenous drive, or both.
The 2008 ATM skimming incident at Blue Sequoia Bank, for example, has afflicted
the way customers use ATM machines and their debit cards, changed security policies
and procedures at ATM machines and the use of debit cards, and motivated the bank to
educate its customers through mass media campaigns. Therefore, bank personnel and
customers as the social actors readily accept the institutional principles that already linger
and encode these into scripts that guide their security behavior. The act of encoding
creates a boundary for social actors to behave according to the scripts, thus constraining
their actions.

7.2.3. Revisiting Principles Enactment: Intentional Versus Unintentional Actions
The principles enactment2 starts from successful adoption of rules and encoded
scripts among social actors. At this stage, social actors readily accept regulations and
begin to socialize these regulations into their activities in the organization, attempting to
make these newly regulated activities a routine or a habit. The acceptance and adoption
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of these regulations and institutional principles, or script enactment by social actors,
ideally does not involve awareness (Barley and Tolbert 1997). The prescribed behavior is
viewed as rational by social actors and is the only acceptable way to conform to the social
structure. When formalized actions become embedded in a collective organizational
behavior, social actors voluntarily behave according to prescribed institutional principles
and rules as a routine rationale (Berger and Luckmann 1966; Powell and DiMaggio 1991;
Scott 2008). Social actors adjust their behavior, whether or not they are aware of
behaving in such a way, when interacting with artifacts and facilities (Barley 1986;
Barley and Tolbert 1997; Giddens 1984).
This stage sees the implementation of rules set by the Central Bank, which are
formed

as

institutional

principles

after

repeated

institutionalizations.

The

implementations of the institutional principles in different organizations depend upon the
individualized modes of action and organizational culture. Centro Metropolitan Bank, for
example, develops a framework for managing fraud, which is an implementation of
Information Security Guidelines. On the other hand, Blue Sequoia Bank focuses more on
technology. This bank implements the information security guidelines by deploying stateof-the-art security technologies system and investing in technology, most evidently by its
use of electronic token device as a complimentary security authentication for electronic
banking and transactions. This in turn forces Blue Sequoia Bank to develop standards of
procedure for personnel using its security technologies and also adopt measures to raise
its customers’ awareness about the importance of security.
While there are scripts that serve as a prescription for behavior, social actors often
do not consciously follow the scripts (Barley and Tolbert 1997). Social actors behave
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unintentionally, simply according to the scripts. When they realize that their behavior is
according to the scripts, social actors reinstate their rationale in doing so. Bank personnel
(e.g., management and staff members) and customers maintain their Organizational
Information Security when they are restricted in their organization’s institutional realm
(Hazari et al. 2008). Managing security behavior can be achieved through the
enforcement of security rules, culture, and value system (Dhillon 2001). Security
behavior is determined by information security awareness and hence drives actors’
compliance with security rules (Bulgurcu et al. 2010).
The prescribed behavior comes with a set of penalties for compliance failure.
Penalty as an attribute of law is fundamental for the preservation of social order (Selznick
1969). This study believes that security behavior is a result of compliance with security
rules and information security awareness (Bulgurcu et al. 2010). For example, as a
governmental public institution, Earl Capita Bank has announced that personnel misusing
data or using data for a purpose other than that originally proposed will commit a felony.
To avoid misconduct, Centro Metropolitan Bank creates and implements a dual control
and approval procedure for its data access request whereby a staff member from one
division needs to create a formal request to the data-owning department. The data-owner
department in turn forwards the request to the IT department for the actual data. These
implementations demonstrate security management control, or institutional authority, of
all the three dimensions: technical, formal, and informal. While Blue Sequoia Bank
seems to pay more attention to technical control, the other two institutions have imbibed
a more balanced focus on the issue of security-control dimensions.
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The success of institutional principles of information security enactment is
generally based on sanctioning, awareness, and habitualized routine. Studies have
pinpointed the importance of sanctioning employees to perpetuate security rules in order
to enforce information security (Bulgurcu et al. 2010; Herath and Rao 2009; Hong et al.
2006; Moulton and Coles 2003; Straub and Welke 1998; Von Solms and Von Solms
2009). Such principles enactment can therefore be classified into two general categories:
1. Intentional/aware: In this category, social actors safeguard their information
asset with the awareness that they are under authority supervision and they feel
responsible to the social system (i.e., institution) they belong to. While
institutional and structuration scholars argue that institutionalization/structuration
emerges from habitualized actions, this study is based upon formal institutions
where regulations and bureaucracy are rigid and apparent. The rigidity of
regulations and bureaucracy among these institutions is a result of the multilevel
governance initiated by the Central Bank at the highest level. Not only do bank
personnel feel responsible and obligated to support information security in their
institution, bank personnel are threatened by the sanctioning of security rules.
Principles Enactment = Security Behavior

Compliance
 Power exercise.
 Sanctioning.

Responsibility

+

 Ethics in security.
 Security awareness.

+++

Figure 7.3 – Intentional Principles Enactment
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Compliance emerges as an effect of power exercised by institutional authority
(see previous section and chapters on deontic power and constitutive power) and
sanctioning. Responsibility is an effect of social actors’ awareness about their
obligation towards information security and the need for engaging in ethical
conduct to safeguard information asset (Dhillon and Backhouse 2000).

2. Unintentional/unaware: In this category, social actors safeguard their
information asset simply because this action has become their daily, natural
habit/routine. They are no longer consciously aware of their obligation to secure
the information asset of their social system. As the scripts (or corporate security
culture) linger in the institutional realm, social actors perform their routine tasks
which include actions by which they are also preserving the security of their
institution’s information asset. Only when information security has become the
norm and a culture, should social actors voluntarily preserve it (Vroom and Von
Solms 2004). Institutional scholars such as Scott (1987; 2008) and Barley (1986)
are strong proponents of this principles-enactment mode, as they believe that
social actors unintentionally perform routines that are considered as rational by
the members of the social system.

As they interact with information systems, depicted in the realm of action, social
actors incorporate the two modes of principles enactment. Guided by scripts containing
corporate security culture, social actors manage and maintain information security in their
institution according to their conscience, the sense of responsibility that they feel towards
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the security of their information asset, and the fear of penalties and reprimand by their
fellows and/or institutional authority. Due to the formal nature of the institution, the
Central Bank and Commercial Banks demonstrate institutionalization as a regulative
pillar as proposed by Scott (2008). Despite these actions becoming a natural habit
amongst bank personnel during the phase of information security institutionalization,
these actions which are done for the management and maintenance of information
security are strongly governed and controlled by institutional authority which has the
overall objective of preserving social order and stability.

7.2.4. Revisiting Script Revision and Script Replication
In this study, script revision and script replication3 are used to depict certain
moments during the occurrence of security breach incident. This process is actually
intended to highlight institutional change due to extraordinary drives (e.g., technological
change, economic downturns, or security breach) that cause social actors to purposely
alter the institution. Script replication, however, is a connotation of a replication of
patterned behavior that has become a habit. In Earl Capita Bank, the relatively nonexistent case of security breach places the emphasis on script replication instead. This
phase depicts an instance of regulatory adoption and acceptance of regulated behavior.
The two cases pertaining to commercial banks which have been analyzed and discussed
in the previous chapters depict how security breach incidents force personnel to alter the
institutionalized information security and hence delineate script revision. The intricacy
and danger of unidentified breach cases, which have the potential to seriously damage the
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Figure 7.1 shows two processes for each script revision and script replication. Processes c, g, and k denote
script revision while processes c’, g’, and k’ denote script replication.
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reputation of both banks, are the drive and the objective for the banks to improve their
information security.
In a formal organization, particularly one that exhibits a strong vertical hierarchy,
script revision and replication proceed from the highest level to the lowest level in the
hierarchy. The three case studies outlined in the previous chapters depict how social
actors enforce the scripts, act according to the scripts, or modify the scripts. This process
is common to all stakeholders, beginning from institutional authority to bank tellers and
customers at a local branch. Bureaucratization creates the chain of command illusion,
which relies particularly on rules and is in turn, is highly utilized for formal governance
and control by institutional authority (Selznick 1969).
Script revision and replication are therefore a result of information security
governance and control, with the objective to accomplish strategic objective, manage and
prevent risks, and control and direct actions (see chapter 2). The two modes of script
sustainability represent how rules and institutional principles are replicated and further
sustained in a normal condition or altered and improved in the aftermath of a security
breach incident. Despite these two modes being considered a collective action, script
revision and replication occur under the watchful eyes of institutional authority. The
institutional authority ensures security control and governance, and it oversees behavior
that revises and deviates from security rules and institutional principles or behavior that
naturally and voluntarily adheres to these rules and principles.
Now, we arrive at another facet of the issue. Had the breach incidents not occurred,
the banks would have been under a wrong impression that their information security was
adequate and rigorous (Rhee et al. 2005). One might argue that a security breach should
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be considered a ramification and a parasite that needs to be terminated. As a drive
towards institutional change, however, security breach represents an exogenous
environmental shock that thwarts “the successful completion of reproductive procedures”
of information security governance and implementation in these two banks (Powell and
DiMaggio 1991, p. 153). As such, security breach incidents are considered a focal
starting point of re-institutionalization. Re-institutionalization signifies an “exit from one
institutionalization, and entry into another institutional form, organized around different
principles or rules” (Powell and DiMaggio 1991, p. 152).
A study by Ryan and Bordoloi (1997) identify the most prevalent security threats in
medium to large organizations, including access to data/system by outsiders, natural
disaster, loss due to inadequate backups, and inadequate or nonexistent logon processes.
The breach case at Centro Metropolitan Bank demonstrates a weak physical control by
another commercial bank. The Electronic Data Capture (EDC) fraud case of Centro
Metropolitan Bank is a hard hit for the bank. However, the incident did not hurt the
bank’s financial performance. Knowing that the incident may damage its reputation for
issuing a debit card that is easily manipulated, Centro Metropolitan Bank immediately
pronounced the case to be a serious one that could tarnish the bank’s reputation in the
long run and the bank paid serious attention to the case.
The ATM skimming case at Blue Sequoia Bank had caused the bank to lose
customers’ trust. This case is an example of access of data/system by outsiders and the
lapse forced the bank to figure out ways to improve their debit card transactions and
ATM transactions. All mitigating and preventive measures involving technical upgrades
and formal-control modification are a form of security policies improvement. As the two
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commercial banks alter and improve the security of their electronic-banking transactions,
scripts containing security rules and institutional principles for the electronic-banking
transactions change and hence are revised. Script revision requires conscious actions,
through which social actors aim to improve certain procedures or to survive from a
mishap. As an institutional change, re-institutionalization is a result of such modification.
The institutional change in Earl Capita Bank is however slightly different from that
in the two commercial banks. Earl Capita Bank is progressing toward centralizing its
information security into two information systems divisions: In	
   addition	
   to	
   the	
   two	
  
departments	
   sharing	
   responsibility	
   for	
   technical	
   controls,	
   the	
   Information	
  
Technology	
   Department	
   is	
   responsible	
   for	
   technical	
   controls	
   and	
   the	
   Information	
  
Management	
   Division	
   is	
   responsible	
   for	
   formal	
   controls. The institutional force was
an endogenous drive that could have forced rapid changes within Earl Capita Bank’s
internal security rules. These instances instead have caused a gradual change in Earl
Capita Bank. Such institutional change represents the institutional development of
information security in Earl Capita Bank as the Central Bank, progressing towards
centralization and elimination of data ownership while encouraging information
stewardship. This is an instance of script replication.
While re-institutionalization of information security causes script modification,
script replication represents institutional development. As introduced by Powell and
DiMaggio (1991), institutions during institutional development are nowhere close to
abolishment (i.e., de-institutionalization) but instead they become more complex. During
institutional development, corporate security culture becomes more complex and more
embedded in institutional realm as social actors become more familiar with and more
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accustomed to such a culture. As a subset of organizational culture, corporate security
culture contains some of the attributes of organizational culture. Not only does it need to
be shared among members of a social system, corporate security culture needs to have
sufficiently functioned in order to become valid and capable of being taught to new
members of the social system. The scripts replicate as social actors become more familiar
with the culture and principles.
While script revision requires conscious actions, script revision is a natural
occurrence as social actors continue to pursue their routines. Barley and Tolbert (1997)
have signified that only contextual and exogenous changes contribute to script revision
since social actors tend to resist changes and maintain status quo. Social actors “simply
behave according to their perception of the way things are” (Barley and Tolbert 1997, p.
102). In this study, as more and more bank personnel voluntarily perform their routines,
scripts that contain security rules and principles become more apparent and are replicated
among bank personnel. Scripts based on secure procedures to use ATM, for example, are
enforced and implemented by everyone, right from the top-level management at the
central headquarters down to customers at a local ATM vestibule.

7.2.5. Revisiting Patterned-Actions Objectification and Externalization
As they become a habit, actions achieve patterns and start dwelling in the
institutional realm over time. All collective security institutional principles and rules
become a distinct culture in a formal organization. As part of the effects of action on
structure, patterned-actions objectification and externalization exhibit how patterned
actions accumulate into such a culture that is ready to be used as scripts in a subsequent
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institutionalization episode. The objectification and externalization of actions into the
institutional realm require abstraction of habitualized actions and behavior until the new
actions and behavior are considered rational and natural.
Only when patterned actions become a habit can they be habitualized and
institutionalized. Social actors need to be acquainted with and socialized to these actions
before such actions can be institutionalized (Berger and Luckmann 1966). The
abstraction of patterned actions into the institutional realm is also termed as objectivated
sedimentation (Berger and Luckmann 1966, p. 69). After a while, the habitualized
activities become taken for granted. Social actors become unaware and unconscious and
accept the rationality of behaving according to the prescribed script. The concept of
rationale conduct serves as a foundation for agreement and acceptance among social
actors, or an attribute of a social system (Selznick 1969). This study focuses on how bank
personnel’s interaction with security artifacts settles intoa habit and a rationale among
amongst personnel belonging to the same institution. Prior to having their interactions
institutionalized, bank personnel need to understand the information and security risk as
well as the importance of information security.
This study demonstrates how personnel of the Central Bank are introduced to
information risk and how such a risk can be harmful for the institution’s reputation. Such
introduction and socialization entails the imparting of information security education in
order to raise personnel’s awareness of information security. As institutional authority
develops and enforces security rules, social actors are forced to adhere to these security
rules and behave accordingly. This process requires extensive policy awareness and
training, which can be used to reinforce security culture in the institution (Knapp et al.
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2009). Security awareness and policy education are also important procedures to build up
strong information security policies, which create a security culture when these are
integrated into a strategic information systems plan (Doherty and Fulford 2006).
The objective of organizing and directing actions into natural and voluntary
patterned actions of safeguarding information assets is to prevent similar incidents from
occurring and to minimize any risk that has been previously overlooked. In the two
commercial-bank case studies, this study divides the patterned-actions objectification and
externalization into two schemes: Institutionalized patterned actions in a normal
condition and Institutionalized patterned actions in the aftermath of a security breach
incident.
In the aftermath of the EDC fraud, Centro Metropolitan Bank immediately formed a
task force that heightened all three security-control dimensions. The ATM skimming case
at Blue Sequoia Bank forced the bank to upgrade its online debit-card transaction process
and the corresponding technologies. In addition to doing so, the bank also started to
educate its customers on the importance of secure debit-card transactions and raised their
awareness about information security.
The two cases of commercial banks cover an extensive array of security
technologies, which portray the routine interactions between bank personnel and such
technologies. Both commercial banks realize the necessity of increasing information
security awareness among bank personnel in order to have successful interactions
between bank personnel and security technologies. While they draw on their knowledge
and experience to interact with technologies, bank personnel as social actors require more
than awareness to initiate such interactions. Successful interactions require all resources
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and rules to dictate such interactions (Orlikowski 2000) and “sediment” these interactions
into the social structure (Berger and Luckmann 1966; Barley 1986; Barley and Tolbert
1997).
According to Orlikowski (2000), the following are requirements which form the
prerequisites to enact social structure based on sustaining social actors’ interactions with
technology artifacts:


Knowledge of using technology artifacts.



Experience with using technology artifacts.



Formal rules and regulations about the use of technology artifacts.



Power to enforce such rules and regulations.



Communication between social actors on the use of technology artifacts.



Organizational structure as a basis to reflect changes in social structure
due to the use of technology artifacts.

These requirements in time accumulate into scripts for social actors to draw upon
when interacting with security artifacts in subsequent institutionalization episodes. Built
on the concept of actions upon the institutional properties of an organization as
introduced by Orlikowski (1992), these requirements become scripts containing
institutional principles of information security that are reinforced through interactions
with security artifacts and are less likely to be altered. Using this view, information
security is therefore an “enacted environment” that is built and strengthened upon by the
conditioning of the three social structures: signification, domination, and legitimation
(Orlikowski 1992, p. 411).
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When institutional principles are altered due to institutional changes, behavior
deviates and social actors become conscious of any such deviation and alteration. The
different way social actors interact with security artifacts accumulates and slowly
integrates with the existing security culture, creating new scripts to be used in the next
security institutionalization episode. The subsequent episode depicts new, and expectedly
improved, information security practices and governance. In the two commercial-bank
cases, the commercial banks form a special task force that acts as a temporary
institutional authority, overseeing improvement in security behavior and technology
artifacts. The two commercial banks improve their respective technical controls by
upgrading their security technologies, formal controls (e.g., Centro Metropolitan Bank
creates a special unit that oversees debit-card transaction), and informal controls by
educating their personnel (particularly customers) about changes in security technologies
and new procedures for the use of such technologies.
Patterned-actions objectification and externalization serves as the basis for
accumulating security culture in the institutional realm of information security practices
and governance. Institutional changes such as a security breach incident (e.g., the ATM
skimming incident or the EDC machine fraud incident) force script revision that in turn
causes a deviation in actions. These new ways of interacting with security artifacts are
conscious actions that require changes in technical controls, formal controls, and informal
controls of information security. These new changes integrate with the existing security
culture, creating new scripts. Routine actions, on the other hand, are natural occurrences
that slowly accumulate into a security culture unique to the institution. Social actors
unconsciously externalize and naturally objectify their security behavior. Regardless of
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such unconscious actions, social actors are still constrained by institutional authority,
particularly by formal controls and informal controls. As such, while they naturally and
voluntarily interact with security artifacts, social actors’ security behavior is watched
over by institutional authority through security rules and efforts to raise security
awareness.

7.3.

The Synthesis: Intra-Level Institutionalization

7.3.1. Overview
Unlike the previous framework, the framework for intra-level institutionalization
focuses on formal interactions between two entities. This framework borrows the one
introduced by Scott (2008), drawing on multilevel institutional processes. The foundation
is built upon two types of institutionalization:


Top-down institutionalization whereby an entity enjoying a higher
authority has the capacity to sanction its actions to the other entity which
has a lower authority. This process is recognized as the governance and
control process in this study.



Bottom-up institutionalization whereby an entity with a lower authority
negotiates its actions with the other entity which possesses a higher
authority. This process is termed as the conformity and report process in
this study.
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7.3.2. Governance and Control
An outstanding feature of this framework is the apparent use of power particularly
by an entity possessing a higher authority, and acting as the central governance body.
This entity, due to its high status in the social system, instantly assumes deontic power
that it uses to sanction its actions (Hall 2008). While this power is prescribed to the
governing entity, the deontic power’s creation and ascription are artificially crafted by
actors of a social system (Smith and Searle 2003). This study shows that, due to its
deontic power, Earl Capita Bank, which is the Central Bank, assumes the authority to
govern all banking operations in Centro Metropolitan Bank and Blue Sequoia Bank (as
well as other commercial banks), including information security practices. This concept
reinforces the fact that Earl Capita Bank behaves as such simply because of its
authoritative status in the banking sector.
According to Hall (2008), deontic power directly renders the entity (i.e., the Central
Bank) with constitutive power, which this entity uses to formulate and enforce rules for
itself to adhere to. Hall (2008) states that social relations based on constitutive power can
produce particular kinds of actors who behave accordingly in a social system. The central
governing body such as the Central Bank that assumes this power has the privilege and
authority to direct social relations and thus control behaviors of social actors. Constitutive
power is one such powerful tool in the hands of the Central Bank to affect governance of
practices in commercial banks and financial institutions alike (Larner and Le Heron
2005).
Equipped with these two types of power, can Earl Capita Bank play its significant
role in banking sector (Quaglia 2008), including its role in information security
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governance and practices? These powers empower Earl Capita Bank to be the authority
of investigation if the information assurance of each commercial bank is according to the
prescribed information security guidelines. These powers enable Earl Capita Bank to
summon a representative of a commercial bank should a security breach incident be
caused by the commercial bank’s own failure to safeguard its information asset or failure
to comply with the prescribed guidelines. This allows Earl Capita Bank to penalize a
commercial bank for such failures.
Moreover, Earl Capita Bank also owns the authority to prevent the massive impact
that a security breach incident might have (i.e., systemic impact) by formulating and
enforcing new, abstract/general rules4. The Bank-Indonesia case study has depicted the
Central Bank to have developed an information-security guideline for commercial banks
and financial institutions operating in Indonesia. The formulation and enforcement of this
guideline demonstrates that Earl Capita Bank, acting as the authority, indicates
information risks, particularly the levels of each risk and the mitigation plan. This
participation is an essential part of information security governance (Brotby 2009; Von
Solms and Von Solms 2009). Earl Capita Bank can also dispatch a team to undertake
random inspections and conduct audit of information systems (including their security
features) of a commercial bank. The EDC fraud case shows how Earl Capita Bank
exercised its powers to ensure that all EDC machines were being used for online
transactions only so as to prevent similar EDC fraud cases from reoccurring.
The impact of power in institutionalization is significant. Silva and Backhouse
(2003) have addressed how power helps routinize (i.e., habitualize) actions so as to
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A respondent from the Central Bank opts for the use of guideline in lieu of rule. The reason is to provide
liberty and creativity to commercial banks in accordance with each bank’s organizational culture.
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become institutionalized. Lapke (2008) demonstrates how management utilizes power to
force subordinates to comply with security policy to the point where security actions
become institutionalized. According to Silva and Backhouse (2003), two types of power,
namely dispositional power and facilitative power, are utilized by a social actor or an
organizational actor to cause another social actor to do what he/she would not do
otherwise. The dispositional power is similar to the concept of deontic power described in
this study in that it equips a social actor with the power to enforce behavior due to his
capacity in the social system. This type of power emerges due to social conditioning. The
facilitative power is concerned with the systemic approach to control. This type of power
equips a social actor with various techniques to discipline other social actors. As such, the
use of these powers to repetitively, as well as routinely, enforce a desirable behavior
causes such behavior to be institutionalized. Unlike that proposed by Lapke (2008),
however, social actors that are subordinates are not able to resist the enforcement due to
the strong sense of deontic power of Earl Capita Bank that forces commercial banks,
including Centro Metropolitan Bank and Blue Sequoia Bank, to comply. In this study,
Earl Capita Bank uses the deontic power (or facilitative power) and has the power to use
various techniques (e.g., penalty, auditory visit, etc.) to force Centro Metropolitan Bank
and Blue Sequoia Bank to implement information security practices and governance.
Figure 7.4 shows the use of these power types on the intra-level institutionalization of
information security whereas social actor A denotes Earl Capita Bank and social actor B
denotes commercial banks, including Centro Metropolitan Bank and Blue Sequoia Bank.
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Figure 7.4 – A Reproduced Model of Circuit of Power and Institutionalization by Silva and
Backhouse (2003)

In general, the objective of governance and control that the Central Bank practices
is to maintain price stability by keeping the inflation rate low and stable (Ising 2009;
Ullrich 2007). The macro-prudential supervision is a distinct feature and privilege owned
by the Central Bank due to its status (i.e., deontic) in banking sector. The macroprudential supervision is the governance and control tool that is used to direct and
oversee commercial banks and financial institutions, to ensure that risks are minimized in
order to sustain financial stability (Krauskopf and Steven 2009). The information security
governance and control by Earl Capita Bank is simply a smaller, minor part of the larger
macro-prudential supervision that Earl Capita Bank implements to help commercial
banks mitigate their operational risk, which comprises information risk. Earl Capita Bank
is as such an essential key player whose participation and involvement are significant for
the successful management of operational risk (Van Greuning and Brajovic Bratanovic
2000; Fragniere et al. 2010).
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7.3.3. Conformity and Report
Due to the strong deontic power as well as other types of power (e.g., constitutive
and facilitative), commercial banks and financial institutions are required to adhere and
conform to rules enforced by Earl Capita Bank. Herein, the top-down institutionalization
and the bottom-up institutionalization in intra-level institutionalization are established
due to the strong implication of institutional relationship. The Centro Metropolitan Bank
case study and the Blue Sequoia Bank case study have shown the significance of
institutional relationship by creating a Compliance Division. As a special business unit in
a commercial bank, the Compliance Division is assigned with the responsibility to
communicate with the Central Bank on behalf of its institution, to monitor compliance
with the Central Bank’s regulations, and to assist other business units and divisions to
achieve objectives that are regulated by the Central Bank.
There are two types of implementations of prudential bank supervision: off-site
surveillance and on-site examinations (Van Greuning and Bratanovic 2000). The on-site
examinations require the central bank to dispatch auditory teams to examine the
appropriateness of banking operations. These inspections may also be triggered by
problems identified by the off-site surveillance reports (Van Greuning and Bratanovic
2000). The case studies have witnessed Earl Capita Bank as sending its auditory teams
regularly to commercial banks in normal circumstances. The case studies show that Earl
Capita Bank investigated a commercial bank’s security policies and regulations, server
location and physical IT infrastructure, the security of a commercial bank’s Electronic
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Banking Services, Business Continuity plans, etc. Earl Capita Bank may also send its
auditory teams for unannounced auditory visits after a security breach incident occurs.
The reciprocity actions by commercial banks aim to induce the Central Bank to
perform further actions which are necessary to maintain stability in banking sector (Hall
2008). The reporting practice is an extended obligation of commercial banks, as
commercial banks are required to conform to a set of guidelines. This practice is an
example of off-site surveillance as the Central Bank collects data from reports issued by a
commercial bank (Van Greuning and Bratanovic 2000). The policy competencies of the
Central Bank affect the supervisory arrangements as these are monitored by the Central
Bank (Quaglia 2008).
The Central Bank requires such reporting to be able to monitor individual
commercial banks, compare an individual commercial bank’s performance among its
peer group, and detect any significant deviation from its peer group (Van Greuning and
Bratanovic 2000). In the context of this study, commercial banks submit their reports
through their Compliance Divisions, depicting institutional development needs, financial
sector and regulation, risk management culture, corporate governance, and various risk
management practices that include managing operational and information risks. The
Central Bank also uses collective reports from commercial banks to determine a
benchmark and best practices. The Centro Metropolitan Bank case study delineates Earl
Capita Bank conducting unannounced inspections of EDC machines to ascertain that
there was no offline feature on EDC machines in use and allowing only the use of online
transaction for EDC machines. A commercial bank requires a license not only to operate,
but also to provide services such as Electronic-Banking Services. This license, issued by
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the Central Bank, protects a commercial bank’s financial safety net and consumers, and
provides a barrier to entry of institutions that do not meet the stringent criteria to operate
as a bank (Schooner and Taylor 2009). Figure 7.5 depicts the details of prudential
banking supervision context.

Figure 7.5 – A Reproduced Prudential Banking Supervision Context by Van Greuning and
Bratanovic (2000)
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7.4.

Emergent Themes
This study has discovered three important themes that explain the unique context of

institutionalizing information security in the banking sector. The themes emerge due to
the strong nuance of an institution. The three themes are habitualized security routines,
information stewardship, and institutional relationship.

7.4.1. Habitualized Security Routines
Central to the structuration of an information system is the interaction between a
social actor and technologies (i.e., the artifact), that allows technologies to manifest as a
meaningful variable in the organization (Orlikowski 1992). In the context of information
security, the aim of institutionalization is to create a secure social structure in an
information system through interactions between social actors and security technologies.
Each of the three cases delineates the regulated and structured interactions between
stakeholders and security technologies. In addition to the security technologies, additional
modalities include the social actor’s experience and knowledge of using technologies as
well as procedures and regulations of information security. As such, social actors use
their knowledge and interpreting ability to interact with security technologies and
sanction such interactions vis-à-vis` security policies or regulations. These modalities lay
a foundation that links structure and social actions committed by social actors (Walsham
1993). This study has conceptualized an information security culture that embodies
security rules, procedures, methods, and responsibilities, and becomes a natural habit or a
routine that is performed by personnel (Von Solms 2000; Chang and Lin 2007). As one
of such abstractions, habitualized security routines are a manifestation of the principles
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enactment which social actors readily and unconsciously use to act. Therefore, while
script encoding entails encoding security culture from institutional realm to create the
script, principles enactment transforms the script into habitualized security routines that
linger in any social actors’ conscience.
Researchers have denoted that a social structure contains a signification structure, a
domination structure, and a legitimation structure (Giddens 1994; Walsham and Han
1991; Walsham 1993). The institutional realm that embodies these three structures also
contains institutional properties of social actions in a technology usage context (Barley
and Tolbert 1991; Orlikowski 1992; Orlikowski et al. 1995; Orlikowski 2000). In the
context of this study, the institutional properties are prescribed in the corporate
information security culture, offering detailed elucidations of the practice of security
technical controls, formal controls, and informal controls. Institutionalization of
information security is best approached using these three dimensions (Dhillon 2007).
These security-control dimensions provide a foundation for other aspects that serve the
enactment of the three social structures and include security responsibility and modalities
(e.g., technologies or regulations). Furthermore, once these security-control dimensions
have become a routine within an organization, they produce and shall continuously
reproduce the habitualized security routines. The habitualized security routines help resist
any attempt to dissolve the information-security institution5.
The three security-control dimensions do not simply appear as an abstraction of
routines. Once they are adopted through principles enactment, these dimensions become
visible and tangible in the form of actions. Technical controls are implemented as social
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The notion of habitualized routines is conceptualized under the notion of ‘taken-for-grantedness’
proposed by sociologists (Berger and Luckmann 1966; Powell and DiMaggio 1991; Scott 2008).
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actors start to use security artifacts such as PIN number as in the case of Centro
Metropolitan Bank’s SMS banking, Electronic Token Device to use Internet banking
features as in the case of Blue Sequoia Bank. Technical controls are also about
procedures or formal methods to protect data and software. For example, encryption,
hash totals, reuse prevention, and check bits are all formal methods and procedures that
are commonly used in addition to the use of security technologies (Dhillon 2007, pp. 2021). The three case studies have noted the significant and necessary use of formal
controls. Not only formal controls need to be enforced in the intra organizational level,
but formal controls are also implemented directly by the Central Bank on a intra level.
Lastly, the two commercial-bank case studies have depicted the importance of informal
controls for the purpose of communicating security rules and procedures to customers
and branch offices. For example, Centro Metropolitan Bank communicates the
mechanisms of its dual-approval procedure to all branch offices while Blue Sequoia Bank
releases its branch offices from adhering to a strict predefined conduct so as to provide
freedom to implement information security according to each branch’s culture.
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Figure 7.6 – A Close-Up View of Realm of Action

Such visible and tangible appearances of the three security-control dimensions
manifest as behavior and actions represented at the realm of action. Such
conceptualization is in line with that by Barley (1986) and Orlikowski (2000) whereas the
realm of action is a continuous interaction between social actors and modalities
(interpretive scheme, artifacts, and norm) in an ordered manner. Empirical analysis of the
three case studies confirms the order of the interrelation of security-control dimensions as
proposed by Dhillon (2007). While the three are said to be intertwined and interrelated,
conceptually and evidently, the technical controls are directed by formal controls, which
are communicated through informal controls (see figure 7.6).
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The fundamental conceptualization of habitualized security routines is devised by
the unintentional/unaware principles enactment. Institutional and structuration scholars
have acknowledged key concepts such as habit, routine, unintentional, natural, rational,
unaware, or unconscious as directing behavior in the long term. The objective of building
such conceptualization is to understand the transformation of such complex script into an
abstraction of daily chores of information security practices and governance. When a
social actor is informed of the script that contains the corporate information security
culture, she is naturally translating the script using her experience in and knowledge
about information security. Such a natural or unconscious translation cannot occur unless
her experience and knowledge of information security has previously “sedimented”
(Berger and Luckmann 1966) in the institutional realm as part of the security culture.
Therefore, a social actor that is a member of the institution is said to have habitualized all
security routines to direct her security behavior. These routines in turn transform into an
abstraction (Berger and Luckmann 1966) that originates from a habit of using artifacts
(Orlikowski 1992; 2000) and remains as such in the institutional realm (Barley 1986;
Barley and Tolbert 1997).
On the other hand, intentional/aware principles enactment cannot contribute to the
creation of habitualized security routines. This is because social actors are aware of their
routines and may be inclined to object to the performance of such routines. In this sense,
power and regulations become a required tool for enforcing ‘habitualizing’ security
routines. The three case studies demonstrate a rigorous enforcement of information
security technical controls. The case of Earl Capita Bank depicts the dual technical
controls of information security by its IT division and it’s Information Management
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Division. The two departments oversee the implementation of the physical and logical
aspects of security technical controls. The IT Division manages and maintains the
institution’s IT systems and security systems (i.e., the physical aspect) while the
Information Management Division focuses on protecting the information resource of the
institution (i.e., the logical aspect). While the IT Division enjoys exclusive privilege to
govern the physical aspect of technical controls (e.g., enforcing the use of username and
password), the Information Management Division has to share the logical aspect with
other departments within the institution. The two divisions also formulate regulations on
securely using information systems and communicate such controls (i.e., formal controls
and informal controls). As a consequence, personnel of Earl Capita Bank are forced to
comply with these controls in order to subsequently form the habitualized security
routines in the long run.

7.4.2. Information Stewardship
Dhillon and Moores (2001) suggest that technical controls are not sufficient to
provide sound secured information systems. They state that:
“Merely establishing a password is not enough. What is really needed is an understanding
of the organizational structures and business processes and identifying a range of checks
and balances that could be established. These could then be incorporated into the systems
development processes.”

Their argument is based on the assumption that security is an organizational
problem. Central to the study of organizations is the stakeholder. Post et al. (2002, p. 19)
formally define stakeholders of any organization as “the individuals and constituencies
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that contribute, either voluntarily or involuntarily, to its wealth-creating capacity and
activities, and that are therefore its potential beneficiaries and/or risk bearers.” While not
all of them have direct obligations to the institution, such individuals and constituencies
bear the impact of information risk. This study identifies and portrays the assigning of
each division or each business unit as an information steward, which generally functions
to protect the institution’s information assets. An information steward “develops a sound
architecture, motivates and develops IT staff, aligns IT plans with business plans, and
protects the organization’s information assets” (Chen and Preston 2007). The information
stewardship is therefore synonymous with the three security-control dimensions:
technical controls, formal controls, and informal controls. In the case of the Indonesian
banks, the role of an information steward is assumed by all divisions that own
information systems and generate information, as demonstrated by the three case studies.
The case of Earl Capita Bank, for instance, depicts the dual control of information
security with technical controls being an exclusive privilege of the institution’s IT
department. The IT department assumes the sole responsibility of controlling the
technical aspects of the institution’s information security. The Information Management
Division however defines the role of information stewardship for all other divisions that
own information systems. This assignment is an attempt to reduce the strong data
ownership that hinders IT-governance centralization as well as security-governance
centralization. The data-ownership issue in Earl Capita Bank is a major stumbling block
for the Information Management Division to assume the logical-aspect primary
leadership. For instance, the IT department has the full authority to announce and
implement a new security patch for the institution’s local area network and maintain its

	
  

222

implementation. The Information Management Division, however, needs to discuss and
request permission to reestablish the confidentiality context of a document published by
another department within the institution.
In the three case studies, IT division as well as Information Security Division
manages technical controls. The central theme of technical controls is technologies.
Technologies are inscribed with particular symbols and material properties (Orlikowski
2000) and become a meaningful variable only when their use can be manipulated to assist
any social actor in his work (Orlikowski et al. 1995). Technologies, particularly IT
artifacts, are socially and cognitively altered by the social actors, and are always
embedded in a fragment of an instance (e.g., time and place), consisting of interconnected
components, emerging from continuous social and economic interactions, and are
dynamic (Orlikowski and Iacono 2001). Many information systems lack security features
which can be attributed to security underestimation during the systems analysis and
design (Dhillon and Moores 2001). Such underestimation is due to the irrational
optimism of management about the security features of an information system (Rhee et
al. 2005). All respondents of the three case studies agree that information security is an
organizational issue. Hence successful information risk management and control depends
on sound information-security governance.
The Centro Metropolitan Bank case study and the Blue Sequoia Bank case study
demonstrate the possession of formal controls and informal controls by divisions that
process and disseminate information, and own information systems. These divisions,
which act as information stewards, filter personnel who can access their information, how
the information is accessed, and what information can be accessed. Information steward
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is the executor of information security governance since it seeks to accomplish the same
objective as that of security governance. The emphasis is therefore on executives,
controls, and information risk (Brotby 2009; Von Solms and Von Solms 2009).
Information stewardship differs from information security governance in that stewardship
focuses on data and information using the confidentiality, integrity, and availability
concepts (Baldwin et al. 2012). While the three case studies have shown the existence of
such a concept, the notion of information stewardship has been somewhat leaning
towards the stronger notion of data ownership as apparent in the Earl Capita Bank case
study. The concept of data ownership regards an entity as not only the protector of data,
but also the owner of data, while the concept of information stewardship implies the
steward as a data-security service provider (Baldwin et al. 2011). The data ownership has
created small kingdoms of many information owners among divisions in Earl Capita
Bank. A beginning is being made to eradicate this status quo now as a means to achieving
data and information centralization.
Information stewardship, particularly as implemented in Earl Capita Bank, is an
impeccable example of the interrelatedness of technical controls, formal controls, and
informal controls. An institution’s IT division uses its authority to regulate stakeholders
of other divisions, including customers and the public, on the kind of data and
information they are allowed to access and use, the method of such access (e.g., online
access, hardcopy, etc.), and the purpose of such access. Despite each division owning the
authority as an information steward, the IT division, or the Information Security Division,
assumes the technical controls for data and information access in the institution. As such,
divisions consult the IT division for technical access such as user privilege assignment.
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7.4.3. Institutional Relationship
Institutional relationship is closely related to prudential supervision, is a
functionality that aims to “preserve the safety and soundness of an institution,” (Schooner
and Taylor 2009, p. 261). This is in line with the objective of preserving social order and
stability. Institutional relationship is created due to the manifestation of the Central
Bank’s powers to govern, monitor, and control the commercial banks and the commercial
banks compliance, conformity, and adherence with the Central Bank. Institutional
relationship emerges when there is a need for changing conditions that depend on the
levels of individualism, power distance, masculinity, and uncertainty avoidance which
are exhibited by the parties in the relationship (Shankarmahesh et al. 2003). An
institutional relationship can be viewed as a relationship that involves two or more formal
organizations bound by regulations and power. The Central Bank in general implements
two types of power: deontic and constitutive (Hall 2008). These powers can be extended
to include facilitative power (Silva and Backhouse 2003). Using these powers, the
Central Bank formulates information security guidelines that are adopted by commercial
banks and expanded according to each bank’s specific needs and organizational culture.
During adoption through implementation of security rules, the Central Bank
exercises its deontic power (i.e., a power bestowed upon an entity due to its status in its
social community) to govern and monitor the implementation. Deontic power also allows
the Central Bank to exercise its constitutive power for formulating and enforcing
regulations, including the information security guidelines. While such powers are
undermined in developed countries to allow for creative implementation of such rules
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among commercial banks in developed countries, commercial banks in developing
countries (e.g., Indonesia) endure sanctioning and penalties for failure to comply with
regulatory adoption (Schooner and Taylor 2009). In developing countries, centralized,
concentrated power exercised by the Central Bank serves “to compel a change in the
culture of regulation” (Schooner and Taylor 2009, p. 272).
The core of institutional relationship is institutional authority. Institutional authority
appears as a direct response to identify risks and to implement information security
controls (Parrish 2000). Merely controlling critical infrastructures (i.e., technical
controls) is inefficient and is beyond the direct control of organizations (Dutta and
McCrohan 2002). Therefore the control of all security-control dimensions (i.e., technical,
formal, and informal) is necessary to achieve efficiency. Due to the intricate nature of
security-control dimensions, an internal control system is required to ensure security
control. In general, the objective of an internal control is “to cover the aspects of quality
and security as key control objectives in order to take care of ICT controls” (Omoteso et
al. 2010, p. 160). Such internal control follows what is prescribed by the Central Bank.
The internal control hence serves as a compliance authority in a commercial bank.
Furthermore, the internal control manifests as an impact of the institutional relationship.
The Compliance Division initiates this internal control to be implemented by all other
divisions. While technical controls belong almost exclusively to IT division, formal
controls and informal controls are implemented by all other divisions, particularly
divisions that act as Information Stewards.
As discussed previously, each commercial bank assigns its Compliance Division to
act as a single door for communication with the Central Bank. This division is a
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representative of its institution in matters related to the institutional relationship between
a commercial bank and the Central Bank. All operational reports of a commercial bank
are submitted to the Central Bank by the Compliance Division, including reports on
Information Security and infrastructure. On the other hand, the Central Bank uses the
Bank Supervision Division and the Accounting and Payment System Division to
communicate with commercial banks. While the latter focuses on governing and
controlling accounting and financial matters, the first deals with governing and
controlling all matters other than accounting and finance. While technology and security
infrastructure as well as information and communication issues are the responsibility of
the Bank Supervision Division, the Accounting and Payment System Division assumes
the responsibility to govern information systems that are used for accounting and
financial issues.

7.5.

Summary and Discussion
The final but important stage of this study is to review how synthesized concepts

and emergent themes are used to answer research questions. The extent to which this
study contributes to the body of literature depends on the interwoven concepts and
themes. For example, this study has suggested that habitualized security routines emerge
when social actors continue their daily, natural, activities involving information security
governance and practices and strive to resist the impact of security breach as it is deemed
to deviate from their routines.
The first issue that begs a response is the internalization of information security
governance and practices in institutions. The key concept of security internalization is
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habitualization or ‘being accustomed to’. This study shows that there are two realms of
security institutionalization based on Barley and Tolbert’s framework (1997). When
implementing security governance and practices, social actors draw on the corporate
information security culture through various processes. In addition, social actors also
store their routines that involve information security governance and practices in the form
of a conceptualized security culture6. Performing these activities creates a continuous
internalization of information security governance and practices. The result of
internalizing information security governance and practices is the formation of
habitualized security routines. Vice versa, the habitualized security routines are an
abstract component of information security culture since these presuppose knowledge and
experience of information security as well as incorporate formal regulations about
information security among others (Orlikowski 2000). This study demonstrates that
security routines become security culture through script replication and patterned-actions
objectification and externalization.
In a formal organizational setting, simply relying on unintentional principles
enactment is not sufficient. Management that also acts as an authority is required to
ensure that principles enactment of information security governance and practices is
successful. While personnel are in general trustworthy, some may be unreliable and pose
an internal threat (Dhillon and Moores 2001). In addition, management plays an
important role in sound information security (Von Solms and Von Solms 2009).
Information stewardship is assigned to each division management so as to safeguard
information assets (Chen and Preston 2007) by enforcing all three security-control
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
6

This instance is the objectification and externalization of information security practices and governance
into the institutional realm.
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dimensions. This is also true in the context of the intra-level institutionalization. The
Central Bank as the central governance body overlooks minor aspects of information
security governance and practices in commercial banks to ascertain the successful
formation of habitualized security routines in these institutions.
The second issue looks at how the Central Bank affects the institutionalization of
information security. In banking sector, the Central Bank plays a major and critical role.
This role includes governing and controlling the implementation of information security
governance and practices in commercial banks and other financial institutions. The
fundamental concept behind this issue is the institutional relationship. This study
demonstrates that institutional relationship stands on Scott’s framework of multilevel
institutional processes (Scott 2008). There are two processes in the institutional
relationship: a top-down process from the Central Bank to commercial banks and a
bottom-up process from a commercial bank to the Central Bank.

Security Internalization
Routines are built from a
collection of security culture
through
principles
Habitualized
enactment. Actors reproduce
Security
routines
during
script
Routines
replication and store routines
during objectification and
externalization.

	
  

Research Thematic
Central Governance
Impact

Security Reinstitutionalization

The Central Bank
ensures that routines
are well implemented
in commercial banks
and become a habit.

Routines help prevent
security breach as these
serve as a basis for
resistance
to
reinstitutionalization.

229

Information
Stewardship

Intentional
principles
enactment is used to
implement
technical
controls, formal controls,
and informal controls by
management.

The Central Bank oversees
the
implementation
of
habitualized
security
Institutional
routines through regular
Relationship
audit and requires regular
reports from commercial
banks.

The
Compliance
Division acts as an
intermediary of the
Central Bank to assist
information stewards in
their
attempt
to
implement the three
security-control
dimensions.

Security breach changes
how information security
is implemented as the
victim institution assigns
each division to improve
its security controls.

The Central Bank
governs and controls
the implementation of
information
security
while
individual
commercial
bank
reciprocates
through
conformity
and
reporting.

The Central Bank regularly
audits security controls in
each commercial bank and
may conduct surprise audit
when security breach hits.
Similarly,
commercial
banks regularly report their
security governance and
practices to the central
bank and implement any
regulatory changes decreed
by the central bank.

Table 7.1 – An Interpretive Framework for Information Security Institutionalization

The impact of the central bank’s intervention and participation in security practices
and governance in each commercial bank becomes obvious when security breach occurs.
The central bank uses its power to change security rules and conduct surprise auditory
visits to the premises of commercial banks, particularly any commercial bank which is
the victim of the security breach. In doing so, the Central Bank manages the systemic risk
(Van Greuning and Bratanovic 2000) that is caused by security failure in one commercial
bank. During a normal condition, the Central Bank undertakes a regular, or annual,
auditory visit to commercial banks and requires commercial banks to report their
information security governance and practices. This study shows that the Compliance
Division serves as a single door for communicating with the Central Bank and as an
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intermediary of the Central Bank. As an intermediary, this division assists each division
that acts as an information steward to implement the three security-control dimensions.
The issue regarding information security re-institutionalization after a security
breach relies on the very fundamental concept of an institution. Institutions never emerge
from nothing and resist changes (Scott 2008) in order to retain social order and stability
(Burrell and Morgan 1979). In an inter-level institutionalization, information stewardship
proves to be a powerful tool in preventing security breaches. Institutional relationship is
another safety feature from a intra-level institutionalization perspective.
The important issue in re-institutionalization is, however, the fact that security
breach is merely an instance in information security. While it is viewed as a nuisance by
most scholars and practitioners, security breach is a major incident that drastically
changes and impacts how information security is handled and implemented in an
institution. Computer crimes are considered subversive acts (Dhillon and Moores 2001)
rather than an episode of information security institutionalization. In this study, security
breach re-institutionalizes information security through script revision whereby social
actors improve their information security governance and practices. Such improvement,
for example, includes changes in technical controls (e.g., technologies and procedural
upgrade), formal controls (e.g., new and improved security rules), and informal controls
(e.g., increased security awareness). The objective of doing so is to prevent similar
breach incidents from occurring and causing a damaging impact on the bank and on other
commercial banks (i.e., systemic impact). Information stewardship in this study manifests
through formal controls and informal controls in which each division controls the logical
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aspect of security and communicates information concerning such controls to personnel
of other divisions.
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8

8.1.

CONCLUSION

Overview
This study has explored the internalization of information security governance and

practices, involving collective individuals placed in a form of formal organization. Such a
phenomenon is termed as the institutionalization of information security. Using
theoretical frameworks by Barley and Tolbert (1997) as well as by Scott (2008), this
study has demonstrated that there are many drives and considerations that affect security
institutionalization. In this chapter, all previously discussed concepts and emergent
themes are summarized and reviewed. Several important concepts are revisited:
specifically- information security institutionalization and re-institutionalization, and the
impact of a central governance body.

8.1.1. Information Security Institutionalization and Re-institutionalization
Central to this study is the institutionalization of information security. The
argument presented in this study is that information security governance elucidates the
interaction between knowledgeable human agents and the wider social system within
which they exist. Another argument that merits consideration is that information security
governance becomes institutionalized through social integration of routines and system
integration of relevant technologies. This study conducts an overview of two commercial
banks and the Central Bank of Indonesia as the unit of analysis.
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The fundamental conception of this study is built on standard information security
practices and information security governance. Kawaura (2004) has demonstrated a
failure in corporate governance among Japanese banks, leading to systemic damage in the
Japanese banking sector in the 1990s. Information security governance is a vital
requirement, required to direct information security practices and to ensure sound
information security. This study has shown how information security governance directs
the following aspects in information security: Strategic and Risk Management, Resource
Management and Business Process Management (Brotby 2009), which embody the
strategic, tactical, and operational aspects of information security (Von Solms and Von
Solms 2006a). Information security governance therefore redirects not only the human
resources and formal organizational structure, but also the technical resources by virtue
of managing the operational and environment aspects of security technical resources and
ensuring business continuity (Da Veiga and Eloff 2007). Scholars have also recognized
the importance of the role of executive and top management in information security
governance (Dutta and McCrohan 2002; Khalfan and Alshawaf 2004; Knapp et al. 2006).
This study has depicted the significant impact of enforcing and adhering to
information security policy. Information security policy as a set of regulations directing
security behavior is necessary to promote sound information security (Cuppens and
Cuppens-Boulahia 2008). Top management support is also a key factor that sustains good
practices of information security (Hong et al. 2006; Fulford and Doherty 2003). In this
study, key players such as the Central Bank, the Board of Directors, and the Bank
Management are assuming the authority to formulate, enforce, and communicate
Information Security Policy. The concept of principles enactment introduces the
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intentional, or consious, enactment, by which the bank’s key players and personnel are
coerced into complying with security policy, whether they are motivated or not, to do
so (Bulgurcu et al. 2010). Scholars have denoted such phenomena as an impact of
structuration sanctioning (Giddens 1984; Orlikowski 1992; Orlikowski 2000; Orlikowski
et al. 1995; Walsham 1993; Walsham and Han 1991) whereby bank stakeholders face the
consequences of compliance and compliance failure (Selznick 1969).
All such phenomena embody the three security-control dimensions: technical
controls, formal controls, and informal controls (Dhillon and Moores 2001; Dhillon
2007). The institutionalization of information security depends on the intertwining of the
three security-control dimensions (Dhillon 2007), that manifest into behavior and actions
aimed at safeguarding information assets. In this study, security governance and practices
that become a habit and a routine over time are internalized by members of an institution
and get transformed into information security culture, which is built on experience and
knowledge (Orlikowski 2000).
One of the highlights of this study is the impact of security breach on security
institutionalization. The majority of scholars and practitioners regard security breach as a
plight that results from unethical conduct (Dhillon and Moores 2001). This study
contends

that

security

breach

is

another

episode

in

information

security

institutionalization. Security breach drives such institutionalization into a different
direction through script revision that changes how technical controls, formal controls, and
informal controls are implemented. Security breach forces an institution to upgrade its
technologies and resources (i.e., changes in technical controls), improve security
regulations (i.e., changes in formal controls), and increase security awareness (i.e.,
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changes in informal controls). Security breach draws the attention of the Central Bank,
which aims to mitigate systemic risk. Security breach is hence a variant mask of security
institutionalization.

Figure 8.1 – A Simplified View of Different Episodes of Information Security Institutionalization
Depicting Technical Controls, Formal Controls and Informal Controls

In this study, the institutionalization and re-institutionalization of information
security in an institution are introduced as micro-level institutionalization. Each of the
three case studies has brought forth a unique instantiation of information security
institutionalization. Such an instantiation denotes the institution’s unique identity in terms
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of information security governance and practices. Despite the intervention by the Central
Bank, each commercial bank has proceeded to create its own unique security culture
through different security features and procedures, different security rules, and different
methods of security education. Except when an institution is intentionally disbanded,
institutions in general do not emerge from nothing, do not disappear, and instead change
facets (Powell and DiMaggio 1991; Scott 2008).

The occurrence of such episodes

resembles the concept of recursive structuration as introduced by Barley (1986), Barley
and Tolbert (1997), Giddens (1984), Orlikowski (1992; 2000), Walsham (1993), and
Walsham and Han (1991).
The emergent themes suggest that the different episodes of information security
institutionalization are attributed to the habitualized security routines, which depict how
information security governance and practices become a natural routine or habit and
transform into security culture. In addition, such varying episodes can also be attributed
to the Information Stewardship, which explains how an institution preserves its
information assets by assigning each of its divisions to control such an asset technically,
formally, and informally. While figure 8.1 depicts a simplified representation of
information security institutionalization depicting the three security-control dimensions,
figure 7.1 shows the synthesis of institutionalization concepts showing the
comprehensive four processes: script encoding, principles enactment, script revision and
script replication, and patterned-actions objectification and externalization.

	
  

237

8.1.2. Impact of Central Governance Body
The impact of the central governance body is another highlight of this study. The
Central Bank that acts as the central governance body has been shown to have significant
influences on every operational aspect of a commercial bank, including information
security. As such, the Central Bank is one of the key bank players as portrayed in this
study. The role of the Central Bank has been delineated to be very important in shaping
and conditioning information security governance and practices in banking sector.
An essential concept of the Central Bank’s involvement is power. This study has
elucidated the use and the impact of power on the institutionalization of information
security. There are three types of power: deontic power, constitutive power (Hall 2008),
and facilitative power (Silva and Backhouse 2003). The Central Bank uses this power to
position itself as the highest authority in the banking sector. Such intervention, as has
been delineated in this study, includes formulating security guidelines, enforcing the
implementation of security guidelines among commercial banks and financial
institutions, and controlling and auditing information security governance and practices
in commercial banks and financial institutions.
From a constitutive-power perspective, this study has supported Hall’s (2008)
assertion of the ways by which the Central Bank uses constitutive power to formulate
security rules. In addition, the Central Bank also has the capacity to force commercial
banks and financial institutions to implement such security rules using facilitative power
as denoted by Silva and Backhouse (2003). The Central Bank utilizes these types of
power due to its social status in banking sector, referring to the deontic power as
introduced by Hall (2008). These types of power are used to sanction and reward
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commercial banks and financial institutions to comply with information security policy.
Regulations are needed to maintain social order and stability (Berger and Luckmann
1966), which are the ultimate objective of safeguarding information asset. Figure 7.4
shows how these power types are placed to render the Central Bank the authority to
govern and control information security in banking sector.
Equipped with these types of power, the Central Bank conducts the governance and
control of information security in banking sector. Commercial banks and financial
institutions reciprocate these actions by conforming to such actions and reporting their
operational activities to the Central Bank. Such bidirectional relationships represent a
top-down process and a bottom-up process of the multilevel institutional processes
proposed by Scott (2008). Institutional relationship reflects this theoretical framework,
embodying these two processes. In this study, institutional relationship is the basis for the
prudential supervision, which is an authoritative privilege owned by the central bank. The
core concepts of institutional relationship are relationships among formal organizations
(i.e., institutions), power utilization, rules implementation and control, and regulatory
conformity. Using this concept, the Central Bank is positioned as the highest authority
that represents the government in banking sector, defined as the institutional authority.
Figure 3.5 depicts the macro-level institutionalization that adopts Scott’s (2008)
multilevel institutional processes.

8.2.

Implications for Theory
Despite the adoption of a descriptive framework to develop a theoretical framework

for this study, this study highlights several major implications. Firstly, previous studies
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have singled out security breach as merely a plight and therefore do not consider it a
factor that can improve the implementation aspects of information security. This study
presents a radical position by introducing security breach as a driving force in
institutionalizing information security governance and practices. This argument is built
on one that is presented by Rhee et al. (2005). Information security is not taken seriously
when all is safe, but gains attention when a security breach hits. As such, rather than
fussing about security breach and various counteractions to it, this study suggests the
acceptance of security breach as part of the implementation and governance of
information security. Organizations put tremendous efforts into improving technical
controls, formal controls, and informal controls once a security breach hits since
organizations strive to resist changes (Scott 2008) and maintain stability and social order
(Burrell and Morgan 1979).
Secondly, this study highlights how information security becomes internalized in
organizations. Such an internalization cannot escape the interplay between technical
controls, formal controls, and informal controls. This study is developed from a social
science perspective. While the fundamental idea is the interaction between social actors
and artifacts such as security artifacts and technologies, such an interaction requires
complicated processes that explain how such interaction becomes internalized.
Borrowing Barley and Tolbert’s (1997) framework for institutionalization and
structuration, this study portrays various formats of such interactions in an
institutionalization as a process. Such interaction appears as an abstraction in some
phases such as script encoding and emerges in its literal form when principles are
successfully enacted. Furthermore, such interaction occurs for the attainment of certain
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objectives that are unique, and depend on the organization’s objectives and culture. To
conceptualize and simplify the various formats of such interaction, a terminology of
habitualized security routines is introduced, focusing on how such an interaction becomes
routine. Such phenomena are in line with the concept proposed by Berger and Luckmann
(1966) that the interaction between social actors and artifacts is socially constructed and
hence a social construction of reality. This study also supports socio-organizational
security scholars who opine that information security is not a technical problem but rather
a managerial issue. Moreover, this finding is a support for the argument that information
security governance and practices become institutionalized through social integration of
routines and system integration of relevant technologies.
Thirdly, this study supports the significant impact of power on information security
governance and practices. Built on the structuration concept, this study shows how power
can be used to facilitate the interaction between social actors and artifacts as well as to
sanction such interactions. While some higher authority key players in an internal
organization possess the power to govern and control information security
implementation, a central governance body is required to explain different types of power
needed to govern and control information security implementation. Such organization
requires a valid admission in a social system in order to obtain the deontic power (Hall
2008) or dispositional power (Silva and Backhouse 2003), which finally endows the
organization with the constitutive power that is used to formulate rules (Hall 2008) and
facilitative power that is used to control and force such rules (Silva and Backhouse 2003).
Fourthly, this study provides a major implication for the theoretical lens,
particularly the institutionalization and the structuration framework by Barley and Tolbert
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(1997). In the context of information security, this study extends the notion of script and
differentiates the application of and the causes for script replication and script revision.
Barley and Tolbert (1997) and Barley (1986) have denoted a script as merely a link
between actions and institutions and that a script contains patternized interactions. This
study goes beyond such conceptualization by stating that the script contains information
security culture formed over time through accumulated knowledge and experience of
social actors pertaining to information security. In addition, this study combines
institutionalization concepts from scholars such as Berger and Luckmann (1966), Scott
(1987; 2008), and Powell and DiMaggio (1991). This study distinguishes script
replication as one that represents a normal condition, from script revision that emerges as
a result of attempts to survive after a security breach. The script revision is shown to
ignite re-institutionalization as introduced by Powell and DiMaggio (1991). Last but not
least, this study embeds the three security-control dimensions in the realm of action. The
interrelated implementation of formal controls, technical controls, and informal controls
has been proved to serve as the basis for organization’s resilience against the impact of
security breach.
Finally, another major highlight is the institutional relationship that depicts the
interaction among organizations engaged in implementing information security.
Information security studies have mostly placed emphasis on internal management issues,
reiterating the importance of executives and top management in the successful
implementation of information security.
This study moves beyond the internal management view by proposing that an
organization plays the role and acts as an authority. This study has shown the importance
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of such an organization which can direct, govern, and control information security
through certain key players placed in another organization which acts as a subordinate.
Rather than looking at how groups of key players influence each other, this study
proposes that formal collections of key players have the power to influence. Such a
finding is a positive response to the argument that information security governance
elucidates the interaction between knowledgeable human agents and the wider social
system within which they are situated.

8.3.

Implications for Practice
The findings of this study point towards several implications for practice, which are

presented below. Information security is a managerial issue that requires commitment by
not only the internal key players such as executives, top management, middle
management, and employees, but also other similar organizations and the central
governance body operating in the sector. This study has depicted the relationship between
information security, information risk, and systemic risk, which resembles a domino
effect. The central governance body and subordinate organizations need to maintain a
mutually trusting institutional relationship in order to sustain sound information security.
In this sense, the central governance body might benefit from an assessment of how much
of its power is used to control and govern subordinate organizations into implementing
sound information security governance and practices. Vice versa, practitioners at
subordinate organizations might also benefit from carefully assessing the degree of
control and governance by the central governance body.
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Practitioners may also benefit from evaluating the importance of giving equal
treatment to technical controls, formal controls, and informal controls of information
security. Practitioners should realize that a routine implementation of these controls has
the potential to transform into a corporate security culture unique to an organization,
given the successful internalization of such controls in security implementation. While
security breach has been said to be just another phase in information security
implementation, any practitioner as a member of a social system should always be aware
of any threat of information risk and make every effort to mitigate such a risk. This study
has depicted that even when an organization is prepared, a security breach can affect that
organization indirectly due to security failure in another organization. This is an example
of the damaging impact of systemic risk.
Finally, information security should be made available to not only internal key
players, but also to customers and other similar organizations in the sector. Hence,
informal controls such as security education and awareness are as important as technical
controls and formal controls of information security. This study has shown how
customers can be gullible and may fall into a trap by perpetrators of unethical practices.
Furthermore, this study has demonstrated that these unethical perpetrators are very
creative and in fact do not even use state-of-the-art technology artifacts to breach security
(Dhillon 2007). Perpetrators simply prey on customers in the hope of duping them on the
basis of their gullibility and lack of security awareness of such customers. While
customers need to be constantly educated about the importance of information security
and the procedures for safeguarding information assets, other similar organizations in the
sector also need to understand the security culture and procedures of an organization. The
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EDC machine fraud has highlighted the lack of understanding and clarity of each other’s
security features, security artifacts and procedures amongst two banks.

8.4.

Limitations and Future Research Avenues
Like any other scientific product, this study unfortunately does not come free from

limitations. By presenting these limitations, exciting research avenues become available
for exploration to other scholars. Firstly, this study is conducted in a developing country.
An extant piece of literature by Schooner and Taylor (2009) has stated that too much
power and control by the Central Bank may actually limit the freedom of commercial
banks in exercising their information security governance and practices. Another similar
study in a developed country such as the United States should be conducted to present an
interesting parallel or comparison with this study.
Secondly, security policy and risk management are considered simply a component
in the institutionalization of information security. Security policy and risk management
are positioned as part of the formal controls of security that are automatically internalized
along with technical controls and informal controls during information security
institutionalization. A future study that places emphasis on the impact of internalizing
security policy on information security institutionalization could throw up interesting
findings. In addition, another study that focuses on risk management should be conducted
to see how mitigating information risk and information assurance can re-institutionalize
information security.
Thirdly, the commercial banks in the case studies are all large commercial banks
that boast of strong information systems from among their counterparts in Indonesia.
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There are in fact many other smaller commercial banks in rural areas using nonautomated information systems. Hence there is a tendency that this study favors
computerized information security that supports information security as a whole. Another
study should be conducted for the purpose of comparing information security governance
between commercial banks with automated information security, other commercial banks
with weak automated information security, and commercial banks with non-automated
information security. Furthermore, such a study needs to emphasize on the internalization
of information security governance and practices when drawing such a comparison.
Finally, this study has introduced several important concepts such as systemic risk
and micro-prudential supervision borrowed from the banking theory. This study however
focuses on the internal information security institutionalization in each commercial bank
and the Central Bank and also takes note of the relationship between the Central Bank
and all commercial banks. The latter is a subject that merits a closer examination and
another study should be conducted to focus mainly on the institutional relationship
between the central bank and a commercial bank in terms of information security and
highlight the impact of such relationship on other commercial banks using the systemic
risk concept.
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A

INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

Theoretical Element

Research Question

Interview Question
What is your position in your company?
Briefly describe your task and duties.

Inter-Level: Script Encoding

Internalization of
security governance and
practices by an
organization

Impact of external
governing body

Inter-Level: Principles Enactment

Impact of security
breaches
Internalization of
security governance and
practices by an
organization

Impact of external
governing body

Describe what you know about risk.
Who is in charge of constituting risk
policies and regulations in your
company?
Describe the policies and regulations of
using your company’s IT system.
Is there any specific reference or
guidance for risk policies and
regulations?
Does your company devise riskmanagement policies and procedures to
other commercial banks?
Describe what you know about a
security breach.
How is your company’s IT security
system maintained or enhanced?
How are these practices reflected in a
branch level?
What action do management/controller
personnel take to enforce security
culture in your company?
Who is in charge of enforcing and
controlling risk policies and regulations?
What is the institutional relationship
between your company and the central
bank?
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Impact of security
breaches

Internalization of
Inter-Level: Script Replication and security governance and
Revision
practices by an
organization

Has there been any security-breach
incident in your company or its
branches?
To whom do you report any security
breach incident?
Are risk policies and regulations in your
company periodically revised? How
often?
To whom are the risk policies and
regulations revision reported?
Who is in charge of receiving report and
revision from your company’s branches?
Who is in charge of receiving report and
revision in a branch level?
Who is in charge of revising risk policies
and regulations?
Do branch personnel have the authority
to constitute and revise risk policies and
regulations? Why?

Inter-Level: Patterned-Actions
Objectification and
Externalization

Internalization of
security governance and
practices by an
organization

Is your company’s IT security system
periodically maintained or enhanced?
How often?
Who is in charge of the IT security
system maintenance?
Who are the key players that enforce and
control risk policies and regulations in a
branch level?
How are these policies and regulations
enforced and governed in your
company’s branches?
What are the penalties for securitybreach incidents for employees?
What are the penalties for compliance
failure?
What is the practice of information
security governance in your company?
What are the frameworks used for
practicing information security
governance in your company?
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Impact of security
breaches

Intra-Level: Governance and
Control

Impact of external
governing body

Describe the implementation of
information security in your company
and what your contributions are for such
implementations?
How do you handle any security-breach
incident?
How does/would your company handle
security-breach incident?
How do commercial banks comply?
How do you expect commercial banks to
comply?
What penalties does your company
implement for any security-breach
incident in commercial banks?
How often do you expect commercial
banks to report their informationsecurity practices?
How do commercial banks report such
practices?

Intra-Level: Governance and
Control

Internalization of
security governance and
practices by an
organization

How does your organization comply
with the central bank's risk policies and
regulations?
How does your company report a
security-breach incident to the central
bank?
How does your company report its
information-security practices to the
central bank?
Has the central bank ever imposed any
penalty over any incident or compliance
failure? Examples?
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DATA

COLLECTION:

RECORDS

AND

SCHEDULE

Legend: EM: Executive Management
A: Authority
M: Management
OP: Operational Personnel
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Date

Organization

Centro
05/24/2010 Metropolitan
Bank

05/26/2010

Earl Capita
Bank

Earl Capita
05/31/2010
Bank

Subject

Vice
President of
IT Security
Dept.

IT Dept.
Manager
(Directorate
of
Information
Technology)
Head of Risk
Management
Team (Office
of Governor)

Time
Start

12:10 PM

2:00 PM

8:10 AM

Time
End

2:25 PM

4:00 PM

9:35 AM

Duration Interview? EM? A? M? OP?

1:15

2:00

1:25

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Focus Area

No

Organizational
background
briefing and
preliminary
interview.
Electronic
copies of
organizational
structure
obtained.

No

Research
presentation and
preliminary
interview.

No

Data collection:
Interview on
organizational
structure (script
encoding and
principles
enactment).
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Senior
Analysts
(Special Unit
2:20 PM
for
Information
Management)

Earl Capita
06/01/2010
Bank

06/02/2010

Earl Capita
Bank

Special Unit
for
Information
Management

2:00 PM

Senior
Analysts
(Special Unit 11:35
for
AM
Information
Management)

4:00 PM

3:35 PM

1:45 PM

1:40

1:35

2:10

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Introduction and
preliminary
interview.

Yes

Sharing session
with the UKMI's
personnel:
Dissertationproposal
presentation

No

Data collection:
Interview on
technical control
and
organizational
structure (script
encoding and
principles
enactment).
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Head of
Payment
Information
Systems
Regulator
(Directorate
of
Accounting
and Payment
System)
Head of
Payment
Information
Systems
Supervisor
(Directorate
of
Accounting
and Payment
System)

06/03/2010

Earl Capita
Bank

Head of
Payment
Information
Systems
Licensing
(Directorate
of
Accounting
and Payment
System)

3:40 PM

5:20 PM

8:25 AM

4:35 PM

5:45 PM

9:10 AM

55 min.

25 min.

45 min.

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Data collection:
Interview on
governance and
control of
macroprudential
supervision
theory.

No

Data collection:
Interview on
governance and
control of
macroprudential
supervision
theory.

No

Data collection:
Interview on
governance and
control of
macroprudential
supervision
theory.
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Senior IT
Researcher
(Directorate
of
Information
Technology)

9:30 AM

Analysts
(Special Unit
fot
2:00 PM
Information
Management)

10:50
AM

1:20

Yes

No

No

Yes

No

4:08 PM

2:08

Yes

No

No

No

Yes

Data collection:
Interview on
technical control
(principles
enactment,
script
replication, and
patternedactions
objectification
and
externalization).
Data collection:
Interview on
information
stewardship
(principles
enactment and
patternedactions
objectification
and
externalization).
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06/04/2010

Earl Capita
Bank

Senior
Analyst
(Special Unit
4:10 PM
for
Information
Management)

4:20 PM

10 min.

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

No

Senior
Analyst,
Analyst,
Junior
Analyst
(Directorate
of Bank
Licensing
and Banking
Information)

3:25 PM

1:00

Yes

No

No

Yes

Yes

2:25 PM

Data collection:
Interview on
information
stewardship
(principles
enactment,
script
replication, and
patternedactions
objectification
and
externalization).
Data collection:
Interview on
information
systems
management
and use (script
encoding,
principles
enactment,
script
replication, and
patternedactions
objectification
and
externalization).
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Earl Capita
06/07/2010
Bank

Head of Risk
Management
Team (Office
of Governor)

Senior
Analyst of
Public
Relation
Buerau
(Office of
Governor)

Head of
Strategic
Planning
Bureau
(Office of
Governor)

	
  

9:00 AM

10:35
AM

10:50
AM

10:05
AM

10:45
AM

11:50
AM

1:05

10 min.

1:00

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

No

Data collection:
Interview on
risk policies
(script encoding,
principles
enactment,
script
replication, and
patternedactions
objectification
and
externalization).

Yes

Data collection:
Interview on
risk policies and
management
(script
encoding).

No

Data collection:
Interview on
risk mitigation
and
implementation
(principles
enactment,
script
replication, and
patternedactions
objectification
267

and
externalization).

Senior
Researcher
(Directorate
of Banking
Research and
Regulation)

1:45 PM

2:55 PM

1:10

Yes

No

No

Yes

No

Data collection:
Interview on
policies
formulation,
control, and
implementation
(script encoding,
principles
enactment,
script
replication, and
patternedactions
objectification
and
externalization).
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06/08/2010

Earl Capita
Bank

Analyst
(Directorate
of Bank
Licensing
and Banking
Information)

11:10
AM

Senior
Analysts
(Special Unit
2:10 PM
for
Information
Management)

11:45
AM

35 min.

Yes

No

No

No

Yes

3:20 PM

1:10

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

No

Data collection:
Interview on
information
systems
management
and use (script
encoding,
principles
enactment,
script
replication, and
patternedactions
objectification
and
externalization).
Data collection:
interview on
information
stewardship and
security access
and control
(principles
enactment and
patternedactions
objectification
and
externalization).
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06/09/2010

06/10/2010

Earl Capita
Bank

Earl Capita
Bank

Head of IT
Operational
and Senior IT
Researcher
8:00 AM
(Directorate
of
Information
Technology)

9:02 AM

1:02

Yes

No

No

Yes

No

Senior Bank
Supervisor
(Directorate
of Bank
Supervision
3: Private
Banks)

11:00
AM

11:45
AM

45 min.

Yes

No

Yes

No

No

Head of Risk
Management
Team and
Analyst
(Office of
Governor)

9:00 AM

10:17
AM

1:17

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

No

Data collection:
Interview on
data recovery
plan (script
revision).

Data collection:
Interview on
governance and
control of
macroprudential
supervision
theory.
Data collection:
Interview on
risk
management
information
systems (script
encoding and
principles
enactment).
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Senior Bank
Supervisor
(Directorate
of Bank
Supervision
3: Private
Banks)

06/14/2010

Earl Capita
Bank

Head of
Payment
Information
Systems
Supervisor
(Directorate
of
Accounting
and Payment
System)
Head of
Payment
Information
Systems
Regulator
(Directorate
of
Accounting
and Payment
System)

2:00 PM

9:15 AM

12:00 PM

2:35 PM

9:25 AM

35 min.

10 min.

12:18 PM 18 min.

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

No

Data collection:
Interview on
governance and
control of
macroprudential
supervision
theory.

No

Data collection:
interview on
governance and
control of
macroprudential
supervision
theory.

No

Data collection:
Interview on
governance and
control of
macroprudential
supervision
theory.
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06/15/2010

06/18/2010

Earl Capita
Bank

Bank
Supervisors
(Directorate
of Bank
Supervision
1: State
Banks)

9:40 AM

11:30
AM

1:50

Yes

No

Yes

No

No

Blue Sequoia
Bank

Head of
Compliance,
IT Analyst,
and Head of
Human
Resource

2:45 PM

3:40 PM

55 min.

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Earl Capita
Bank

Senior IT
Researcher
(Directorate
of
Information
Technology)

3:25 PM

3:35 PM

10 min.

Yes

No

No

Yes

No

Data collection:
Interview on
governance and
control of
macroprudential
supervision
theory.
Organizational
background
briefing and
dissertationproposal
presentation.
Data collection:
Interview on
security for
intranet,
internet, and
email (script
encoding,
principles
enactment,
script revision
and replication,
and patternedactions
objectification
and
externalization).
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Centro
06/21/2010 Metropolitan
Bank

Operational
Group Head,
Business
Operation
Improvement
11:10
Dept. Head,
AM
and Domestic
Payment
Dept. Head
(Central
Operation)

11:35
AM

25 min.

Yes

No

No

Yes

No

IT Audit Unit
Head
4:43 PM
(Internal
Audit Dept.)

5:45 PM

1:02

Yes

No

No

Yes

No

Data collection:
Interview on
information
systems
management
and use (script
encoding,
principles
enactment,
script
replication, and
patternedactions
objectification
and
externalization).
Data collection:
Interview on
security
implementation
(script encoding,
principles
enactment,
script
replication, and
patternedactions
objectification
and
externalization).
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Centro
06/22/2010 Metropolitan
Bank

Assistent of
Mass
16:00
Banking Vice
President

16:11

11 min.

No

No

Yes

Yes

No

Research
introduction.

Centro
06/24/2010 Metropolitan
Bank

Vice
President of
IT Security
Dept.

2:08 PM

3:15 PM

1:07

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

No

Data collection:
Interview on
security for
debit card and
ATM
infrastructure,
hardware, and
software
(principles
enactment and
patternedactions
objectification
and
externalization).

Centro
06/25/2010 Metropolitan
Bank

Operational
Risk
Management
Team Leader

9:05 AM

9:25 AM

20 min.

No

No

Yes

Yes

No

Research
introduction.
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Assistent of
Mass
3:35 PM
Banking Vice
President

4:40 PM

1:05

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

No

Data collection:
Interview on on
security for
debit card and
ATM
infrastructure,
hardware, and
software (script
encoding,
principles
enactment, and
patternedactions
objectification
and
externalization).
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Centro
06/29/2010 Metropolitan
Bank

Centro
06/30/2010 Metropolitan
Bank

IT Audit Unit
Head
8:50 AM
(Internal
Audit Dept.)

Operational
Risk
Management
Team Leader

4:15 PM

9:38 AM

5:15 PM

48 min.

1:00

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Data collection:
interview on
conformity and
report of macroprudential
supervision
theory and on
security for
debit card and
ATM
infrastructure,
hardware, and
software
(principles
enactment,
script replication
and revision,
and patternedactions
objectification
and
externalization).

No

Data collection:
interview on
information risk
management
(script encoding,
principles
enactment, and
script revision
and replication).
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Centro
07/01/2010 Metropolitan
Bank

Assistent of
Mass
5:33 PM
Banking Vice
President

6:10 PM

37 min.

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

No

Centro
07/05/2010 Metropolitan
Bank

Vice
President of
IT Security
Dept.

4:53 PM

53 min.

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

No

4:00 PM

Data collection:
Interview on
debit-card
transaction and
security
(principles
enactment,
script revision,
patternedactions
objectification
and
externalization).
Data collection:
Interview on
security policies
(script encoding,
principles
enactment,
script
replication, and
patternedactions
objectification
and
externalization).
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Centro
07/08/2010 Metropolitan
Bank

Centro
07/09/2010 Metropolitan
Bank

E-Banking
Product
Manager

8:15 AM

IT Audit Unit
Head
9:18 AM
(Internal
Audit Dept.)

9:26 AM

10:15
AM

1:11

57 min.

Yes

Yes

No

No

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

No

Data collection:
Interview on
electronic and
card payment
(principles
enactment and
patternedactions
objectification
and
externalization).

No

Data collection:
Interview on
security policies
formulation and
implementation
(script encoding
and script
replication and
revision) and
conformity and
report of macroprudential
supervision
theory.
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Centro
07/12/2010 Metropolitan
Bank

Operational
Risk
Management
Team Leader

4:18 PM

4:56 PM

38 min.

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

No

Centro
07/13/2010 Metropolitan
Bank

Vice
President of
Head
Corporate
Center Audit

9:13 AM

9:40 AM

27 min.

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Centro
07/15/2010 Metropolitan
Bank

Vice
President of
Compliance
Group

10:18
AM

11:25
AM

1:07

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Data collection:
Interview on
conformity and
report of macroprudential
supervision
theory.
Data collection:
Interview on
confidential data
(principles
enactment and
patternedactions
objectification
and
externalization).
Data collection:
Interview on
conformity and
report of macroprudential
supervision
theory.
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IT Audit Unit
Head
2:10 PM
(Internal
Audit Dept.)

2:50 PM

40 min.

Yes

No

No

Yes

No

Operational
Risk
Management
Team Leader

4:35 PM

15 min.

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

No

4:20 PM

Data collection:
Interview on
security breach
and incidental
case (script
encoding,
principles
enactment,
script revision,
and patternedactions
objectification
and
externalization).
Data collection:
Interview on
security breach
and incidental
case (script
encoding,
principles
enactment,
script revision,
and patternedactions
objectification
and
externalization).
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Centro
07/16/2010 Metropolitan
Bank

Vice
President of
IT Security
Dept.

2:23 PM

3:33 PM

1:10

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

No

Centro
07/19/2010 Metropolitan
Bank

Assistent of
Mass
5:53 PM
Banking Vice
President

6:25 PM

32 min.

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

No

Data collection:
Interview on
security breach
and incidental
case (script
encoding,
principles
enactment,
script revision,
and patternedactions
objectification
and
externalization).
Data collection:
Interview on
security breach
and incidental
case (script
encoding,
principles
enactment,
script revision,
and patternedactions
objectification
and
externalization).
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Blue Sequoia
07/20/2010
Bank

Head of
Enterprise
Security
Group

10:15
AM

11:23
AM

1:08

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Blue Sequoia
07/29/2010
Bank

Head of
Enterprise
Security
Group

10:08
AM

11:12
AM

1:04

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Data collection:
Interview on
information risk,
control, and
security policy
(script encoding,
principles
enactment, and
patternedactions
objectification
and
externalization).
Data collection:
Interview on
security
implementation
and security
policies (script
encoding,
principles
enactment,
script
replication, and
patternedactions
objectification
and
externalization).
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Blue Sequoia
Bank

Head of
Electronic
Banking
Operation
Group

3:32 PM

4:26 PM

1:06

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Blue Sequoia
08/10/2010
Bank

Head of
Enterprise
Security
Group

2:13 PM

3:48 PM

1:35

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

08/02/2010

Data collection:
Interview on
debit-card and
electronic
payment
(principles
enactment,
script
replication, and
patternedactions
objectification
and
externalization).
Data collection:
Interview on
security
implementation
and security
breach incident
(script encoding,
principles
enactment,
script replication
and revision,
and patternedactions
objectification
and
externalization).
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Blue Sequoia
08/12/2010
Bank

08/16/2010

Blue Sequoia
Bank

Head of
Enterprise
Security
Group

2:13 PM

2:48 PM

35 min.

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Compliance
Advisor

1:35 PM

2:28 PM

53 min.

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

Data collection:
Interview on
technical
controls and
security
technologies
(principles
enactment and
patternedactions
objectification
and
externalization).
Data collection:
Interview on
security policies
formulation
(script
encoding) and
conformity and
report of macroprudential
supervision
theory.
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08/16/2010

Blue Sequoia
Bank

Head of
Electronic
Banking
Operation
Group

3:05 PM

3:40 PM

35 min.

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Data collection:
Interview on
debit-card
payment
(principles
enactment and
patternedactions
objectification
and
externalization).
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Muhamad Faisal Fariduddin Attar Nasution was born on November 27, 1978 in Jakarta,
Indonesia. He is the first son of Dr. Darmin Nasution and Salsia Ulfa Sahabi Manoppo. He
visited France to accompany his father who was pursuing a masters and doctoral degree in
developmental economic study at the Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne and spent 5 years of
his childhood living in Antony, a suburb of Paris. In the late of 1985, he returned to Jakarta,
Indonesia, where he spent his remaining childhood and his adolescent period. He consistently
ranked in the top 1% during his high-school career and was accepted to the prestigious
Universitas Indonesia where he received his Sarjana Ilmu Komputer degree (equivalent to the
U.S. Bachelor of Science in Computer Science) in 2002. He graduated with satisfactory predicate
and subsequently worked at the Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency (IBRA) in 2002 as a
contract web-based systems analyst programmer for one year.
Fari soon received the Indonesia’s Upstream Oil and Gas Executive Agency Scholarship
in 2003 and embarked on his graduate study in the United States. He enrolled at the University of
Missouri at Saint Louis where he received his MBA degree in general business administration in
2005. Upon graduation, he was hired as an external temporary consultant with the World Bank
Group at Washington, D.C., where he assisted data collection for the South-East Asia National
Single Window project.
In 2006, Fari was accepted to the doctoral program in information systems at Virginia
Commonwealth University School of Business. During his tenure at VCU, Fari was awarded a
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graduate assistantship that covered his tuition costs and stipend. Employed as an adjunct
instructor, Fari gained a significant experience in teaching technical-subject courses and
managerial-subject courses such as computer hardware and software, database systems,
fundamental data communications, and systems analysis and design. He also received his first
taste of teaching a large class when he taught business information systems.
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